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Abstract
The enforcement of sensitive policies in untrusted environments is still an open challenge
for policy-based systems. On the one hand, taking any appropriate security decision re-
quires access to these policies. On the other hand, if such access is allowed in an untrusted
environment then confidential information might be leaked by the policies. The key chal-
lenge is how to enforce sensitive policies and protect content in untrusted environments.
In the context of untrusted environments, we mainly distinguish between outsourced and
distributed environments. The most attractive paradigms concerning outsourced and
distributed environments are cloud computing and opportunistic networks, respectively.
In this dissertation, we present the design, technical and implementation details of our
proposed policy-based access control mechanisms for untrusted environments. First of all,
we provide full confidentiality of access policies in outsourced environments, where service
providers do not learn private information about policies during the policy deployment
and evaluation phases. Our proposed architecture is such that we are able to support
expressive policies and take into account contextual information before making any access
decision. The system entities do not share any encryption keys and even if a user is
deleted, the system is still able to perform its operations without requiring any action.
For complex user management, we have implemented a policy-based Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) mechanism, where users are assigned roles, roles are assigned permissions
and users execute permissions if their roles are active in the session maintained by service
providers. Finally, we offer the full-fledged RBAC policies by incorporating role hierarchies
and dynamic security constraints.
In opportunistic networks, we protect content by specifying expressive access control
policies. In our proposed approach, brokers match subscriptions against policies associated
with content without compromising privacy of subscribers. As a result, an unauthorised
broker neither gains access to content nor learns policies and authorised nodes gain access
only if they satisfy fine-grained policies specified by publishers. Our proposed system
provides scalable key management in which loosely-coupled publishers and subscribers
communicate without any prior contact. Finally, we have developed a prototype of the
system that runs on real smartphones and analysed its performance.
i
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent advancements in technology have changed the way how electronic data is stored
and retrieved. Nowadays, individuals and enterprises are increasingly utilising remote
services (such as Dropbox [1], Google Cloud Storage [2] and Amazon Simple Storage
Service [3]), mainly for economical benefits. These services not only enable information
sharing but also ensure availability of data from anywhere at any time. However, the
growing use of remote services raises serious privacy issues by putting personal data at
risk, particularly when the servers offering such services are untrusted. Unfortunately,
servers get direct access to the data they store and process. For protecting sensitive data
from servers in untrusted environments, data could be encrypted before leaving trusted
boundaries. Regardless of whether the data is encrypted or not, the server will need
to decide who will gain access to it. For regulating access to the data, access control
policies could be specified. These are access control policies that will describe who can
gain access to the data. State-of-the-art policy-based systems can ensure enforcement of
these policies. However, the matter becomes complicated when sensitive policies, which
may leak private information, have to be enforced in untrusted environments.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
The enforcement of sensitive policies in untrusted environments is still an open challenge
for policy-based systems. On the one hand, taking any appropriate security decision re-
quires access to these policies. On the other hand, if such access is allowed in an untrusted
environment then confidential information might be leaked by the policies. The key chal-
lenge is how to enforce sensitive policies and protect data in untrusted environments. This
challenge arises from a fundamental question, i.e., how can we establish trust in untrusted
environments? By establishing trust in untrusted environments, we will enable individu-
als and enterprises to leverage business models based on untrusted environments. At the
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same time, we would be fostering trust of end-users by ensuring privacy and security of
their personal data.
According to Gartner, the cloud-based security (including access management) services
market will be worth $2.1 billion in 2013 and it will rise to $3.1 billion in 2015 [4]. This im-
plies that security (access management in particular) of outsourced data is a key problem
from a business analyst’s point of view. It is important to know that outsourced envi-
ronments are naturally untrusted. In the context of untrusted environments, we mainly
distinguish two scenarios: (i) outsourced environments and (ii) distributed environments.
The most attractive paradigms concerning outsourced and distributed environments are
cloud computing and opportunistic networks, respectively.
1.1.1 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm offering outsourced services to enterprises
for storing and processing a huge amount of data at very competitive costs. It promises
higher availability, scalability and more effective quality of service than in-house solutions.
In cloud computing, the outsourced piece of data is within easy reach of cloud service
providers. Unfortunately, one of the strong obstacles in widespread adoption of the cloud is
to preserve confidentiality of the data [5]. There are several techniques that can guarantee
confidentiality of data stored in outsourced environments while supporting basic search
capabilities [6–15]. However, they do not support access control policies to regulate access
to a particular subset of the stored data. State-of-the-art policy based mechanisms can
work only when they are deployed and operated within a trusted domain [16]. In an
untrusted environment, access policies may reveal sensitive information about the data
they aim to protect.
To understand how access policies may reveal sensitive information in outsourced
environments, let us imagine a scenario where a healthcare provider has outsourced its
health record management services to a third party service provider. In this scenario,
we do not trust the service provider to preserve data confidentiality. Therefore, we can
encrypt health records before storing them in the outsourced environment. Furthermore,
health records are associated with an access policy in order to prevent any unintended
access. Let us consider the following access policy: only a Cardiologist may access the
health record, which is attached to the health record. Even if the data is encrypted, a
curious service provider may still infer private information about the patient’s medical
conditions. In the example policy, a curious service provider may easily deduce that
the patient could have heart problems. A misbehaving service provider may sell this
information to banks that could deny the patient a loan given her health conditions.
There are solutions that aim at providing the fine-grained access control on data stored
2
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in outsourced environments [17–20]. However, those solutions are not suitable for scenarios
where administrative actions are taken dynamically; this is because any administrative
actions including updating access rights, adding users (or resources) and removing users
(or resources) require re-distribution of new keys, as well as re-encryption of existing data
with those keys. The core research issue is to develop an efficient scheme with flexible key
management that can enforce expressive access control policies in outsourced environments
without revealing private information to service providers.
1.1.2 Opportunistic Networks
Opportunistic networks are an emerging paradigm that has enabled individuals and enter-
prises to offer new services instantaneously. The fundamental reason behind this flexibility
is that this paradigm aims at providing services without requiring any in-house Informa-
tion Technology (IT) infrastructure [21]. Basically, opportunistic networks eliminate the
need of any Internet connectivity.
In opportunistic networks, nodes can publish their own content and subscribe to others’
content by indicating their interest. Any node can also act as a broker (also called a
relay) that opportunistically receives content and interest, matches them and possibly
delivers that content to other nodes. These opportunistic networks could be applied
to the exchange of information in a wide range of domains from social media to military
applications. Like cloud service providers, unauthorised brokers in opportunistic networks
may infer private information from cleartext policies even when contents are encrypted.
Let us consider a battlefield scenario where soldiers are interested in sharing or ac-
quiring sensitive information. We assume that there is no Internet connectivity in the
battlefield. However, soldiers can exchange information via the short-range communica-
tion offered by smartphones. Soldiers can publish their content and subscribe for content
of their interest. There are soldiers, known as brokers, who help to exchange content from
one place to another. However, those soldiers must not be able to get access to content.
For regulating access to content, a soldier, who is publishing, can encrypt content us-
ing state-of-the-art encryption techniques and specify an access policy describing which
group of soldiers can get access. For instance, the policy could be either a Soldier from
the Infantry unit or a Major can get access. Although the content is encrypted, soldiers
serving as brokers and attackers (enemy having access to smartphones of brokers), may
infer private information from cleartext policies, i.e., who will receive this content. Fur-
thermore, subscription information (containing interest of subscribers) might compromise
privacy of subscribers.
There are schemes that preserve predicate privacy [22, 23] and assume that the pred-
icate is evaluated at the receiver’s end. Shikfa et al. [24] propose a method that pro-
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vides privacy and confidentiality in context-based forwarding. However, their proposed
scheme disseminates information in one direction, i.e., from publishers to subscribers,
without taking into account whether a subscriber is interested or not. In the context
of publish-subscribe systems, there are many solutions that address privacy and security
issues [25–27]. However, state-of-the-art techniques are mainly based on centralised so-
lutions that cannot be applied to opportunistic networks, where each node may serve as
a publisher, a broker and a subscriber. The challenging research problem is to enable
exchange of content and interest without (i) revealing content and its associated policies
to unauthorised brokers and (ii) compromising the privacy of subscribers in opportunistic
networks.
1.2 Research Contributions
In this dissertation, we present the design, technical and implementation details of our
proposed policy-based access control mechanisms for untrusted environments. In this
section, we first discuss our research contributions in outsourced environments followed
by advancements in opportunistic networks.
1.2.1 Enforcement of Encrypted Policies in Outsourced Environments
One of the main research goals is to enforce access control decisions while protecting
access policies in outsourced environments. The core contributions concerning this part
are as follows:
• We provide full confidentiality of access policies such that service providers in out-
sourced environments do not learn private information about policies during the
policy deployment and evaluation phases.
• We support expressive access control policies, consider contextual conditions and
take into account contextual information before making any access decision. In
particular, our proposed solution is capable of handling complex policies involving
non-monotonic boolean expressions and range queries.
• The system entities do not share any encryption keys and even if a user is deleted
or revoked, the system is still able to perform its operations without requiring re-
encryption of data or access policies.
• For complex user management, we extend the basic policy enforcement mechanism to
introduce the basic RBAC policies, where users are assigned roles, roles are assigned
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permissions and users execute permissions if their roles are active in the session
maintained by the service provider.
• The basic RBAC policies are augmented with role hierarchies by enabling role in-
heritance.
• Finally, we integrate dynamic security constraints (including Dynamic Separation of
Duties and Chinese Wall) to provide the full-fledged RBAC policies in an outsourced
environment. The full-fledged RBAC policies are enforced without revealing any
private information to a curious service provider.
1.2.2 Enforcement of Encrypted Policies in Opportunistic Networks
The second research goal, which is even more challenging, is to propose a scheme that can
enable exchange of content and interest without (i) revealing content and its associated
policies to unauthorised brokers and (ii) compromising the privacy of subscribers. In the
following, we describe main contributions related to the aforementioned goal:
• We protect content by specifying access control policies. In opportunistic networks,
brokers match subscriber’s interest against policies associated with content without
compromising the subscriber’s privacy (say, by learning their interest or attributes).
• In our proposed solution, an unauthorised broker neither gains access to content
nor learns access policies and authorised nodes gain access only if they satisfy fine-
grained policies specified by the publishers.
• The system provides scalable key management in which loosely-coupled publishers
and subscribers communicate with each other without any prior contact.
• Finally, we have developed and analysed the performance of a prototype running on
real smartphones in order to show the feasibility of our approach.
1.3 Organisation of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of the follows chapters:
Chapter 2 proposes a policy-based access control mechanism that can deploy and enforce
sensitive policies in an encrypted manner. The proposed mechanism maintains a
clear separation between the security policies and the actual enforcement mechanism
without loss of confidentiality. Moreover, we show performance overheads of the
proposed algorithms.
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Chapter 3 extends the proposed solution in Chapter 2 for supporting the basic RBAC
policies. In this chapter, we also explain how the basic RBAC policies can incor-
porate role hierarchies. Furthermore, we provide a security analysis. Finally, we
compare performance overheads incurred by access control mechanisms with and
without RBAC models.
Chapter 4 explains how dynamic security policies (including Dynamic Separation of
Duties and Chinese Wall) can be enforced and integrated with RBAC models. This
chapter also shows performance overheads of the proposed algorithms.
Chapter 5 investigates how content could be encrypted and access control policies could
be enforced in distributed environments, in particular in opportunistic networks. We
propose a design and implement a scheme that can run on smartphones. Further-
more, we report some benchmarks of running the proposed cryptographic operations
on smartphones.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarising the chapters presented. It also
points out some future research directions emerging from this work.
Appendix A reports a list of publications (with the corresponding abstracts) related to
the work presented in this dissertation, as well as other publications.
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Chapter 2
ESPOON: Enforcing Encrypted
Security Policies in Outsourced
Environments⋆
Data outsourcing is a growing business model offering services to individuals and enter-
prises for processing and storing a huge amount of data. It is not only economical but
also promises higher availability, scalability, and more effective quality of service than in-
house solutions. Despite all its benefits, data outsourcing raises serious security concerns
for preserving data confidentiality. There are solutions for preserving confidentiality of
data while supporting search on the data stored in outsourced environments. However,
such solutions do not support access policies to regulate access to a particular subset of
the stored data.
The enforcement of sensitive policies in outsourced environments is still an open chal-
lenge for policy-based systems. On the one hand, taking the appropriate security decision
requires access to the policies. However, if such access is allowed in an untrusted environ-
ment then confidential information might be leaked by the policies. Current solutions are
based on cryptographic operations that embed security policies with the security mecha-
nism. Therefore, the enforcement of such policies is performed by allowing the authorised
parties to access the appropriate keys. We believe that such solutions are too rigid because
they strictly intertwine authorisation policies with the enforcement mechanism. In this
chapter, we address the issue of enforcing security policies in an outsourced environment
while protecting the policy confidentiality. Our solution aims at providing a clear separa-
tion between security policies and the enforcement mechanism. The proposed technique
does not reveal access policies and the access request.
⋆The preliminary version of this chapter has appeared in [28].
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, data outsourcing has become a very attractive business model. It offers
services to individuals and enterprises for processing and storing a huge amount of data
at very low cost. It promises higher availability, scalability, and more effective quality
of service than in-house solutions. Many sectors including government and healthcare,
initially reluctant to data outsourcing, are now adopting it [29].
Despite all its benefits, data outsourcing raises serious security concerns for preserving
data confidentiality. The main problem is that the data stored in outsourced environments
is within easy reach of service providers that could gain unauthorised access. There
are several solutions for guaranteeing confidentiality of data in outsourced environments.
For instance, solutions as those proposed in [30, 31] offer a protected data storage while
supporting basic search capabilities performed on the server without revealing information
about the stored data [6–15]. However, such solutions do not support access policies to
regulate the access to a particular subset of the stored data.
2.1.1 Motivation
Solutions for providing access control mechanisms in outsourced environments have mainly
focused on encryption techniques that couple access policies with a set of keys, such as
the one described in [32, 33]. Only users possessing a key (or a set of hierarchy-derivable
keys) are authorised to access the data. The main drawback of these solutions is that
security policies are tightly coupled with the security mechanism, thus incurring high
processing cost for performing any administrative change for both the users and the
policies representing the access rights.
A policy-based solution, such the one described for the Ponder language in [34], is
more flexible and easy to manage because it clearly separates the security policies from
the enforcement mechanism. However, policy-based access control mechanisms are not
designed to operate in outsourced environments. Such solutions can work only when they
are deployed and operated within a trusted domain (i.e., the computational environment
managed by the organisation owning the data). If these mechanisms are outsourced to an
untrusted environment, the access policies that are to be enforced on the server may leak
information on the data they are protecting. As an example, let us consider a scenario
where a hospital has outsourced its healthcare data management services to a third party
service provider. We assume that the service provider is honest-but-curious, similar to
the existing literature on data outsourcing (such as [20]), i.e., it is honest to perform the
required operations as described in the protocol but curious to learn information about
stored or exchanged data. In other words, the service provider does not preserve data
8
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confidentiality. A patient’s medical record should be associated with an access policy in
order to prevent an unintended access. The data is stored with an access policy. As
an example, let us consider the following access policy: only a Cardiologist may access
the data. From this policy, it is possible to infer important information about the user’s
medical conditions (even if the actual medical record is encrypted). This policy reveals
that a patient could have heart problems. A misbehaving service provider may sell this
information to banks that could deny the patient a loan given her health conditions.
2.1.2 Research Contributions
In this chapter, we present a policy-based access control mechanism for outsourced envi-
ronments where we support full confidentiality of access policies. We named our solution
Enforcing Sensitive Policies in Outsourced envirOnmeNts (ESPOON). One of
the main advantages of ESPOON is that we maintain the clear separation between the se-
curity policies and the actual enforcement mechanism without loss of confidentiality. This
can be guaranteed under the assumption that the service provider is honest-but-curious.
Our approach allows us to implement the access control mechanism as an outsourced
service with all the benefits associated with this business model without compromising
the confidentiality of the policies. Summarising, the research contributions of our ap-
proach are threefold. First of all, the service provider does not learn private information
about policies and the requester’s attributes during the policy evaluation process. Sec-
ond, ESPOON is capable of handling complex policies involving non-monotonic boolean
expressions and range queries. Third, the system entities do not share any encryption
keys and even if a user is deleted or revoked, the system is still able to perform its op-
erations without requiring re-encryption of the policies. As a proof-of-concept, we have
implemented a prototype of our access control mechanism and analysed its performance
to quantify the incurred overhead.
2.1.3 Chapter Outline
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we review the related
work. Section 2.3 describes the proposed approach. Solution and algorithmic details are
explained in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5, respectively. The performance overhead of the
proposed solution is reported in Section 2.6. A discussion is provided in Section 2.7.
Finally, we summarise this chapter in Section 2.8.
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2.2 Related Work
Work on outsourcing data storage to a third party has been focusing on protecting the
data confidentiality within the outsourced environment. Several techniques have been
proposed allowing authorised users to perform efficient queries on the encrypted data
while not revealing information on the data and the query [30, 35–44]. However, these
techniques do not support the case of users having different access rights over the protected
data. Their assumption is that once a user is authorised to perform search operations,
there are no restrictions on the queries that can be performed and the data that can be
accessed [6–15].
The idea of using an access control mechanism in an outsourced environment was
initially explored in [19,20,33]. In this approach, De Capitani di Vimercati et al. provide
a selective encryption strategy for enforcing access control policies. The idea is to have a
selective encryption technique where each user has a different key capable of decrypting
only the resources a user is authorised to access. In their scheme, a public token catalogue
expresses key derivation relationships. However, the public catalogue contains tokens in
the clear that express the key derivation structure. The tokens could leak information on
access control policies and on the protected data. To circumvent the issue of information
leakage, in [32] De Capitani di Vimercati et al. provide an encryption layer to protect
the public token catalogue. This requires each user to obtain the key for accessing a
resource by traversing the key derivation structure. The key derivation structure is a graph
built (using access key hierarchies [45]) from a classical access matrix. There are several
issues related to this scheme. First, the algorithm of building key derivation structure
is very time consuming. Any administrative actions to update access rights require the
users to obtain new access keys derived from the rebuilt key derivation structure and it
consequently requires data re-encryption with new access keys. Therefore, the scheme is
not very scalable and may be suitable for a static environment where users and resources
do not change very often. Second, the scheme does not support complex policies where
contextual information may be used for granting access rights. For instance, only specific
time and location information associated with an access request may be legitimate to
grant access to a user.
Another possible approach for implementing an access control mechanism is protecting
the data with an encryption scheme where the keys can be generated from the user’s
credentials (expressing attributes associated with that user). Although these approaches
are not devised particularly for outsourced environments, it is still possible to use them
as access control mechanisms in outsourced settings. For instance, a recent work by
Narayan et al. [46] employ the variant of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) proposed
10
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in [47] (i.e., Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE)) to construct an
outsourced healthcare system where patients can securely store their Electronic Health
Record (EHR). In their solution, each EHR is associated with a secure search index to
provide search capabilities while guaranteeing no information leakage. However, one of the
problems associated with CP-ABE is that the access structure, representing the security
policy associated with the encrypted data, is not protected. Therefore, a curious storage
provider might get information on the data by accessing the attributes expressed in the
CP-ABE policies. The problem of having the access structure expressed in cleartext affects
in general all the ABE constructions [47–50]. Therefore, this mechanism is not suitable
for guaranteeing confidentiality of access control policies in outsourced environments.
Related to the issue of the confidentiality of the access structure, the hidden credentials
scheme presented in [51] allows one to decrypt ciphertexts while the involved parties never
reveal their policies and credentials to each other. Data can be encrypted using an access
policy containing monotonic boolean expressions which must be satisfied by the receiver
to get access to the data. A passive adversary may deduce the policy structure, i.e., the
operators (AND, OR, m-of-n threshold encryption) used in the policy but she does not
learn what credentials are required to fulfil the access policy unless she possesses them.
Bradshaw et al. [52] extend the original hidden credentials scheme to limit the partial
disclosure of the policy structure and speed up the decryption operations. However, in
this scheme, it is not easy to support non-monotonic boolean expressions and range queries
in the access policy. Furthermore, hidden credentials schemes assume that the involved
parties are online all the time to run the protocol.
The homomorphic encryption schemes [53–59] allow untrusted parties to perform
mathematical operations on encrypted data without compromising the encryption. There
are a number of issues with these schemes. The major issue is scalability. Unfortunately,
state-of-the-art schemes are not suitable in practice for processing a huge amount of
data due to computational limitations. Another problem is the key management. These
schemes consider a single user that can perform the decryption. Basically, we are inter-
ested in schemes that can offer encryption and decryption in a multi-user setting, where
each user should have her private key (i.e., different from other users).
The data could be distributed along with the sticky policy attached to it [60–62]. The
data is basically encrypted with the sticky policy. For getting access to the data, the
recipient needs to contact trusted authorities. The trusted authority grants access to the
data by forwarding the decryption key to the recipient. Before sending the decryption key,
the trusted authority verifies credentials of the recipient. Furthermore, this approach en-
ables the trusted authority to take into account consent of the data owner before granting
the access. However, approaches based on the sticky policies are not privacy preserving
11
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because both policies and credentials are in cleartext.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols allow users to retrieve information with-
out revealing queries to the server [63–70]. Basically, they can be deployed for fetching
information from curious servers without compromising privacy of users, though they
are computationally intensive. However, it is not clear how PIR protocols can help in a
situation where the policy enforcement mechanism is delegated to third parties.
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Figure 2.1: The ESPOON architecture for enforcing policies in outsourced environments
2.3 The ESPOON Approach
We propose Enforcing Sensitive Policies in Outsourced envirOnmeNts (ESPOON) that
aims at providing a policy-based access control mechanism that can be deployed in an
outsourced environment. Figure 2.1 illustrates the proposed architecture that has similar
components as the widely accepted architecture for policy-based management proposed
by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [71]. In ESPOON, the Admin User deploys
(i) access policies to the Administration Point that stores (ii) the policies in the Policy
Store. Whenever a Requester, say a doctor, needs to access the data, a request is sent
to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) (1). This request includes the Requester’s
identifier (subject), the requested data (target) and the action to be performed. The PEP
12
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(2) forwards the access request to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP (3)
obtains the policies matching against the access request from the Policy Store and (4)
retrieves the contextual information from the Policy Information Point (PIP). The
contextual information may include the environmental and Requester’s attributes under
which an access can be considered valid. For instance, a doctor should only access the data
during office hours. For simplicity, we assume that the PIP collects all required attributes
including the Requester’s attributes and sends all of them together in one go. Moreover,
we assume that the PIP is deployed in the trusted environment. However if attributes
forgery is an issue, then the PIP can request a trusted authority to sign the attributes
before sending them to the PDP. The PDP evaluates the policies against the attributes
provided by the PIP checking if the contextual information satisfies any policy conditions
and sends to the PEP the access response (5). In case of permit, the PEP forwards the
access action to the Data Store (6). Otherwise, in case of deny, the requested action is
not forwarded. Optionally, a response can be sent to the Requester (7) with either success
or failure.
The main difference with the standard proposed by IETF is that the ESPOON archi-
tecture for the policy-based access control is outsourced in an untrusted environment (see
Figure 2.1). The trusted environment comprises only a minimal IT infrastructure that is
the applications used by the Admin Users and Requesters, together with the PIP. This
reduces the cost of maintaining an IT infrastructure. Having the reference architecture
in the cloud increases its availability and provides a better load balancing compared to
a centralised approach. Additionally, ESPOON guarantees that the confidentiality of the
policies is protected while their evaluation is executed in the outsourced environment.
This allows a more efficient evaluation of the policies. For instance, a naive solution
would see the encrypted policies stored in the cloud and the PDP deployed in the trusted
environment. At each evaluation, the encrypted policies would be sent to the PDP that
decrypts the policies for a cleartext evaluation. After that, the policies need to be en-
crypted and send back to the cloud. The Service Provider where the architecture is
outsourced is honest-but-curious. This means that the provider allows the ESPOON com-
ponents to follow the specified protocols, but it may be curious to find out information
about the data and the policies regulating the accesses to the data. As for the data, we
assume that the confidentiality data is protected by one of the several techniques available
for outsourced environments (see [30, 43, 44, 72]). However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no solution that can address the problem of guaranteeing policy confidentiality
while allowing an efficient evaluation mechanism that is clearly separated from the se-
curity policies. Most of the techniques discussed in the related work section require the
security mechanism to be tightly coupled with the policies. In the following section, we
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can show that it is possible to maintain a generic PDP separated from the security poli-
cies and able to take access decisions based on the evaluation of encrypted policies. In
this way, the policy confidentiality can be guaranteed against a curious provider and the
functionality of the access control mechanism is not restricted.
2.3.1 The System Model
Before presenting the details of the scheme used in ESPOON, it is necessary to discuss
the system model. In this section, we identify the following system entities.
• Admin User: This type of user is responsible for the administration of the policies
stored in the outsourced environment. An Admin User can deploy new policies or
update/delete the policies already deployed.
• Requester: A Requester is a user that requests an access (e.g., read, write, search,
etc.) over the data residing in the outsourced environment. Before the access is
permitted, the policies deployed in the outsourced environment are evaluated.
• Service Provider: The Service Provider is responsible for managing the outsourced
computation environment, where the ESPOON components are deployed and to
store the data, and access policies. It is assumed the Service Provider is honest-but-
curious, i.e., it allows the components to follow the protocol to perform the required
actions but curious to deduce information about the exchanged and stored policies.
• Trusted Key Management Authority (TKMA): The TKMA is fully trusted
and responsible for generating and revoking the keys. For each type of authorised
users (both the Admin User and Requester), the TKMA generates a key pair and
securely transmits one part of the generated key pair to the user and the other to
the Service Provider. The TKMA is deployed on the trusted environment. Although
requiring a TKMA seems at odds with the needs of outsourced the IT infrastruc-
ture, we argue that the TKMA requires less resources and less management effort.
Securing the TKMA is much easier since a very limited amount of data needs to be
protected and the TKMA can be kept offline most of time.
It should be clarified that in our settings an Admin User is not interested in protecting
the confidentiality of access policies from other Admin Users and Requesters. Here, the
main goal is to protect the confidentiality of access policies from the Service Provider.
14
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2.3.2 Representation of Policies
In this section, we provide an informal description of the policy representation used in
our approach. In this chapter, we deal with only positive authorisation policies. This
means that, as default no actions are allowed unless at least one authorisation policy can
be applicable to the request.
if 〈CONDITION 〉 then can 〈S,A, T 〉
Figure 2.2: Representation of policies in ESPOON
In our approach, an authorisation policy is represented as a condition and a tu-
ple as illustrated in Figure 2.2. This authorisation policy is interpreted as follows: if
CONDITION is true then the subject S can execute the action A on the target T . At
the time when a request is made, the information about the subject, the action that is
requested and the target resource is collected by the Requester. The PIP collects several
attributes representing the context in which the request is being executed and sends them
to the PDP.
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Figure 2.3: An example of a contextual condition illustrating Location = Cardiology-ward and
AT > 9#5 and AT < 17#5
The PIP collects and sends required contextual information to the PDP. To represent
contextual conditions, we use the tree structure described in [47] for CP-ABE policies.
This tree structure allows an Admin User to express contextual conditions as conjunctions
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and disjunctions of equalities and inequalities. Internal nodes of the tree structure are
AND, OR or threshold gates (e.g., 2 of 3) and leaf nodes are values of condition predicates
either string or numerical. In the tree structure, a string comparison is represented by a
single leaf node. However, the tree structure uses the bag of bits representation to support
comparisons between numerical values that could express time, date, location, age, or any
numerical identifier. For instance, let us consider a contextual condition stating that the
Requester location should be Cardiology-ward and that the access time should be between
9:00 and 17:00 hrs. Figure 2.3 illustrates the tree structure representing this contextual
condition, where access time is in a 5-bit representation (i.e., #5).
Let us consider CONDITION illustrated in Figure 2.3 requiring location of Requester
and access time. We assume the Requester makes the request when she is in Cardiology-
ward and Access Time (AT) is 10:00 hrs. The PIP collects and then transforms this con-
textual information as follows: Location = Cardiology-ward , AT : 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗, AT : ∗1 ∗ ∗∗,
AT : ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ ∗, AT : ∗ ∗ ∗1∗, AT : ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 , where AT is in a 5-bit representation (same
as it is in CONDITION ). After performing transformation, the PIP sends contextual
information to the PDP. The PDP receives contextual information and then evaluates
CONDITION by first matching attributes in contextual information against leaf-nodes
in the CONDITION tree and then evaluating internal nodes according to AND and OR
gates.
In this policy representation, the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple and the leaf nodes in the condition
tree are in clear text. Therefore, such information is easily accessible in the outsourced
environment and may leak information about the data that the policies protect. In the
following, we show how such representation can be protected while allowing the PDP to
evaluate the policies against the request.
2.4 Solution Details of ESPOON
The main idea of our approach is to use an encryption scheme for protecting the con-
fidentiality of the policies while allowing the PDP to perform the correct evaluation of
the policies. We noticed that the operation performed by the PDP for evaluating policies
is similar to the search operation executed in a database. In particular, in our case the
condition of a policy is the query; and the data that is matched against the query is
represented by the attributes that the Requester sends in the request.
As a starting point, we consider the multiuser Searchable Data Encryption (SDE)
scheme proposed by Dong et al. in [30]. The SDE scheme allows an untrusted server to
perform searches over encrypted data without revealing to the server information on both
the data and elements used in the request. The advantage of this method is that it offers
16
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multi-user access without requiring key sharing between users. Each user in the system
has a unique set of keys. The data encrypted by one user can be decrypted by any other
authorised user. However, the SDE implementation in [30] is only able to perform keyword
comparison based on equalities. One of the major extensions of our implementation is
that we are able to support the evaluation of contextual conditions containing complex
boolean expressions such as non-conjunctive and range queries in multi-user settings.
In general, we distinguish four phases in ESPOON for managing lifecycle of policies
in outsourced environments. These phases include initialisation, policy deployment,
policy evaluation and user revocation. In the following, we provide the details of the
algorithms used in each phase.
2.4.1 The Initialisation Phase
Before the policy deployment and policy evaluation phases, the SDE scheme needs to be
initialised. This is required for generating the required key material. The following two
algorithms that need to be run:
• The initialisation algorithm Init (Algorithm 2.1) is run by the TKMA. It takes as
input the security parameter 1k and outputs the public parameters params and the
master secret key set msk.
• The user key sets generation algorithm KeyGen (Algorithm 2.2) is run by the
TKMA. It takes as input the master secret key set msk and the user (Admin User
or Requester) identity i and generates two key sets Kui and Ksi. The TKMA
sends key sets Kui and Ksi to the user i and the Key Store, respectively. Only the
Administration Point, PDP and PEP are authorised to access the Key Store.
2.4.2 The Policy Deployment Phase
The policy deployment phase is executed when a new set of policies needs to be deployed
on the Policy Store (or an existing version of policies needs to be updated). This phase
is executed by the Admin User who edits the policies in a trusted environment. Before
the policies leave the trusted environment, they need to be encrypted. Our policy repre-
sentation consists of two parts: one for representing the condition and the other for the
〈S,A, T 〉 tuple. Each part is encrypted using the following algorithms:
• The access policy condition encryption algorithm ConditionEnc (Algorithm 2.5) is
run by the Admin User i. It takes as input a contextual condition and the user side
key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and outputs the encrypted contextual
condition.
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• The access policy 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple encryption algorithm SATEnc (Algorithm 2.7) is
run by the Admin User i. It takes as input the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple and Kui and outputs
the client encrypted tuple c∗i (〈S,A, T 〉).
When the encrypted policy is sent to the outsourced environment, then another en-
cryption round is performed. This is accomplished using the following algorithms:
• The access policy condition re-encryption algorithm ConditionReEnc (Algorithm
2.6) is run by the Administration Point. It takes as input the client encrypted
contextual condition and the key Ksi corresponding to the Admin User i and outputs
the server encrypted contextual condition.
• The access policy 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple re-encryption algorithm SATReEnc (Algorithm
2.8) is run by the Administration Point. It takes as input the client encrypted tuple
c∗i (〈S,A, T 〉) and the key Ksi corresponding to the Admin User i and outputs the
re-encrypted tuple c(〈S,A, T 〉).
The access policy can be now stored in the Policy Store. The stored policies do not
reveal any information about the data because they are stored as encrypted.
2.4.3 The Policy Evaluation Phase
The policy evaluation phase is executed when a Requester makes a request to access the
data. Before the access permission is granted, the PDP evaluates the matching policies
in the Policy Store on the Service Provider. The request contains the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple.
This information is encrypted using the following algorithm before it leaves the trusted
environment:
• The 〈S,A, T 〉 request encryption algorithm SATRequest (Algorithm 2.12) is run
by Requester j. It takes as input the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple and Kuj and outputs the client
encrypted tuple T ∗j (〈S,A, T 〉).
The Requester sends the encrypted 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple to the Service Provider. The policy
evaluation phase on the Service Provider side starts with searching all the policies in the
Policy Store matching against the Requester 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple. This is accomplished by the
following algorithm:
• The 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple search algorithm SATSearch (Algorithm 2.13) is run by the
PDP. It takes as input the client encrypted tuple T ∗j (〈S,A, T 〉) from Requester j and
all stored policies in the Policy Store c(〈Si, Ai, Ti〉)1≤i≤n and returns the matching
tuples in the Policy Store.
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If any match is found in the Policy Store then the PDP needs to match the contextual
information against the access policy condition corresponding to the matched tuple. The
PDP fetches the contextual information including Requester and environmental attributes
from the PIP. The PIP encrypts the contextual information using the following algorithm:
• The attributes encryption algorithm AttributesRequest (Algorithm 2.14) is run
by the PIP j. It takes as input the Requester and environmental attributes and Kuj
and outputs the encrypted attributes.
After receiving the contextual information from the PIP, the PDP matches the PIP
attributes against the access policy condition. The PDP calls the following algorithm to
evaluate the access policy condition:
• The access policy condition evaluation algorithm ConditionEvaluation (Algo-
rithm 2.15) is run by the PDP. It takes as input a list of encrypted attributes,
the key Ksj corresponding to the PIP j and encrypted access policy condition tree
and outputs true on successful policy evaluation and false otherwise.
2.4.4 The User Revocation Phase
The proposed solution offers revocation of a user (an Admin User or a Requester). For
this purpose, the Administration Point runs the following algorithm:
• A user (an Admin User or a Requester) revocation algorithm UserRevocation
(Algorithm 2.17) is run by the Administration Point. Given the user i, the Admin-
istration Point removes the corresponding server side key Ksi from the Key Store.
2.5 Algorithmic Details of ESPOON
In this section, we provide details of algorithms used in each phase for managing lifecycle
of policies. All these algorithms constitute the proposed schema.
2.5.1 The Initialisation Phase
In this phase, the system is initialised and then the TKMA generates required keying
material for entities in ESPOON. During the system initlisation, the TKMA takes a
security parameter k and outputs the public parameters params and the master key set
msk by running Init illustrated in Algorithm 2.1. The detail of Init is as follows: the
TKMA generates two prime numbers p and q of size k such that q divides p− 1 (Line 1).
Then, it creates a cyclic group G with a generator g such that G is the unique order q
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Algorithm 2.1 Init
Description: It generates the system level keying material including public parameters and the
master secret.
Input: A security parameter 1k.
Output: The public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
1: Generate primes p and q of size 1k such that q | p− 1
2: Create a generator g such that G is the unique order q subgroup of Z∗p
3: Choose a random x ∈ Z∗q
4: h← gx
5: Choose a collision-resistant hash function H
6: Choose a pseudorandom function f
7: Choose a random key s for f
8: params← (G, g, q, h,H, f)
9: msk← (x, s)
return (params,msk)
subgroup of Z∗p (Line 2). Next, it randomly chooses x ∈ Z
∗
q (Line 3) and compute h as g
x
(Line 4). Next, it chooses a collision-resistant hash function H (Line 5), a pseudorandom
function f (Line 6) and a random key s for f (Line 7). Finally, it publicises the public
parameters params = (G, g, q, h,H, f) (Line 8) and keeps securely the master secret key
msk = (x, s) (Line 9).
Algorithm 2.2 KeyGen
Description: For each user, it generates two key sets: one for the user while other for the
server.
Input: The master secret key msk, the user identity i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client side key set Kui and server side key set Ksi .
1: Choose a random xi1 ∈ Z
∗
q
2: xi2 ← x− xi1
3: Kui ← (xi1, s)
4: Ksi ← (i, xi2)
return (Kui ,Ksi)
For each user (including an Admin User and a Requester), the TKMA generates the
keying material. For generating the keying material, the TKMA takes the master secret
key msk, the user identity i and the public parameters params and outputs two key sets:
the client side key set Kui and the server side key set Ksi by running KeyGen illustrated
in Algorithm 2.2. In KeyGen, TKMA randomly chooses xi1 ∈ Z
∗
q (Line 1) and computes
xi2 = x − xi1 (Line 2). It creates the client side key set Kui = (xi1, s) (Line 3) and the
server side key set Ksi = (i, xi2) (Line 4).
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of keys in ESPOON
After running Algorithm 2.2, the TKMA sends the client side key set Kui and the
server side key set Ksi to user i and the Administration Point on the Service Provider,
respectively. The client side key set Kui serves as a private key for user i. The Admin-
istration Point of the Service Provider inserts Ksi in the Key Store by updating it as
follows: KS = KS ∪Ksi. The Key Store is initialised as: KS ← φ. Figure 2.4 illustrates
key distribution where Admin User A, Requester R and PIP P receive KuA, KuR and
KuP , respectively. The TKMA sends the corresponding server side key sets KsA, KsR
and KsP to the Administration Point on the Service Provider. The Administration Point
inserts server side key sets into the Key Store. Please note that only the Administration
Point, the PDP and the PEP are authorised to access the Key Store.
2.5.2 The Policy Deployment Phase
In the policy deployment phase, an Admin User defines and deploys policies. In general, a
policy can be deployed after performing two rounds of encryptions. An Admin User per-
forms a first round of encryption while the Administration Point on the Service Provider
performs a second round of encryption. For performing a first round of encryption, an
Admin User runs ClientEnc illustrated in Algorithm 2.3. ClientEnc takes as input (pol-
icy) element e, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the public
parameters params and outputs the client encrypted element c∗i (e). In ClientEnc, an
Admin User randomly chooses re ∈ Z
∗
q (Line 1), computes σe as fs(e) (Line 2), and then
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Algorithm 2.3 ClientEnc
Description: It transforms the cleartext element into the client encrypted element.
Input: Element e, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the public
parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted element c∗i (e).
1: Choose a random re ∈ Z
∗
q
2: σe ← fs(e)
3: cˆ1 ← g
re+σe
4: cˆ2 ← cˆ
xi1
1
5: cˆ3 ← H(h
re)
6: c∗i (e)← (cˆ1, cˆ2, cˆ3)
return c∗i (e)
Algorithm 2.4 ServerReEnc
Description: It transforms the client encrypted element into the server encrypted element.
Input: The client encrypted element c∗i (e) and the server side key set Ksi corresponding to
Admin User i.
Output: The server encrypted element c(e).
1: c1 ← (cˆ1)
xi2 .cˆ2 = cˆ
xi1+xi2
1 = (g
re+σe)x = hre+σe
2: c2 = cˆ3 = H(h
re)
3: c(e) = (c1, c2)
return c(e)
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Figure 2.5: The policy deployment phase
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computes cˆ1, cˆ2 and cˆ3 as g
re+σe (Line 3), cˆxi11 (Line 4) and H(h
re) (Line 5), respectively.
cˆ1, cˆ2 and cˆ3 constitute c
∗
i (e) (Line 6). An Admin User transmits to the Administration
Point the client encrypted elements of a policy as shown in Figure 2.5.
The Administration Point retrieves the server side key set corresponding to the Admin
User and performs a second round of encryption by running ServerReEnc illustrated in
Algorithm 2.4. ServerReEnc takes as input the client encrypted element c∗i (e) and the
server side key set Ksi corresponding to Admin User i and outputs the server encrypted
element c(e). The Administration Point calculates c1 and c2 as (cˆ1)
xi2 .cˆ2 = cˆ
xi1+xi2
1 =
(gre+σe)x = hre+σe (Line 1) and cˆ3 = H(h
re) (Line 2), respectively. Both c1 and c2 form
c(e) (Line 3). The Administration Point stores the server encrypted policies in the Policy
Store as shown in Figure 2.5.
Algorithm 2.5 ConditionEnc
Description: It transforms the cleartext condition into the client encrypted condition.
Input: The contextual condition T , the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i
and the public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted contextual condition TCi .
1: TCi ← T
2: for each leaf node e in TCi do
3: c∗i (e)← call ClientEnc (e, Kui , params)
4: replace e of TCi with c
∗
i (e)
5: end for
return TCi
Algorithm 2.6 ConditionReEnc
Description: It transforms the client encrypted condition into the server encrypted condition.
Input: The client encrypted contextual condition TCi and identity of Admin User i.
Output: The server encrypted contextual condition TS .
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i
2: TS ← TCi
3: for each client encrypted leaf node c∗i (e) in TS do
4: c(e)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (e), Ksi)
5: replace c∗i (e) of TS with c(e)
6: end for
return TS
Deployment of Contextual Conditions: The contextual condition can be deployed
in two steps. In the first step, an Admin User performs a first round of encryption by
running Algorithm 2.5. This algorithm takes as input the contextual condition T , the
client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the public parameters params
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and outputs the client encrypted contextual condition TCi . First, it copies T to TCi
(Line 1). For each leaf node in TCi (Line 2), it generates the client encrypted element by
calling ClientEnc illustrated in Algorithm 2.3 (Line 3) and then updates TCi by replacing
element e with the client encrypted element c∗i (e) (Line 4). An Admin User sends the
client encrypted contextual condition to the Administration Point. In the second step, the
Administration Point performs another round of encryption by running Algorithm 2.6.
This algorithm takes as input the client encrypted contextual condition TCi and identity
of Admin User i and outputs the server encrypted contextual condition TS. First, it
retrieves from the Key Store the server side key Ksi corresponding to Admin User i (Line
1). Next, it copies TCi to TS (Line 2). For each each client encrypted leaf node in TS
(Line 3), it generates the server encrypted element by calling ServerReEnc illustrated
in Algorithm 2.4 (Line 4). Then, it replaces the client encrypted element c∗i (e) of TS with
the server encrypted element c(e) (Line 5).
Algorithm 2.7 SATEnc
Description: It transforms the cleartext tuple into the client encrypted tuple.
Input: The 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the
public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted tuple c∗i (〈S,A, T 〉).
1: c∗i (S)← call ClientEnc (S, Kui , params)
2: c∗i (A)← call ClientEnc (A, Kui , params)
3: c∗i (T )← call ClientEnc (T , Kui , params)
4: c∗i (〈S,A, T 〉) ← (c
∗
i (S), c
∗
i (A), c
∗
i (T ))
return c∗i (〈S,A, T 〉)
Algorithm 2.8 SATReEnc
Description: It transforms the client encrypted tuple into the server encrypted tuple.
Input: The client encrypted tuple c∗i (〈S,A, T 〉) and identity of Admin User i.
Output: The server encrypted tuple c(〈S,A, T 〉).
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i
2: c(S)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (S), Ksi)
3: c(A)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (A), Ksi)
4: c(T )← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (T ), Ksi)
5: c(〈S,A, T 〉)← (c(S), c(A), c(T ))
return c(〈S,A, T 〉)
Deployment of a 〈S,A, T 〉 Tuple: For deploying any 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple, an Admin User
performs the first round of encryption using her private key as illustrated in Algorithm
2.7, where each element including S, A and T is encrypted on the client side by running
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ClientEnc (Algorithm 2.3) as shown in Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3, respectively. The
Administration Point on the server side receives the client encrypted tuple and performs
the second round of encryption using the server side key corresponding to the Admin
User as illustrated in Algorithm 2.8, where the Administration Point first retrieves the
server side key corresponding to Admin User i from the Key Store (see Line 1) and then
re-encrypts c∗i (S), c
∗
i (A) and c
∗
i (T ) by running ServerReEnc (Algorithm 2.4) as shown
in Line 2, Line 3 and Line 4, respectively. Finally, the server encrypted tuple is stored in
the Policy Store.
Algorithm 2.9 ClientTD
Description: It transforms the cleartext element into the client generated trapdoor.
Input: Element e, the client side key set Kui corresponding to user i and the public parameters
params.
Output: The client generated trapdoor td∗i (e).
1: Choose a random re ∈ Z
∗
q
2: σe ← fs(e)
3: t1 ← g
−regσe
4: t2 ← h
reg−xi1regxi1σe = gxi2regxi1σe
5: td∗i (e)← (t1, t2)
return td∗i (e)
Algorithm 2.10 ServerTD
Description: It transforms the client generated trapdoor into the server generated trapdoor.
Input: The client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) and the server side key set Ksi corresponding to
user i.
Output: The server generated trapdoor td(e).
1: td(e)← txi21 .t2 = g
xσe
return td(e)
Algorithm 2.11 Match
Description: It matches the serer encrypted element against the server generated trapdoor.
Input: The server encrypted element c(e) = (c1, c2) and the server generated trapdoor td(e) =
T .
Output: true or false .
1: if c2
?
= H(c1.T
−1) then
return true
2: else
return false
3: end if
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Figure 2.6: The policy evaluation phase
2.5.3 The Policy Evaluation Phase
The policy evaluation phase is executed when a Requester makes a request. In this
phase, a Requester sends client generated trapdoors (using Algorithm 2.9) of a request to
the PEP. The PEP converts client generated trapdoors into server generated trapdoors
(using Algorithm 2.10) and sends them to the PDP. The PDP matches server encrypted
trapdoors of the request with server encrypted elements of the policy (using Algorithm
2.11). Optionally, the PDP may require contextual information in order to evaluate
contextual conditions. The PIP sends client generated trapdoors of contextual information
to the PDP. The PDP converts client generated trapdoors into server generated trapdoors
and then evaluates contextual conditions based on contextual information. Finally, the
PDP returns either true or false as shown in Figure 2.6. In the following, we describe
how we generate trapdoors and perform the match.
For calculating client generated trapdoors of a request (or contextual information), a
Requester (or the PIP) runs ClientTD illustrated in Algorithm 2.9. ClientTD takes
as input each element e of the request, the client side key set Kui corresponding to user
i and the public parameters params and outputs the client generated trapdoor td∗i (e).
First, it choose randomly re ∈ Z
∗
q (Line 1). Next, it calculates σe as fs(e) (Line 2).
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Then it calculates t1 and t2 as g
−regσe (Line 3) and hreg−xi1regxi1σe = gxi2regxi1σe (Line
4), respectively. Both t1 and t2 form td
∗
i (e) (Line 5). A Requester sends client generated
trapdoors of the request to the PEP. The PEP receives client generated trapdoors and
runs ServerTD illustrated in Algorithm 2.10 for calculating server generated trapdoors.
ServerTD takes as input the client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) and the server side key set
Ksi corresponding to user i and outputs the server generated trapdoor td(e). It calculates
td(e) as txi21 .t2 = g
xσe (Line 1).
In order to match a server encrypted element of a policy with a server generated
trapdoor of a request, the PDP runs Match illustrated in Algorithm 2.11. Match takes
as input the server encrypted element c(e) = (c1, c2) and the server generated trapdoor
td(e) = T and returns either true or false. It checks the condition c2
?
= H(c1.T
−1) (Line
1). If the condition holds, it returns true (Line 1) indicating that the match is successful.
Otherwise, it returns false (Line 2).
In the following, we describe how to evaluate policies. For the evaluation of each
policy, we follow general strategy as already described in this section and also illustrated
in Figure 2.6.
Algorithm 2.12 SATRequest
Description: It transforms the cleartext tuple into the client generated trapdoor tuple.
Input: Tuple 〈S,A, T 〉, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Requester j and the public
parameters params.
Output: The client generated trapdoor tuple td∗j (〈S,A, T 〉).
1: td∗j(S)← call ClientTD (S, Kuj , params)
2: td∗j(A)← call ClientTD (A, Kuj , params)
3: td∗j(T )← call ClientTD (T , Kuj , params)
4: td∗j(〈S,A, T 〉)← (td
∗
j (S), td
∗
j (A), td
∗
j (T ))
return td∗j(〈S,A, T 〉)
Generating Tuples: A Client Request: For making an access request, a Requester
transforms the cleartext tuple into the trapdoor tuple as illustrated in Algorithm 2.12,
which transforms each element in tuple including S, A and T into its corresponding
trapdoor td∗j(S), td
∗
j(A) and td
∗
j (T ) (using ClientTD illustrated in Algorithm 2.9)as
shown in Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3, respectively. The Requester client side sends the
trapdoor tuple to the PEP.
Searching a Tuple: When a Requester makes an access request, the PEP receives the
client encrypted request and then it re-encrypts the request. The Service Provider first
retrieves the server side key corresponding to Requester j as illustrated in Algorithm
2.13 Line 1. Next, it calls ServerTD (Algorithm 2.10) for each client encrypted element
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Algorithm 2.13 SATSearch
Description: It checks whether the access request matches with any encrypted tuple on the
server side.
Input: The client generated trapdoor tuple td∗j(〈S,A, T 〉), the identity of Requester j and a list
(of size n) of encrypted policies stored on the server c(〈Si, Ai, Ti〉)1≤i≤n).
Output: true or false .
1: Ksj ← KS[j] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester j
2: td(S)← call ServerTD (td∗j (S), Ksj )
3: td(A)← call ServerTD (td∗j (A), Ksj )
4: td(T )← call ServerTD (td∗j (T ), Ksj )
5: for each encrypted tuple c(〈S,A, T 〉) in c(〈Si, Ai, Ti〉)1≤i≤n) do
6: matchS ← call Match (c(S), td(S))
7: matchA ← call Match (c(A), td(A))
8: matchT ← call Match (c(T ), td(T ))
9: if matchS
?
= true and matchA
?
= true and matchT
?
= true then
return true
10: end if
11: end for
return false
including td∗j (S), td
∗
j (A) and td
∗
j(T ) and calculates td(S), td(A) and td(T ) as shown in Line
2, Line 3 and Line 4, respectively. Then, the Service Provider checks if any encrypted tuple
in the Policy Store matches with the encrypted access request (Line 5). For performing
this match, all three encrypted elements are matching using Match (Algorithm 2.11)
(Line 6-8). If all three elements are matched (Line 9), then this algorithm returns true .
In case if no match is found, this algorithm returns false.
Algorithm 2.14 AttributesRequest
Description: It transforms contextual attributes into trapdoors.
Input: List of attributes contextual attributes L, the client side key set Kuj corresponding to
PIP j and the public parameters params.
Output: The client generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCj .
1: LCj ← φ
2: for each attribute e in L do
3: td∗j(e)← call ClientTD (r, Kuj , params)
4: LCj ← LCj ∪ td
∗
j (e)
5: end for
return TCj
Generating Contextual Attributes: The PIP runs AttributesRequest illustrated
in Algorithm 2.14 to calculate client generated trapdoors of contextual information. At-
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tributesRequest takes as input a list of contextual attributes L, the client side key set
Kuj corresponding to PIP j and the public parameters params and outputs the client
generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCj . First, it creates and initialises
new list LCj (Line 1). For each attribute e in L (Line 2), it calculates the client generated
trapdoor td∗j (e) by calling Algorithm 2.9 (Line 3) and adds td
∗
j(e) in LCj (Line 4).
Algorithm 2.15 ConditionEvaluation
Description: It evaluates contextual condition and returns true on successful match and false
otherwise.
Input: The client generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCj , the server encrypted
contextual condition TS and the identity of PIP j.
Output: true or false .
1: Ksj ← KS[j] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to PIP j
2: LS ← φ
3: for each client generated trapdoor td∗j (e) in LCj do
4: td(e)← call ServerTD (td∗j (e), Ksj )
5: LS ← LS ∪ td
∗
j(e)
6: end for
7: TREE ← TS
8: Add decision field to each node in TREE
9: for each node n in TREE do
10: n.decision← null
11: end for
12: for each leaf node n in TREE do
13: for each server generated trapdoor td(e) in LS do
14: n.decision← call Match (n.c(e), td(e))
15: if n.decision
?
= true then
16: break ;
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: call EvaluateTree (TREE .root , TREE ) ⊲ see Algorithm 2.16
return TREE .root .decision
Evaluating Contextual Conditions: For evaluating any contextual condition, the
PDP runs ConditionEvaluation illustrated in Algorithm 2.15. This algorithm takes
as input the client generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCj , the server
encrypted contextual condition TS and identity of PIP j and returns either true or false.
First, it retrieves from the Key Store the server side key Ksj (Line 1). Next, it creates
and initialises a new list LS (Line 2). For each client generated trapdoor td
∗
j(e) in LCj
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(Line 3), it calculates the server generated trapdoor td(e) by calling Algorithm 2.10 (Line
4) and adds td(e) in LS (Line 5). Next, it copies TS to TREE (Line 7) and adds decision
field to each node in TREE (Line 8). For each node n in TREE (Line 9), it initialises
n.decision as null (Line 10). For each leaf node n in TREE (Line 12), it checks if any
server generated trapdoor td(e) in LS (Line 13) matches with it by calling Algorithm 2.11
(Line 14). Next, it evaluates non-leaf nodes of TREE by running Algorithm 2.16 (Line
20). Finally, it returns either true or false depending upon the evaluation of TREE .
Algorithm 2.16 EvaluateTree
Description: Given a tree node, it recursively evaluates internal nodes of a policy tree and
returns true if the policy tree is satisfied and false otherwise.
Input: Node n and tree T .
Output: true or false .
1: if n.decision 6= null then
return n.decision
2: end if
3: for each child c of n in tree T do
4: call EvaluateTree (c, T ) ⊲ recursive call
5: end for
6: t← 0
7: m← 0
8: for each child c of n in tree T do
9: t← t+ 1
10: if c.decision
?
= true then
11: m← m+ 1
12: end if
13: end for
14: if (n.gate
?
= AND and m
?
= t) or (n.gate
?
= OR and m ≥ 1) then
15: n.decision ← true
16: else
17: n.decision ← false
18: end if
return n.decision
EvaluateTree evaluates a tree containing AND and OR gates. It takes as input root
node n and tree T and returns either true or false. First, it checks if the decision for n is
already made (Line 1). If so, it returns the decision (Line 1). For each child c of n in tree
T (Line 3), it recursively calls EvaluateTree (Line 4). Next, it creates and initialises t
(Line 6) and m (Line 7) indicating total children of n and a count of matched children,
respectively. For each child c of n in tree T (Line 8), it counts total children (Line 9)
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and matched children by checking made decisions (Line 11). Next, it checks if non-leaf
node is AND and all children are matched or non-leaf node is OR and at least one child
is matched (Line 14). If so, it is set as true (Line 15) and false (Line 17) otherwise.
Algorithm 2.17 UserRevocation
Description: It removes users from the system.
Input: The user identity i.
Output: true or false .
1: if exits(KS[i])
?
= false then
return false
2: end if
3: Ksi ← KS[i]
4: KS ← KS\Ksi
return true
2.5.4 The User Revocation Phase
In this phase, a user (an Admin User or a Requester) can be removed from the system.
This phase consists of one algorithm called UserRevocation illustrated in Algorithm
2.17, which is run by the Administration Point. Given the user identity i, this algorithm
checks whether the server side key set corresponding to user i exists in the Key Store
(Line 1). If not then this algorithm returns false (Line 1), indicating that no such user
exists. Otherwise, the server side key set Ksi corresponding to user i is removed from the
Key Store (Line 3-4) and finally this algorithm returns true (Line 4), indicating that user
i has been removed from the system successfully.
2.6 Performance Analysis of ESPOON
In this section, we discuss a quantitative analysis of the performance of ESPOON. It
should be noticed that here we are concerned about quantifying the overhead introduced
by the encryption operations performed both in the trusted and outsourced environments.
In the following discussion, we do not take into account the latency introduced by the
network communication.
2.6.1 Implementation Details of ESPOON
We have implemented ESPOON in Java 1.6. We have developed all the components of
the architecture required in the management lifecycle of ESPOON policies in outsourced
environments. In particular, we have implemented all the algorithms presented in Section
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2.5. We have tested the implementation of ESPOON on a single node based on an
Intel Core2 Duo 2.2 GHz processor with 2 GB of RAM, running Microsoft Windows XP
Professional version 2002 Service Pack 3. The number of iterations performed for each of
the following results is 1000.
2.6.2 Performance Analysis of the Policy Deployment Phase
In this section, we analyse the performance of the policy deployment phase. In this phase,
access policies are first encrypted at the Admin User side (that is a trusted domain) and
then sent over to the Administration Point running in the outsourced environment. The
Administration Point re-encrypts the policies and stores them in the Policy Store in the
outsourced environment. The policy contains two parts (i) a contextual condition and (ii)
a 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple. In the following, we discuss performance overheads of deploying both
parts.
Deploying a Contextual Condition: Our policy representation consists of the tree
representing the policy condition and the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple describing what action A a sub-
ject S can perform over the target T . In the tree representing contextual conditions, leaf
nodes represent string comparisons (for instance, Location = Cardiology-ward) and/or
numerical comparisons (for instance, AccessTime > 9 ). A string comparison is always
represented by a single leaf node while a numerical comparison may require more than
one leaf nodes. In the worst case, a single numerical comparison, represented as s bits,
may require s separate leaf nodes. Therefore, numerical comparisons have a major impact
on the encryption of a policy at deployment time.
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Figure 2.7: Performance overhead of deploying contextual conditions: (a) numerical and string
comparisons and (b) size of a numerical attribute
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The performance overhead of deploying contextual conditions is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.7. Figure 2.7(a) illustrates the performance overhead of deploying numerical and
string comparisons. In this graph, we increase the number of string comparisons and
numerical comparisons present in the contextual condition of a policy. As the graph, the
time taken by deployment functions on the client side and the server side grow linearly
with the number of comparisons in the contextual condition. The numerical compar-
isons have a steeper line because one numerical comparison of size s may be equiva-
lent to s string comparisons in the worst case. For string comparisons, we have used
“attributeNamei=attributeV aluei”, where i varies from 1 to 10. For numerical compar-
isons, we have used “attributeNamei < 15#4”.
1
To check how the size of the bit representation impacts on the encryption functions
during the deployment phase, we have performed the following experiment. We fixed the
number of numerical comparisons in the contextual condition to only one and increased
the size s of the bit representation from 2 to 20 for the comparison “attributeName <
2s−1. Figure 2.7(b) shows the performance overhead of the encryption during the policy
deployment phase on the client side, as well as on the server side. We can see that
the policy deployment time incurred grows linearly with the increase in the size s of a
numerical attribute. In general, the time complexity of the encryption of the contextual
conditions during the policy deployment phase is O(m + n · s) where m is the number
of string comparisons, n is the number of numerical comparisons, and s represents the
number of bits in each numerical comparison.
Table 2.1: Performance overhead of encrypting the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple during the policy deployment
Algorithm Name SATEnc SATReEnc
Time (in milliseconds) 46.44 11.65
Deploying a 〈S,A, T 〉 Tuple: As for the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple, the average encryption time
taken by the SATEnc (Algorithm 2.7) and SATReEnc (Algorithm 2.8) are shown in
Table 2.1. The time complexity of the encryption of the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple during the policy
deployment phase is constant because it does not depend on any parameters.
During the policy deployment phase, the encryption operations performed on the Ad-
min User side take more time to encrypt the access policy than the Service Provider side
to re-encrypt the same policy (either ConditionReEnc or SATReEnc). This is because
the ConditionEnc and SATEnc algorithms perform more complex cryptographic oper-
ations, such as generation of random number and hash calculations, than the respective
algorithms on the Service Provider side.
1It should be noted that using the comparison less than 15 in a 4-bit representation represents the worst case
scenario requiring 4 leaf nodes.
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2.6.3 Performance Analysis of the Policy Evaluation Phase
In this section, we analyse the performance of the policy evaluation phase. In this phase,
a Requester encrypts the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple before sending to the PEP running in the out-
sourced environment. The PEP re-encrypts and forwards it to the PDP. The PDP has to
select the set of policies that are applicable to the request. Once the PDP has found the
policies then the PDP will evaluate if the attributes in the contextual information satisfy
any of the conditions of the selected policies. In the following, we discuss performance
overhead of generating the encrypted 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple, searching the requested 〈S,A, T 〉
tuple in the policy store and evaluating contextual conditions.
Table 2.2: Performance overhead of generating the 〈S,A, T 〉 request
Algorithm Name SATRequest
Time (in milliseconds) 47.07
The 〈S,A, T 〉 Request Tuple: To make a request, it is necessary to generate the
〈S,A, T 〉 tuple representing the subject S requesting to perform action A on target T .
The 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple needs to be transformed into trapdoors before it is sent over to the
PEP. The trapdoors will be used for performing the encrypted policy evaluation in the
outsourced environment. The trapdoor representation does not leak information on the
element of the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple. This phase takes approximately 47.07 milliseconds (ms)
as shown in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.8: Performance overhead of searching a 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple
Searching a 〈S,A, T 〉 Tuple: Once the PDP gets the request, it re-encrypts and then
performs an encrypted search in the Policy Store in order to find any matching 〈S,A, T 〉
tuples. Figure 2.8 shows the performance overhead on the Service Provider side. In
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our experiment, we varied the number of encrypted policies stored in the Policy Store
ranging from 50 to 1000. As we can observe, it takes 0.5 ms on average for performing an
encrypted match operation between the 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple of the request and the 〈S,A, T 〉
tuple in the Policy Store. This means that on average it takes half a second for finding a
matching policy in the Policy Store with 1000 policies.
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Figure 2.9: Performance overhead of evaluating contextual conditions: (a) numerical and string
attributes and (b) size of a numerical attribute
Evaluating Contextual Conditions: If any match is found in the Policy Store then
the PDP needs to fetch the contextual information from the PIP. The PIP is responsible
to collect and send the required contextual information that includes information about
the Requester (for instance, Requester’s location or Requester’s age) or the environment
in which the request is made (for instance, time or temperature). The PIP transforms
these attributes into trapdoors before sending to the PDP (as illustrated in Algorithm
2.14). For each single string attribute (for instance, Location = Cardiology-ward), the
PIP generates a single trapdoor. For each numerical attribute of size s-bit (for instance,
AccessTime = 10#5 ), the PIP generates s trapdoors. Figure 2.9 shows the performance
overhead of evaluating contextual conditions. In particular, Figure 2.9(a) shows the per-
formance overhead of generating trapdoors by the PIP on the client side for both numerical
and string attributes. In our experiment, we vary number of attributes (both string and
numeric) from 1 to 10. As we can see, the graph grows linearly with the increase in num-
ber of attributes. For numerical attributes, the curve of trapdoor generation on the client
side is steeper than that of the string attributes because numerical attribute is of size s
bits where s is set to 4. This means that each numerical attribute requires 4 trapdoors;
on the other hand, a string attribute requires only a single attribute. We observe also the
behaviour of generating client trapdoors for a numerical attribute of varying size. Figure
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2.9(b) shows behaviour of generating on the client side trapdoors of a numerical attribute
of varying size ranging from 2 to 20 bits. This graph grows linearly with the increase in
number of bits, representing size of a numerical attribute.
After receiving trapdoors of contextual information, the PDP may evaluate a contex-
tual condition. To evaluate the tree representing a contextual condition, the PDP matches
contextual information against the leaf nodes in the tree, as illustrated in Algorithm 2.15.
To quantify the performance overhead of this encrypted matching, we have performed
the following test. First, we have considered two cases: the first case is the one in which
the PIP provides only string attributes and the contextual condition contains only string
comparisons; in the second, the PIP provides only numerical attributes and the contex-
tual condition consists only of numerical comparisons. For both cases, the number of
attributes varies together with the number of comparisons in the tree.
Figure 2.9(a) shows also the performance overhead of evaluating string and numerical
comparisons on the server side. As we can see, the condition evaluation for numerical
attributes has a steeper curve. This can be explained as follows. For the first case, for each
string attribute only a single trapdoor is generated. A string comparison is represented
as a single leaf node in the tree representing a contextual condition. This means that
m1 trapdoors in a request are matched against m2 leaf nodes in the tree resulting in a
O(m1 · m2) complexity (however, in our experiments the number of attributes and the
number of comparisons are always the same). For the case of the numerical attributes,
we have also to take in to consideration the bit representation. In particular, for a give
numerical attribute represented as s bits, we need to generate s different trapdoors. This
means that n numerical attributes in a request will be converted in to n · s different
trapdoors. These trapdoors then need to be matched against the leaf nodes representing
the numerical comparisons. Figure 2.9(b) shows the performance overhead of evaluating
a numerical comparison where the size of a numerical attribute varies from 2 to 20. As we
have discussed for the policy deployment phase, in the worst case scenario, a numerical
comparison for a s-bit numerical attribute requires s different leaf nodes. If there are n1
numerical attributes in the request and n2 different numerical comparisons (where each
numerical attribute or numerical comparison is of size s), the complexity of evaluating
numerical conditions will be O(n1 ·n2 ·s
2) in the worst case. In general, the complexities of
generating trapdoors for conditions and evaluating contextual conditions are O(m+n · s)
and O(m1 ·m2 + n1 · n2 · s
2), respectively.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of time complexity of each phase in the lifecycle of
ESPOON.
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Table 2.3: Summary of time complexity of each phase in the lifecycle of ESPOON
Phase Name Complexity in the Worst Case
Deployment of contextual condition O(m+ n · s)
Attributes request O(m+ n · s)
Evaluation of contextual condition O(m1 ·m2 + n1 · n2 · s
2)
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Data Protection
In this chapter, we have focused on how to enforce sensitive security policies in outsourced
environments. For the data protection, we may employ existing encryption techniques,
such as the proxy encryption scheme [30] or schemes based on ABE [47,49]. In [73], we have
discussed how to protect data using the proxy encryption scheme. In this dissertation,
we have covered the topic of data protection using CP-ABE [47] in Chapter 5.
2.7.2 Revealing Policy Structure
The access policy structure reveals information about the operators, such as AND and
OR, and the number of operands used in the access policy condition. To overcome this
problem, dummy attributes may be inserted in the tree structure of the access policy.
Similarly, the PIP can send dummy attributes to the PDP at the time of policy evaluation
to obfuscate the number of attributes required in a request.
2.7.3 Collusion Attack
In ESPOON, we assume that multiple users can collude; however, they cannot gain more
than what each user can access individually because each one has her own private key
and combination of those keys do not reveal any further information. On the other
hand, a user and the Service Provider can collude together to gain unauthorised access
to the data by combining their keys, where they can recover the master secret. For
withstanding against this kind of collusion, one possibility is to assume multiple instances
of the Service Provider and split the server side key such that each instance gets one share.
The main drawback of this approach is that it cannot work if all instances of the Service
Provider are compromised. Another approach is to provide protection with an extra layer
of encryption say by employing Key-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [49],
which is collusion-resistant.
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2.7.4 On the Impossibility of Cryptography Alone for Privacy-Preserving
Cloud Computing
Van Dijk and Juels argue in [74] that cryptography alone is not sufficient for preserving the
privacy in the cloud environment. They prove that in multi-client settings it is impossible
to control how information is released to clients with different access rights. Basically,
in their threat model clients do not mutually trust each other. In our settings, users are
mutually trusted: our main contribution is to protect the confidentiality of access policies
(and therefore of the data) from the Service Provider.
2.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the ESPOON architecture to support a policy-based ac-
cess control mechanism for outsourced environments. Our approach separates the security
policies from the actual enforcement mechanism while guaranteeing the confidentiality of
the policies when given assumptions hold (i.e., the Service Provider is honest-but-curious).
The main advantage of our approach is that policies are encrypted but it still allows the
PDP to perform the policy evaluation without knowing the policies. Second, ESPOON
is capable of handling complex policies involving non-monotonic boolean expressions and
range queries. Finally, the authorised users do not share any encryption keys making the
process of key management very scalable. Even if a user key is deleted or revoked, the
other entities are still able to perform their operations without requiring re-encryption of
the policies.
From performance and management perspectives, ESPOON might be suitable for
handling access policies of small to medium enterprises. However, both performance
and management will be cumbersome if ESPOON has to be deployed for handling access
policies of large enterprises having a large number of users, thus requiring complex user
management. In the next chapter, we propose architecture that can enforce sensitive
policies of large enterprises having a large number of users.
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Chapter 3
ESPOONERBAC : Enforcing
Encrypted RBAC Policies in
Outsourced Environments⋆
For complex user management, large enterprises employ RBAC models for making access
decisions based on the role in which a user is active in. However, RBAC models cannot
be deployed in outsourced environments as they rely on trusted infrastructure in order
to regulate access to the data. The deployment of RBAC models may reveal private
information about sensitive data they aim to protect. In this chapter, we aim at filling
this gap by proposing Enforcing Sensitive Policies in Outsourced envirOnmeNts
with Encrypted Role-Based Access Control (ESPOONERBAC) for enforcing RBAC
policies in outsourced environments. ESPOONERBAC is based on ESPOON (discussed
in Chapter 2). Basically, ESPOONERBAC extends ESPOON in order to enforce RBAC
policies in an encrypted manner, where a curious service provider do not learn private
information about sensitive RBAC policies. We have implemented ESPOONERBAC and
provided its performance evaluation showing a limited overhead, thus confirming viability
of our approach.
3.1 Introduction
According to [77], RBAC is the most widely used security model. RBAC [16] makes
decisions based on roles a user is active in. However, it cannot be deployed in outsourced
environments because it assumes a trusted infrastructure in order to regulate access on
data. In RBAC models, RBAC policies may leak information about the data they aim
⋆The preliminary version of this chapter has appeared in [75,76].
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to protect. In [28], we propose ESPOON that aims at enforcing authorisation policies in
outsourced environments. In [76], we extend ESPOON to support RBAC policies and role
hierarchies but our solution does not outsource all operations because we assume presence
of the Company RBAC Manager in trusted environments for the role assignment.
3.1.1 Research Contributions
In this chapter, we present an RBAC mechanism for outsourced environments where we
support full confidentiality of RBAC policies. We named our solution Enforcing Sensi-
tive Policies in Outsourced envirOnmeNts with Encrypted Role-Based Access
Control (ESPOONERBAC). ESPOONERBAC is based on ESPOON. Like ESPOON,
ESPOONERBAC can enforce RBAC policies without revealing private information to the
service provider that is assumed honest-but-curious. Summarising, the research contribu-
tions in this chapter are threefold.
1. The service provider does not learn private information about RBAC policies and
the requester’s attributes during the policy deployment or evaluation processes.
2. We extend the basic RBAC policies to support role hierarchies. The curious service
provider enforces role hierarchy without revealing information about roles in the role
hierarchy graph.
3. The system entities do not share any encryption keys and even if a user is deleted
or revoked, the system is still able to perform its operations without requiring re-
encryption of RBAC policies.
As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented a prototype of our ESPOONERBAC mech-
anism and analysed its performance to quantify the overhead incurred by cryptographic
operations used in the proposed scheme.
3.1.2 Chapter Outline
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related work.
In Section 3.3, we present the proposed architecture of ESPOONERBAC . Section 3.4 and
Section 3.5 focus on solution details and algorithmic details, respectively. Security analysis
of ESPOONERBAC is provided in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7, we analyse the performance
overhead of ESPOONERBAC . Finally, Section 3.8 summarises this chapter.
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3.2 Related Work
RBAC [16] is an access control model that logically maps well to the job-function specified
within an organisation. In the basic RBAC model, a system administrator or a security
officer assigns permissions to roles and then roles are assigned to users. A user can make
an access request to execute permissions corresponding to a role only if he or she is
active in that role. A user can be active in a subset of roles assigned to him/her by
making a role activation request. In RBAC, a session keeps mapping of users to roles that
are active. In [16], Sandhu et al. extend the basic RBAC model with role hierarchies for
structuring roles within an organisation. The concept of role hierarchy introduces the role
inheritance. In the role inheritance, a derived role can inherit all permissions from the
base role. The role inheritance incurs extra processing overhead as requested permissions
might be assigned to the base role of one in which the user might be active.
The RBAC model may activate a role or grant permissions while taking into account
the context under which the user makes the access request or the role activation re-
quest [78–84]. The RBAC model captures this context by defining contextual conditions.
A contextual condition requires certain attributes about the environment or the user mak-
ing the request. These attributes are contextual information, which may include access
time, access date and location of the user who is making the request. The RBAC model
grants the request if the contextual information satisfy the contextual conditions. In [85],
Crampton and Khambhammettu discuss delegation in RBAC. Unfortunately, existing so-
lutions [16, 78–85] assume a trusted infrastructure to regulate access on data and they
cannot be applied to outsourced environments, where a curious service provider might
leak sensitive policies.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a strict model of access control that takes a
hierarchical approach to control access to resources [86]. In MAC, access to resources
is controlled by the system administrator. MAC assigns security labels to resources.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a type of access control in which resource owners
control access to their resources [87]. In DAC, each resource object has an Access Control
List (ACL) that contains a list of users or groups who can gain access to the resource
object. Like traditional RBAC, both MAC and DAC assume a trusted infrastructure in
order to regulate access to the resources.
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a standard that defines an
access control policy language and a processing model specifying how to evaluate access
requests against deployed access control policies [71,88]. The XACML policy language is
based on eXtensible Markup Language (XML). For making any access decision, XACML
considers that access control policies and access requests are in cleartext. Unfortunately,
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cleartext policies and access requests may reveal private information.
In [28], we propose ESPOON that aims at enforcing authorisation policies in out-
sourced environments. In ESPOON, a data owner (or someone on the behalf of data
owners) may attach an authorisation policy with the data while storing it on the out-
sourced server. Any authorised requester may get access to the data if she satisfies the
authorisation policy associated with that data. However, ESPOON lacks to provide sup-
port for RBAC policies. In [76], we extended ESPOON to support RBAC policies and role
hierarchies. However, in [76] the role assignment is performed by the Company RBAC
Manager, which is run in the trusted environment. On the other hand, in our current
architecture, the role assignment is performed by the service provider running in the
outsourced environment. In other words, we have eliminated the need of an additional
online-trusted-server i.e., the Company RBAC Manager.
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Figure 3.1: The ESPOONERBAC architecture for enforcing RBAC policies in outsourced envi-
ronments
3.3 The ESPOONERBAC Approach
ESPOONERBAC aims at providing RBAC mechanism that can be deployed in an out-
sourced environment. Figure 3.1 illustrates the proposed architecture that has similar
components to the widely accepted architecture for the policy-based management pro-
posed by IETF [71]. In ESPOONERBAC , an Admin User deploys (i) RBAC policies
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and sends them to the Administration Point that stores (ii) RBAC policies1 in the
Policy Store. These policies may include permissions assigned to roles, roles assigned
to users and the role hierarchy graph that are stored in the Permission Repository, the
Role Repository and the Role Hierarchy repository, respectively.
A Requester may send (1) the role activation request to the PEP. This request
includes the Requester’s identifier and the requested role. The PEP forwards (2) the role
activation request to the PDP. The PDP retrieves (3) the policy corresponding to the
Requester from the Role Repository of the Policy Store and fetches (4) the contextual
information from the PIP. The contextual information may include the environmental
and Requester’s attributes under which the requested role can be activated. For instance,
consider a contextual condition where a role doctor can only be activated during the duty
hours. For simplicity, we assume that the PIP collects all required attributes and sends all
of them together in one go. Moreover, we assume that the PIP is deployed in the trusted
environment. However, if attributes forgery is an issue, the PIP can request a trusted
authority to sign the attributes before sending them to the PDP. The PDP evaluates role
assignment policies against the attributes provided by the PIP checking if the contextual
information satisfies contextual conditions and sends to the PEP (5) the role activation
response. In case of permit, the PEP activates the requested role by updating the Session
containing the Active Roles repository (6a). Otherwise, in case of deny, the requested
role is not activated. Optionally, a response can be sent to the Requester (7) with either
success or failure.
After getting active in a role, a Requester can make the access request that is sent
to the PEP (1). This request includes the Requester’s identifier, the requested data
(target) and the action to be performed. The PEP forwards (2) the access request to
the PDP. After receiving the access request, the PDP first retrieves from the Session
information about the Requester if she is already active in any role (3a). If so, the PDP
evaluates if the Requester’s (active) role is permitted to execute the requested action on
the requested data. For this purpose, the PDP retrieves (3) the permission assignment
policy corresponding to the active role from the Permission Repository of the Policy Store
and fetches (4) the contextual information from the PIP required for evaluating contextual
conditions in the permission assignment policy. For instance, consider the example where
a Cardiologist can access the cardiology report during office hours. The PDP evaluates
the permission assignment policies against the attributes provided by the PIP checking if
the contextual information satisfies any contextual conditions and sends to the PEP (5)
the access response. In case of permit, the PEP forwards the access action to the Data
Store (6b). In case if no contextual condition is satisfied, the PDP retrieves the role
1In the rest of this chapter, by term policies we mean RBAC policies.
43
44 3.3. THE ESPOONERBAC APPROACH
hierarchy from the Role Hierarchy repository of the Policy Store and then traverses this
role hierarchy graph in order to find if any base role, the Requester’s role might be derived
from, has permission to execute the requested action on the requested data. If so, the
PEP forwards the access action to the Data Store (6b). Otherwise, in case of deny, the
requested action is not forwarded. Optionally, a response can be sent to the Requester
(7) with either success or failure.
Since ESPOONERBAC is based on ESPOON, we use the same system model as already
considered in ESPOON (see Section 2.3.1).
if 〈CONDITION 〉 then 〈USER〉 can be active in 〈{R1, R2, . . . , Rn}〉
Figure 3.2: RBAC Policy: Role assignment
if 〈CONDITION 〉 then 〈R〉 can execute 〈{(A1, T1), (A2, T2), . . . , (An, Tn)}〉
Figure 3.3: RBAC Policy: Permission assignment
3.3.1 Representation of RBAC Policies and Requests
In this section, we provide details about how to represent policies and requests used in our
approach. An RBAC policy contains a role assignment policy, a permission policy and
a role hierarchy graph. In the following, we discuss each of them. Figure 3.2 illustrates
how we represent role assignment policies in ESPOONERBAC . The meaning of role as-
signment policy is as follows: if contextual condition, CONDITION , is true then USER
can be active in any role(s) out of role set {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}. Figure 3.3 illustrates how we
represent permission assignment policies in ESPOONERBAC . The meaning of permission
assignment policy is as follows: if contextual condition, CONDITION , is true then role
R can execute any permission(s) out of permission set {(A1, T1), (A2, T2), . . . , (An, Tn)}.
The PDP evaluates contextual conditions of both role assignment and permission as-
signment policies before granting the access. In order to evaluate a contextual condition,
the PDP requires contextual information. The contextual information captures the con-
text in which a Requester makes access or role activation requests.
A Requester can make a role activation request ACT or an access request REQ . In
ACT = (i, R), a Requester includes her identity i along with role R to be activated. After
a Requester is active in R, she can execute permissions assigned to R. For executing any
permission, a Requester sends REQ = (R,A, T ) that includes R she is active in, action
A to be taken over target T . A Requester sends ACT or REQ requests to the PEP.
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The PEP receives and forwards requests ACT or REQ to the PDP. The PDP fetches
policies corresponding to requests from the Policy Store. The PDP may require contextual
information in order to evaluate contextual conditions to grant ACT or REQ (as already
explained in Section 2.3.2).
R1 extends 〈{Ri, Rii, . . . , Rk1}〉
R2 extends 〈{Ri, Rii, . . . , Rk2}〉
.
.
.
Rn extends 〈{Ri, Rii, . . . , Rkn}〉
Figure 3.4: RBAC Policy: Role hierarchy
Cardiologist Assistant
Doctor
Cardiologist
Intern
Figure 3.5: An example of a role hierarchy graph illustrating that Cardiologist and Doctor roles
are derived from Intern while the Cardiologist role is derived from Cardiologist and Doctor roles
The ESPOONERBAC architecture supports role inheritance. In role inheritance, a
derived role can execute all permissions from its base role. Before denying REQ , the
PDP may need to check if base role of one in REQ can execute requested permissions.
In order to find base roles, we store a role hierarchy graph on the Service Provider. In
ESPOONERBAC , the PDP traverses in the role hierarchy graph to find base roles. Figure
3.4 illustrates how we represent a role hierarchy graph. In Figure 3.4, each line represents
a role that may extend a set of roles. All these inheritance rules may form a role hierarchy
graph. For instance, consider an example from healthcare domain where a Cardiologist
Assistant extends Intern, a Doctor extends Intern and finally a Cardiologist extends both
Cardiologist Assistant and Doctor. If we combine all these inheritance rules then it can
form a graph as shown in Figure 3.5.
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In this representation, leaf-nodes in CONDITION , R, A, T of both ACT and REQ ,
roles in the role hierarchy graph, and attributes in contextual information are in cleartext.
Therefore, such information is easily accessible in the outsourced environment and may
leak information about the data that policies protect. In the following, we show how we
protect such representation while allowing the PDP to evaluate policies against requests
and contextual information.
3.4 Solution Details of ESPOONERBAC
ESPOONERBAC aims at enforcing policies in outsourced environments. The main idea of
our approach is to use an encryption scheme for preserving confidentiality of policies while
allowing the PDP to perform the correct evaluation. In ESPOONERBAC , we can notice
that the operation performed by the PDP for evaluating policies (against attributes in
the request and contextual information) is similar to the search operation executed in a
database. In particular, in our case the policy is a query; while, attributes in the request
(ACT or REQ) and contextual information represent the data. For ESPOONERBAC , we
extend ESPOON. In the following, we describe core phases in ESPOONERBAC .
3.4.1 The Policy Deployment Phase
For deploying (or updating existing) policies, an Admin User performs a first round of
encryption using her client side key set. An Admin User encrypts elements of policies.
In role assignment policies, an Admin User encrypts all roles assigned to a user. In
permission assignment policies, an Admin User encrypts both action and target parts of
each permission and also encrypts the role to which these permissions are assigned. As we
know that a tree represents condition conditions of both role assignment and permission
assignment policies (as shown in Figure 2.3), an Admin User encrypts each leaf node of
the tree while non-leaf (internal) nodes representing AND, OR or threshold gates are in
cleartext. In a role hierarchy graph (as shown in Figure 3.5), an Admin User encrypts
each of its node representing a role. After completing the first round of encryption on
policies, an Admin User sends client encrypted policies to the Administration Point on the
Service Provider. These client encrypted policies are protected but cannot be enforced as
these are not in common format. To convert client encrypted policies to common format,
the Administration Point performs a second round of encryption using server side key
set corresponding to the Admin User. The second round of encryption serves as a proxy
re-encryption. In the second round of encryption, the Administration Point encrypts all
elements that are encrypted in the first round of encryption. Finally, the Administration
Point stores server encrypted policies in the Policy Store.
46
CHAPTER 3. ENFORCING ENCRYPTED RBAC POLICIES 47
3.4.2 The Policy Evaluation Phase
A Requester can make a role activation request ACT . Before sending ACT to the Service
Provider, a Requester generates a client trapdoor of the role in ACT . A Requester
generates client trapdoor using her client side key set. The trapdoor representation does
not leak information on elements of requests. Similarly, a Requester can make an access
request REQ after getting active in a role. A Requester generates a client trapdoor
for each element in REQ including the role, the action and the target. A Requester
sends requests containing client generated trapdoors to the PEP on the Service Provider.
The PEP performs another round of trapdoor generation for converting all trapdoors
into a common format. After performing a second round of trapdoor generation on the
server side, the PEP forwards server generated trapdoors to the PDP. The PDP fetches
policies from the Policy Store and then performs encrypted matching of trapdoors in
request against encrypted elements in policies. The encrypted matching in outsourced
environments does not leak information about elements of requests or policies.
The PDP may require contextual information in order to evaluate the contextual con-
ditions of policies. The PIP collects contextual information and generates client trapdoors
for elements of contextual information using her client side key set. The PIP sends client
generated trapdoors of contextual information to the PDP. The PDP performs another
round of trapdoor generation using server side key set corresponding to the PIP. Finally,
the PDP evaluates the contextual condition by matching trapdoors of contextual infor-
mation against encrypted leaf nodes of the tree representing the contextual condition (as
shown in Figure 2.3). After evaluating leaf nodes, the PDP evaluates non-leaf nodes of
the tree based on AND, OR and threshold gates. The PDP grants the access request if
(the root node of) the tree evaluates to true .
The PDP may need to find base roles corresponding to the role in REQ considering the
fact that a derived role has all permissions from its base role. In order to find base roles, the
PDP fetches the role hierarchy graph from the Policy Store. The PDP matches trapdoor
of role in REQ against server encrypted roles in the role hierarchy graph. While deploying
the role hierarchy graph, we store also server generated trapdoor of the role along with
each server encrypted of role because the PDP needs a trapdoor of each base role so that
it can match this trapdoor against encrypted roles in the Permission Repository. After
traversing in the role hierarchy graph, the PDP extracts server generated trapdoors of all
base roles of one that matches with trapdoor of role in REQ . The PDP verifies if any
base role has requested permissions. If so, the PDP grants the request.
47
48 3.5. ALGORITHMIC DETAILS OF ESPOONERBAC
3.5 Algorithmic Details of ESPOONERBAC
In this section, we provide details of algorithms used in core phases (including the policy
deployment phase and the policy evaluation phase) for managing lifecycle of policies. The
following algorithms (along with ESPOON algorithms described in Chapter 2, Section 3.5)
constitute the proposed schema.
3.5.1 The Policy Deployment Phase
In the following, we describe how to deploy different (parts of) policies including role
assignment, permission assignment, contextual conditions and role hierarchy graph. For
the deployment of each (part of) policy, we follow general strategy as already described
in Section 2.5.2 and also illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Algorithm 3.1 RoleAssignment:ClientEnc
Description: It transforms the cleartext role assignment list into the client encrypted role
assignment list.
Input: List of roles L to be assigned to Requester j, the client side key set Kui corresponding
to Admin User i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted role assignment list LCi .
1: LCi ← φ
2: for each role r in list L do
3: c∗i (r)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params) ⊲ see Algorithm 2.3
4: LCi ← LCi ∪ c
∗
i (r)
5: end for
return (j, LCi)
Algorithm 3.2 RoleAssignment:ServerReEnc
Description: It re-encrypts the client encrypted role assignment list and generates the server
encrypted role assignment list.
Input: The client encrypted role assignment list LCi for Requester j and identity i of Admin
User.
Output: The server encrypted role assignment list LS .
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i
2: LS ← φ
3: for each client encrypted role c∗i (r) in list LCi do
4: c(r)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (r), Ksi) ⊲ see Algorithm 2.4
5: LS ← LS ∪ c(r)
6: end for
return (j, LS)
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Deployment of Role Assignment Policies: In order to assign roles to a Requester,
an Admin User can deploy role assignment policies. For this purpose, an Admin User
runs RoleAssignment:ClientEnc illustrated in Algorithm 3.1. This algorithm takes
as input a list of roles L to be assigned to Requester j, the client side key set Kui
corresponding to Admin User i and the public parameters params and outputs the client
encrypted role assignment list LCi . First, it creates and then initialises a list LCi (Line
1). For each role in L (Line 2), it generates client encrypted role by calling ClientEnc
illustrated in Algorithm 2.3 (Line 3) and then it updates LCi by adding client encrypted
role (Line 4). An Admin User sends the client encrypted role assignment list to the
Administration Point. During the second round of encryption, the Administration Point
runs RoleAssignment:ServerReEnc illustrated in Algorithm 3.2. This algorithm takes
as input the client encrypted role assignment list LCi for Requester j and identity i of
Admin User and ouputs the server encrypted role assignment list LS. While running
RoleAssignment:ServerReEnc, the Administration Point first retrieves the server side
keyKsi corresponding to Admin User i (Line 1). It creates and initialises a list LS (Line 2).
For each role in LCi (Line 3), it generates server encrypted role by calling ServerReEnc
illustrated in Algorithm 2.4 (Line 4) and updates LS by adding the server encrypted role
(Line 5).
Algorithm 3.3 PermissionAssignment:ClientEnc
Description: It transforms the cleartext permission assignment list into the client encrypted
permission assignment list.
Input: List of permissions L to be assigned to role r, the client side key set Kui corresponding
to Admin User i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted permission assignment list LCi assigned to the client generated
role c∗i (r).
1: c∗i (r)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params)
2: LCi ← φ
3: for each permission (action, target) in L do
4: c∗i (action)← call ClientEnc (action, Kui , params)
5: c∗i (target)← call ClientEnc (target, Kui , params)
6: LCi ← LCi ∪ (c
∗
i (action), c
∗
i (target))
7: end for
return (c∗i (r), LCi)
Deployment of Permission Assignment Policies: An Admin User can assign
permissions to a role. In order to deploy policies regarding permissions assignment to roles,
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Algorithm 3.4 PermissionAssignment:ServerReEnc
Description: It re-encrypts the client encrypted permission assignment list.
Input: The client encrypted permission assignment list LCi for client generated role c
∗
i (r) and
identity i of Admin User.
Output: The server encrypted permission assignment list LS and the server generated role c(r).
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i
2: c(r)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (r), Ksi)
3: LS ← φ
4: for each client encrypted permission (c∗i (action), c
∗
i (target)) in list LCi do
5: c(action)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (action), Ksi)
6: c(target)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (target), Ksi)
7: LS ← LS ∪ (c(action), c(target))
8: end for
return (c(r), LS)
an Admin User runs Algorithm 3.3. This algorithm takes as input a list of permissions L
to be assigned to role r, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the
public parameters params and outputs the client encrypted permission assignment list
LCi assigned to client generated role c
∗
i (r). First, it generates client encrypted role c
∗
i (r)
by calling ClientEnc illustrated in Algorithm 2.3 (Line 1). Next, it creates and initialises
new list LCi (Line 2). For each permission in L (Line 3), it generates the client encrypted
action c∗i (action) (Line 4) and the client encrypted target c
∗
i (target) (Line 5) and updates
LCi by adding the client encrypted permission (Line 6). An Admin User sends the client
encrypted permission list along with the client encrypted role to the Administration Point.
The Administration Point runs another round of encryption by running Algorithm 3.4.
This algorithm takes as input the client encrypted permission assignment list LCi for
client generated role c∗i (r) and identity i of Admin User and outputs the server encrypted
permission assignment list LS and the server generated role c(r). First, it retrieves from
the Key Store the server side key set Ksi corresponding to Admin User i (Line 1). Next, it
generates the server encrypted role by calling ServerReEnc illustrated in Algorithm 2.4
(Line 2). Then, it creates and initialises new list LS (Line 3). For each client encrypted
role in LCi (Line 4), it generates the server encrypted action (Line 5) and the server
encrypted target (Line 6) and updates LS by adding the server encryption permission
(Line 7).
Deployment of a Role Hierarchy Graph: We know that a derived role inherits all
permissions from its base role. In case if requested permissions are not assigned to the
Requester’s role, the PDP may need to traverse in the role hierarchy graph to find base
roles corresponding to the Requester’s role and then PDP verifies if any base role can
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Algorithm 3.5 RoleHierarchy:ClientEnc
Description: It encrypts the role hierarchy graph.
Input: The role hierarchy graph G, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i
and the public parameters params.
Output: The client generated role hierarchy graph GCi .
1: GCi ← G
2: for each node r in GCi do
3: c∗i (r)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params)
4: td∗i (r)← call ClientTD (r, Kui , params) ⊲ see Algorithm 2.9
5: replace r of GCi with (c
∗
i (r), td
∗
i (r))
6: end for
return GCi
Algorithm 3.6 RoleHierarchy:ServerReEnc
Description: It re-encrypts the client generated role hierarchy graph.
Input: The client generated role hierarchy graph GCi and identity of Admin User i.
Output: The server generated role hierarchy graph GS .
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i
2: GS ← GCi
3: for each client generated node (c∗i (r), td
∗
i (r)) in GS do
4: c(r)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (r), Ksi)
5: td(r)← call ServerTD (td∗i (r), Ksi) ⊲ see Algorithm 2.10
6: replace (c∗i (r), td
∗
i (r)) of GS with (c(r), td(r))
7: end for
return GS
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fulfil requested permissions. For this purpose, the PDP needs a trapdoor of each base role
so that it can match this trapdoor against encrypted roles in the Permission Repository.
Therefore, a role hierarchy graph stores a role trapdoor along with each encrypted role.
The deployment of role hierarchy graph takes place in two steps. In the first step, an
Admin User runs Algorithm 3.5. This algorithm takes as input the role hierarchy graph
G, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the public parameters
params and outputs the client generated role hierarchy graph GCi. First, it copies G
to GCi (Line 1). For each node r in GCi (Line 2), it generates the client encrypted role
by calling ClientEnc illustrated in Algorithm 2.3 (Line 3) and the client trapdoor by
calling ClientTD (Line 4) illustrated in Algorithm 2.9 that is explained later in this
section. Next, it replaces r of GCi with the client encrypted role and the client generated
trapdoor (Line 5). An Admin User sends the client generated role hierarchy graph to
the Administration Point. In the second step, the Administration Point runs Algorithm
3.6. This algorithm takes as input the client generated role hierarchy graph GCi and
identity of Admin User i and outputs the server generated role hierarchy graph GS. First,
it retrieves from the Key Store the server side key Ksi corresponding to Admin User i
(Line 1). Next, it copies GCi to GS (Line 2). For each client generated node (Line 3), it
generates the server encrypted role by calling ServerReEnc illustrated in Algorithm 2.4
(Line 4) and the server trapdoor by calling ServerTD (Line 5) illustrated in Algorithm
2.10 that is explained later in this section and then updates GS by replacing the client
generated node with the server generated node (Line 6).
3.5.2 The Policy Evaluation Phase
The policy evaluation phase is executed when a Requester makes a request either ACT
or REQ . In the following, we describe how to evaluate (parts of) policies including role
assignment, permission assignment, contextual conditions and role hierarchy graph. For
the evaluation of each (part of) policy, we follow general strategy as already described in
this section and also illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Searching a Role: A Requester can make a role activation request ACT and sends it
to the Service Provider. In order to grant ACT , the Service Provider runs SearchRole
illustrated in Algorithm 3.7. This algorithm takes as input the client generated trapdoor
of role td∗i (r) and the server encrypted role assignment list LS for Requester i. First, it
retrieves from the Key Store the server side key Ksi corresponding to Requester i (Line
1). Next, it calculates the server generated trapdoor td(r) by calling Algorithm 2.10 (Line
2). For each server encrypted role c(r) in LS (Line 3), it performs matching against td(r)
by calling Algorithm 2.11 (Line 4). If any match is successful (Line 5), it returns true
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Algorithm 3.7 SearchRole
Description: It checks whether the requested role is in the role assignment list of the Requester.
Input: The client generated trapdoor of role td∗i (r) and the server encrypted role assignment
list (or list of active roles in session) LS for Requester i.
Output: true or false .
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester i
2: td(r)← call ServerTD (td∗i (r), Ksi)
3: for each server encrypted role c(r) in LS do
4: match← call Match (c(r), td(r)) ⊲ see Algorithm 2.11
5: if match
?
= true then
return true
6: end if
7: end for
return false
(Line 5), meaning that ACT is granted. Otherwise, it returns false (Line 7).
After ACT is granted, the PEP updates Session by adding in the Active Roles repos-
itory the server generated trapdoor of role. Once a Requester is active in a role, she can
make an access request REQ . Before granting REQ , the Service Provider checks if the
Requester is already in the role in REQ . For this purpose, the Service Provider runs
Algorithm 3.7, where LS shows a list of active roles in the session. Furthermore, the PDP
also runs Algorithm 3.7 for searching the role in REQ in the Permission Repository with
a slight modification of ignoring the server trapdoor generation (in Line 2) as it is already
generated when the role of REQ is searched in the session.
Searching a Permission: A Requester can send REQ for executing certain permis-
sions. The PEP on the Service Provider checks if the Requester is active in the role
indicated in REQ and then the searches that role in the Permission Repository by run-
ning Algorithm 3.7. After a role is matched in the Permission Repository, the PEP
searches the permission in REQ by running Algorithm 3.8. This algorithm takes as in-
put the client generated trapdoor of permission (td∗i (action), td
∗
i (target) and the server
encrypted permission assignment list LS for Requester i and returns either true or false.
First, it retrieves from the Key Store from the Key Store the server side key Ksi corre-
sponding to Requester i (Line 1). Next, it calculates server generated trapdoors of both
action (Line 2) and target (Line 3) by calling Algorithm 2.10. For each server encrypted
permission (c(action), c(target)) in LS (Line 4), it matches the server encrypted action
with the server generated action (Line 5) and the server encrypted target with the server
generated taret (Line 6), respectively, by calling Algorithm 2.11. If both matches are
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Algorithm 3.8 SearchPermission
Description: It checks whether the requested permission is present in the list of permissions
assigned to the Requester.
Input: The client generated trapdoor of permission (td∗i (action), td
∗
i (target) and the server
encrypted permission assignment list LS for Requester i.
Output: true or false .
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester i
2: td(action)← call ServerTD (td∗i (action), Ksi)
3: td(target)← call ServerTD (td∗i (target), Ksi)
4: for each server encrypted permission (c(action), c(target)) in LS do
5: matchaction ← call Match (c(action), td(action))
6: matchtarget ← call Match (c(target), td(target))
7: if matchaction
?
= true and matchtarget
?
= true then
return true
8: end if
9: end for
return false
successful (Line 7) for any permission (c(action), c(target)) in LS, it returns true (Line
7). Otherwise, it returns false (Line 9).
Algorithm 3.9 SearchRoleHierarchyGraph
Description: It checks whether the Requester’s role is inherited from any base role in the role
hierarchy graph.
Input: The server generated trapdoor of role td(r) and the server generated role hierarchy
graph GS .
Output: true or false .
1: for each server encrypted role c(r) in GS do
2: match← call Match (c(r), td(r))
3: if match
?
= true then
return true
4: end if
5: end for
return false
Searching Roles in Role Hierarchy Graph: The PDP may need to search base roles
of one in REQ since a derived role inherits all permissions from its base role. The PDP
runs SearchRoleHierarchyGraph illustrated in Algorithm 3.9 to find base roles from
the encrypted role hierarchy graph. This algorithm takes as input the server generated
trapdoor of role td(r) and the server generated role hierarchy graph GS and returns true
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if any base role is found and false otherwise. For each server encrypted role c(r) in GS
(Line 1), it checks if td(r) matches with any c(r) by calling Algorithm 2.11 (Line 2). If
any match is found (Line 3), it returns true (Line 3). Otherwise, it returns false (Line 5).
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we provide a combined security analysis of ESPOONERBAC and ESPOON
because ESPOONERBAC is built on the top of ESPOON. In other words, ESPOONERBAC
uses algorithms presented in Chapter 2. Therefore, we have not provided any security
analysis of ESPOON in Chapter 2. In this section, we analyse the security of the pol-
icy deployment phase that includes the Role Assignment (RA) encryption (Algorithms
3.1 and 3.2), the Permission Assignment (PA) encryption (Algorithms 3.3 and 3.4), the
Contextual Condition (CC) encryption (Algorithms 2.5 and 2.6), and the Role Hierarchy
(RH) encryption (Algorithms 3.5 and 3.6). We then analyse the security of the policy
evaluation phase that include Search Role (SR) (Algorithms 2.9 and 3.7), Search Permis-
sion (SP) (Algorithms 2.9 and 3.8), Contextual Condition Evaluation (CCE) (Algorithms
2.14 and 2.15) and Search Role Hierarchy (SRH) (Algorithms 2.9, 2.10 and 3.9).
We first define some basic concepts on which we build our security proofs.
3.6.1 Preliminaries
In general, a scheme is considered secure if no adversary can break the scheme with
probability significantly greater than random guessing. The adversary’s advantage in
breaking the scheme should be a negligible function of the security parameter.
Definition 1 (Negligible Function). A function f is negligible if for each polynomial p(.)
there exists N such that for all integers n > N it holds that f(n) < 1
p(n)
.
We consider a realistic adversary that is computationally bounded and show that our
scheme is secure against such an adversary. We model the adversary as a randomised
algorithm that runs in polynomial time and show that the success probability of any such
adversary is negligible. An algorithm that is randomised and runs in polynomial time is
called a Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm.
Our scheme relies on the existence of a pseudorandom function f . Intuitively, the
output a pseudorandom function cannot be distinguished by a realistic adversary from
that of a truly random function. Formally, a pseudorandom function is defined as:
Definition 2 (Pseudorandom Function). A function f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is
pseudorandom if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such
that:
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|Pr[Afk(·) = 1]− Pr[AF (·) = 1]| < negl(n)
where k → {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly randomly and F is a function chosen uniformly
randomly from the set of function mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
Our proof relies on the assumption that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) is hard
in a group G, i.e., it is hard for an adversary to distinguish between group elements gαβ
and gγ given gα and gβ.
Definition 3 (DDH Assumption). The DDH problem is hard regarding a group G if for all
PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such that |Pr[A(G, q, g, gα, gβ,
gαβ) = 1]− Pr[A(G, q, g, gα, gβ, gγ) = 1]| < negl(k) where G is a cyclic group of order q
(|q| = k) and g is a generator of G, and α, β, γ ∈ Zq are uniformly randomly chosen.
Encryption algorithms in the policy deployment phase are based on ClientEnc (Al-
gorithm 2.3) and ServerReEnc (Algorithm 2.4). It is equivalent to encrypting a single
keyword in the SDE scheme [30]. Dong et al. [30] show that the single Keyword En-
cryption (KE) scheme is INDistinguishable under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA).
A cryptosystem is considered IND-CPA secure if no PPT adversary, given an encryption
of a message randomly chosen from two plaintext messages chosen by the adversary, can
identify the message choice with non-negligible probability. Dong et al. [30] prove the
following theorem about the single KE scheme:
Theorem 1. If the DDH problem is hard relative to G, then the single keyword encryption
scheme KE is IND-CPA secure against the server S , i.e., for all PPT adversaries A there
exists a negligible function negl such that:
SuccAKE,S(k) = Pr


b′ = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(params,msk)← Init(1k)
(Ku, Ks)← KeyGen(msk, U)
w0, w1 ← A
ClientEnc(Ku,·)(Ks)
b
R
←− {0, 1}
c∗i (wb) = ClientEnc(xi1, wb)
b′ ← AClientEnc(Ku,·)(Ks, c
∗
i (wb))


< 1
2
+ negl(k)
(3.1)
Proof. See Theorem 1 in [30].
3.6.2 Security of Encryption Algorithms in the Policy Deployment Phase
Using the fact that the KE scheme is IND-CPA secure, we show that the four encryption
schemes: RA, PA, CC and RH are also IND-CPA against the server. We give the proof
details for the Roles Assignment encryption scheme RA. We will show that the following
theorem holds:
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Theorem 2. If the single keyword encryption KE scheme is IND-CPA secure against the
server, then the RA encryption scheme RA is also IND-CPA, i.e., for all PPT adversaries
A, there exists a negligible function negl such that SuccARA,S(k) <
1
2
+ negl(k).
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that breaking the RA encryption reduces
to breaking the KE encryption. We define the following game in which the adversary A
challenges the game with two lists of roles L0 and L1 having the same number of roles
t. We construct the following vector containing the encryption of roles from both lists:
~C(i) = C(r10), . . . , C(r
i
0), C(r
i+1
1 ), . . . , C(r
t
1). The success probability of the adversary in
distinguishing the encryption of the two lists of roles is defined as:
SuccA(k) =
1
2
Pr[A( ~C0) = 0] +
1
2
Pr[A( ~Ct) = 1] (3.2)
In the following, we show that breaking the RA scheme reduces to breaking the KE
game. In the KE game from [30], the adversary challenges the game with two keywords
w0 and w1 and tries to distinguish between their encryptions. Let us consider a PPT
adversary A′ who attempts to challenge the single keyword encryption scheme KE using
the corresponding RA adversary A as a sub-routine The game is the following:
• A′ is given the parameters (G, q, g, h,H, f) as input and for each user i is given
(i, xi2).
• A′ passes these parameters to A.
• A generates two lists of roles L0 and L1 having the same number of roles t and gives
them to A′.
• A′ chooses i
r
←− [1, t]. It then uses ri0, r
i
1 to challenge the single keyword en-
cryption KE game. The adversary gets back cib as the result, where c
i
b is the
encryption of either ri0 or r
i
1. A
′ uses this result to construct a hybrid vector
(c10, . . . , c
i−1
0 , c
i
b, c
i+1
1 , . . . , c
t
1) and sends it to A.
• A′ outputs b′, the bit output by A.
A is required to distinguish ~C(i) and ~C(i−1) and the probability of A’s success in
distinguishing correctly is:
SucciA(k) =
1
2
Pr[A( ~C(i)) = 0] +
1
2
Pr[A( ~C(i−1)) = 1] (3.3)
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Since i is randomly chosen, it holds that:
SuccA′(k) =
∑t
i=1 Succ
i
A(t) ·
1
t
= 1
2t
Pr[A( ~C0) = 0] +
∑t−1
i=1(Pr[A(
~C i) = 0]
+Pr[A( ~C i) = 1]) + 1
2
Pr[A( ~Ct) = 1]
= 1
t
(1
2
Pr[A( ~C0) = 0] + 1
2
Pr[A( ~Ct) = 1]) + t−1
2t
= 1
t
SuccA(k) +
t−1
2t
(3.4)
Because the success probability of A′ to break the single keyword encryption scheme
KE is SuccA′(k) <
1
2
+ negl(k), it follows that SuccA(k) <
1
2
+ negl(k).
The proof for the other encryption schemes is similar and for lack of space we do not
show all the details.
3.6.3 Security of Algorithms in the Policy Evaluation Phase
We now analyse the security of SR, SP, CCE and SRH. These algorithms require the
Service Provider to take some client input (i.e., trapdoors computed using Algorithm
2.9), process it (i.e., re-encrypt it using Algorithm 2.10), and test whether it matches
some information stored on the server. Though a single operation has been proved secure,
we are interested in what these algorithms leak to the Service Provider. We follow the
concept of non-adaptive indistinguishability security introduced for encrypted databases
by [38] and adapted by [30] in a multi-user setting. We show that given two non-adaptively
generated histories with the same length and outcome, no PPT adversary can distinguish
the histories based on what it can observe from the interaction. A history contains all
the interactions between clients and the Service Provider. Non-adaptive history means
that the adversary cannot choose sequences of client inputs based on previous inputs and
matching outcomes.
In the following, we show the details for the SR scheme. In this scheme, a history is
defined as follows:
Definition 4 (SR History). An SR history Hi is an interaction between a Service Provider
and all clients that connect to it, over i role activation requests. Hi = (L
u1
s , . . . , L
ui
s , r
u1
1 ,
. . . , ruii ), where ui represents an identifier of the client making the requests, L
ui
s represents
the lists of roles for client ui, and r
ui
i represents the request made by the client.
We formalise the information leaked to a Service Provider as a trace. We define two
kinds of traces: the trace of a single request and the trace of a history. The trace of a
request leaks to the Service Provider which role in Lis matches the request and can be
formally defined as: tr(r) = {td ∗i (role), L
i
s, idx}, where idx is the index of the matched
role, if any, in Lis.
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We define the role matching pattern P over a history Hi to be a set of binary matrices
(one for each client) with columns corresponding to encrypted roles in the list of the
client, and rows corresponding to requests. P[j, k] = 1 if request j matched the k’s role
and P[j, k] = 0 otherwise.
The trace of a history includes the encrypted role assignment lists of all clients Luis
stored by the Service Provider and which can change as new roles are added and clients
leave of join the system, the trace of each request, and the role matching pattern Pi for
each client.
During an interaction, the adversary cannot see directly the plaintext of the request,
instead it sees the ciphertext. The view of a request is defined as:
Definition 5 (View of a Request). We define the view of a request qu11 under a key set
Kui as: VKui(q
ui) = tr(qui)
Definition 6 (View of a History). We define the view of a history with i interactions Hi
as VKu(Hi) = (L
u1
s , . . . , L
ui
s , VKui (q
ui
1 ), . . . , VKui (q
ui
i ).
The security definition is based on the idea that the scheme is secure if nothing is
leaked to the adversary beyond what the adversary can learn from traces.
We define the following game in which an adversary A generates two histories Hi0 and
Hi1 with the same trace over i requests. Then the adversary is challenged to distinguish
the views of the two histories. If the adversary succeeds with negligible probability, the
scheme is secure.
Definition 7 (Non-adaptive indistinguishability against a curious Service Provider). The
SR scheme is secure in the sense of non-adaptive indistinguishability against a curious
Service Provider if for all i ∈ N and for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible
function negl such that:
Pr


b′ = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(params,msk)← Init(1k)
(Ku, Ks)← KeyGen(msk, U)
Hio,Hi1 ← A(Ks)
b
R
←− {0, 1}
b′ ← A(Ks, VKu(Hib))


<
1
2
+ negl(k) (3.5)
where U is a set of user IDs, Ku is the user side key sets, Ks are the server side key sets,
Hi1 and Hi0 are two histories over i requests such that Tr(Hi0) = Tr(Hi1).
Theorem 3. If the DDH problem in hard relative to G, then the SR scheme is a non-
adaptive indistinguishable secure scheme. The success probability of a PPT adversary A
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in breaking the SR scheme is defined as:
SuccA(k) = 1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L1), TD(~r1)) = 1]
< 1
2
+ negl(k)
(3.6)
where RA(~Li) is the role encryption of the vector of lists of Hi, and TD(~ri) is the
ClientTD of the roles in the requests of Hi.
Proof. We consider an adversary A′ that challenges the RE IND-CPA game using A
as a sub-routine. A′ does the following:
• A′ receives public parameters params and the server side (i, xi2) keys.
• To generate a view of a history Hi = (L
u1
1 , . . . , L
ui
i , q
u1
1 , . . . , q
ui
i ). A
′ performs the
following steps:
– For each role assignment list L
uj
j , run Algorithm 3.1 to encrypt it as RA(L
uj
j ).
– For each Search Role request q
uj
j , run ClientTD (Algorithm 2.9) to generate
the trapdoor TD(r) for the role.
• A outputs Hi0,Hi1. A
′ encrypts Hi1 by itself and challenges the RA IND-CPA game
with ~L0 and ~L1, the vectors of all roles lists in the two histories. It gets the result
RA(~Lb), where b
R
←− {0, 1} and forms a view of a history (RA(~Lb), TD(~r1)). It sends
the view to A.
• A tries to determine which vector was encrypted and outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
• A′ outputs b′.
Because the RA scheme is IND-CPA, it follows that:
1
2
+ negl(k) > SuccA
′
RA(k)
= 1
2
Pr[A((RA(~L0), TD(~r1))) = 0]+
1
2
Pr[A((RA(~L1), TD(~r1))) = 1]
(3.7)
Now let us consider another adversary A′′ who wants to distinguish the pseudorandom
function f using A as a sub-routine. The adversary does the following:
• It generates (G, q, g, h,H) as public parameters, and sends them to A along with f .
For each user i, it chooses randomly xi1, xi2 such that xi1 + xi2 = x. It sends all
(i, xi2) to A and keeps all (i, xi1, xi2).
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• A outputs Hi0,Hi1. A
′′ encrypts all the roles lists in Hi0 as RA(~L0). It chooses
b
R
←− {0, 1} and asks the oracle to encrypt all roles in Hib. It combines the results to
form a view (RA(~L0), TD(~rb)) and returns it to A.
• A outputs b′. A′′ outputs 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
There are two cases to consider: Case 1: the oracle in A′′s game is the pseudorandom
function f , then:
Pr[A′′fs(.)(1k) = 1] =
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r1)) = 1]
(3.8)
Case 2: the oracle in A′′s game is a random function f , then for each distinct role r,
σr is completely random to A. Moreover, we know the traces are identical, so RA(~Lb)
and TD(~rb) are completely random to A. In this case:
Pr[A′′fs(.)(1k) = 1] =
1
2
(3.9)
Because f is a pseudorandom function, by definition it holds that:
|Pr[A′′fs(.)(1k) = 1]− Pr[A′fs(.)(1k) = 1]| < negl(k)
Pr[A′′fs(.)(1k) = 1] < 1
2
+ negl(k)
(3.10)
Sum up SuccA
′
RE(k) and Pr[A
′′fs(.)(1k) = 1]:
1 + negl(k) > 1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r1)) = 1]+
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r1)) = 0]+
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L1), TD(~r1)) = 1]
= 1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L0), TD(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2
+
1
2
Pr[A(RA(~L1), TD(~r1)) = 1]+
= 1
2
+ SuccA(k)
(3.11)
Therefore, SuccA(k) < 1
2
+ negl(k).
3.7 Performance Analysis of ESPOONERBAC
In this section, we discuss a quantitative analysis of the performance of ESPOONERBAC .
In particular, we focus on performance of the modules that have been modified as com-
pared to the ESPOON architecture presented in Chapter 2. It should be noticed that here
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we are concerned about quantifying the overhead introduced by the encryption operations
performed both at the trusted environment and the outsourced environment. In the fol-
lowing discussion, we do not take into account the latency introduced by the network
communication.
3.7.1 Implementation Details of ESPOONERBAC
We have implemented ESPOONERBAC in Java 1.6. We have developed all the components
of the architecture required for performing the policy deployment and policy evaluation
phases. For the cryptographic operations, we have implemented all the functions pre-
sented in Section 3.5. We have tested the implementation of ESPOONERBAC on a single
node based on an Intel Core2 Duo 2.2 GHz processor with 2 GB of RAM, running Mi-
crosoft Windows XP Professional version 2002 Service Pack 3. The number of iterations
performed for each of the following results is 1000.
3.7.2 Performance Analysis of the Policy Deployment Phase
In this section, we analyse the performance of the policy deployment phase. In this phase,
an Admin User encrypts policies and sends those encrypted policies to the Administration
Point running in the outsourced environment. The Administration Point re-encrypts poli-
cies and stores them in the Policy Store in the outsourced environment. In the following,
we analyse the performance of deploying (part of) policies including the role assignment
list, the permission assignment and the role hierarchy graph (as shown in Figure 3.6.
The Role Assignment List: In order to deploy a role assignment list, an Admin
User performs a first round of encryption on the client side (see Algorithm 3.1) and sends
the client encrypted role assignment list to the Administration Point. The Administration
Point performs another round of encryption on the server side (see Algorithm 3.2) before
storing the role assignment list in the Policy Store. Figure 3.6(a) shows performance over-
head on the client side, as well as on the server side in order to deploy a role assignment
list. In this graph, we observe the performance by increasing number of roles in a role
assignment list. As we can expect, the performance overhead increases linearly with the
linear increase in the number of roles in a role assignment list. As we can notice, the
graph grows linearly with the linear increase in the number of roles in the role assignment
list Lr. Asymptotically, the complexity of this phase is Θ(|Lr|).
During the policy deployment phase, the encryption algorithm on the client side (Al-
gorithm 2.3) takes more time that of the server side (Algorithm 2.4) as shown in Figure
3.6. The encryption algorithm on the client side takes more time because it performs more
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Figure 3.6: Performance overhead of deploying RBAC policies: (a) a list of roles assigned to a
user, (b) a list of permissions to a role and (c) a role hierarchy graph
63
64 3.7. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ESPOONERBAC
complex cryptographic operations such as random number generation and hash calcula-
tion as illustrated in Algorithm 2.3. However, any policy is deployed very rarely; whereas,
it may be evaluated quite frequently. Therefore, the performance overhead of the policy
evaluation phase (discussed in Section 3.7.3) is of great importance.
The Permission Assignment List: For deploying permissions assigned to a role,
an Admin User performs a first round of encryption on the client side (see Algorithm
3.3) and sends both the client encrypted role and client encrypted permissions to the
Administration Point, where each permission contains both an action and a target. The
Administration Point generates the server encrypted role and server encrypted permis-
sions after performing a second round of encryption on the server side (see Algorithm
3.4). Figure 3.6(b) shows the performance overhead of deploying a permission assignment
list. This graph illustrates the performance of deploying a permission assignment list for
a role with a number of permissions ranging from 1 to 20. As we can expect, the perfor-
mance overhead increases linearly with the linear increase in the number of permissions in
the permission assignment list Lp. Asymptotically, the complexity of this phase is Θ(|Lp|).
Contextual Conditions: Both the role assignment and the permission assignment
lists include a contextual condition as we can see in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, respec-
tively. The performance of contextual condition is already analysed in Chapter 2, Section
2.6.2 (see Figure 2.7).
The Role Hierarchy Graph: The PDP may search for a base role of the one in
the access request REQ since a derived role inherits all permissions from its base role.
For supporting this search, we deploy a role hierarchy graph. For deploying a role hi-
erarchy graph, an Admin User performs the first round in order to generate the client
encrypted trapdoor, as well as to calculate the client generated trapdoor of each role in
the graph (see Algorithm 3.5). The Admin User sends the client generated role hierarchy
graph to the Administration Point. The Administration Point performs the second round
to generate the server encrypted trapdoor, as well as to calculate the server generated
trapdoor of each role in the graph (see Algorithm 3.6). The PDP matches the trapdoor
of role in REQ with the server encrypted role and if this match is successful, it finds
trapdoors of the base roles. The trapdoors of base roles are required in order to perform
search in the list of server encrypted roles in the Permission Repository.
In our experiment, we consider a role hierarchy graph in which each role Ri extends
role Ri+1 for all values of i from 0 to n − 1 where n indicates the total number of nodes
and varies from 5 to 25. Figure 3.6(c) shows the performance overhead of encrypting a
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role hierarchy graph both on the client side and the server side. The graph grows linearly
with the number of roles in a role hierarchy graph GRH . Asymptotically, the complexity
of this phase is Θ(|GRH |).
Table 3.1: Performance overhead of encrypting requests during the policy evaluation phase
Request Type Time (in milliseconds)
ACT 16.353
REQ 47.069
3.7.3 Performance Analysis of the Policy Evaluation Phase
In this section, we analyse the performance of the policy evaluation phase. In this phase,
a Requester sends the encrypted request to the PEP running in the outsourced environ-
ment. The PEP forwards the encrypted request to the PDP. The PDP has to select
the set of policies that are applicable to the request. The PDP may require contextual
information in order to evaluate the selected policies. In the following, we calculate the
performance overhead of generating requests, search a role (in the Role Repository, in
the Active Roles repository or in the Permission Repository), searching a permission and
searching a role in a role hierarchy graph.
Generating Requests: A Requester may send the role activation request ACT . In
order to generate ACT , a Requester calculates the client generated role (see Algorithm
2.9). This trapdoor generation of role takes 16.353 ms as illustrated in Table 3.1. After a
Requester is active in a role, she may make an access request REQ . A Requester has to
calculate trapdoor for each element (including role, action and target) in REQ . The REQ
generation takes 47.069 ms as illustrated in Table 3.1. We can see that REQ generation
takes 3 times of ACT generation because REQ has to calculate 3 trapdoors while ACT
has to generate only a single trapdoor. The request generation does not depend on any
parameters and can be considered constant.
Searching a Role in the Role Repository/Session: In order to grant ACT , the
PDP needs to search roles in the Role Repository. For searching a role, the PDP first
calculates the server generated trapdoor of role in ACT and then matches this server
encrypted trapdoor with server encrypted roles in the role assignment list as illustrated in
Algorithm 3.7. Figure 3.7(a) shows the performance overhead (in the worst case) of per-
forming this search. In this graph, we can observe that it grows linearly with increase in
number of roles. As the graph indicates, the search function takes initial approximately 4
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Figure 3.7: Performance overhead of evaluating RBAC policies: (a) searching roles in the Role
Repository/Session, (b) searching a role in the Permission Repository, (c) checking the list of
permissions assigned to a role and (d) searching a role in the role hierarchy graph
66
CHAPTER 3. ENFORCING ENCRYPTED RBAC POLICIES 67
ms to generate the server encrypted trapdoor of role in ACT while it takes approximately
0.6 ms to perform encrypted match.
The PDP grants ACT by adding the server encrypted role of the Requester in the
Active Roles repository of the Session. This implies that the Session maintains a list of
active roles. Once a Requester makes an access request REQ , the PDP has to search in
the Session if she is already active in role indicated in REQ . The performance overhead of
searching a role in session is same as it incurs for searching a role in the Role Repository
(shown in Figure 3.7(a)). Asymptotically, the complexity of this phase is O(|Lr|).
Searching a Role in the Permission Repository: After finding the role of REQ
in the list of active roles, the PDP has to search if the same role has the requested per-
mission. For this purpose, the PDP has first to search the role of REQ in the Permission
Repository and if any match is found, it has to search the requested permission in the list
of permissions assigned to the found role. Figure 3.7(b) shows the performance overhead
(in the worst case) of searching a role in the Permission Repository. The graph grows
linearly with the increase in the number of roles in the Permission Repository. The PDP
runs Algorithm 3.7 but with a slight modification of ignoring the server trapdoor genera-
tion (in Line 2) as it is already generated when the role of REQ is searched in the session.
This is why, searching a role in the Permission Repository (as illustrated in Figure 3.7(b))
takes less time than searching a role in the Role Repository or Session (as illustrated in
Figure 3.7(a)). Asymptotically, the complexity of this phase is O(|Lr|).
Searching a Permission: After a role is found in the Permission Repository, the PDP
searches the requested permission in the list of permissions assigned to the found role (see
Algorithm 3.8). Before searching the list of permissions, the PDP has to calculate server
generated trapdoors of both the action and the target present in REQ . As we explained
earlier, a single trapdoor generation on the server side takes approximately 4 ms. The
trapdoor generation of the requested permission, containing an action and a target, takes
8 ms. Next, the PDP match (server generated trapdoors of) this requested permission
with the list of (sever encrypted) permissions assigned to the found role. Figure 3.7(c)
shows the performance overhead (in the worst case) of searching server generated trap-
door of permission with a list of server encrypted permissions. The graph grows linearly
with the increase in the number of permissions in the list. For each permission match,
the PDP performs (at most) two encrypted matches each incurring approximately 0.6 ms.
Asymptotically, the complexity of this phase is O(|Lp|).
Evaluating Contextual Conditions: For evaluating the role assignment (illustrated
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in Figure 3.2) or the permission assignment (illustrated in Figure 3.3) policies, the PDP
may need to evaluate contextual conditions. This part has already been discussed in
Chapter 2, Section 2.6.3 (see Figure 2.9).
Searching in a Role Hierarchy Graph: The PDP may search a role in the role
hierarchy graph. For performing this search, we consider a role hierarchy graph in which
each role Ri extends role Ri+1 for all values of i from 0 to n−1 where n indicates the total
number of nodes and varies from 5 to 25. Figure 3.7(d) shows the performance overhead
of searching a role in the role hierarchy graph deployed on the server side. As we can
expect, the graph grows linearly with the number of roles in a role hierarchy graph GRH .
Asymptotically, the complexity of this phase is O(|GRH |).
Table 3.2: Summary of time complexity of each phase in the lifecycle of ESPOONERBAC
Phase Name Complexity in the Worst Case
Deployment of the role assignment list Θ(|Lr|)
Deployment of the permission assignment list Θ(|Lp|)
Deployment of the role hierarchy graph Θ(|GRH |)
Searching a role O(|Lr|)
Searching a permission O(|Lp|)
Searching in the role hierarchy graph O(|GRH |)
Table 3.2 provides a summary of time complexities of different phases in the lifecycle
of ESPOONERBAC .
Comparing ESPOONERBAC with ESPOON: We compare the performance over-
heads of the policy evaluation of ESPOONERBAC with that of ESPOON [28]. Before we
show the comparison, we see how policies are expressed in both ESPOONERBAC and ES-
POON. The ESPOONERBAC policies are explained in Section 3.3.1. The ESPOON policy
is expressed as a 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple with a CONDITION , meaning if CONDITION holds
then subject S can take action A over target T . For comparing the performance overheads,
we consider ESPOON policies with 50 unique subjects and each subject has 10 unique
actions and targets where each 〈S,A, T 〉 tuple’s condition is the conjunction (AND) of
the contextual condition illustrated in Figure 2.3 and RequesterName=<NAME>. That
is, a subject can execute action over the target provided subject’s name is equal to one
specified in the condition, subject’s location is cardiology-ward and time is between 9 AM
and 5 PM. Similarly, we consider ESPOONERBAC policies with 50 unique roles and each
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role has 10 unique permissions, where each user can get active in 5 roles. The introduction
of RBAC simplifies the roles and permission management because we can enforce possible
conditions at role activation time instead of enforcing them at the permission grant time.
For instance, we can enforce location and time checks (i.e., the condition illustrated in
Figure 2.3) at the role activation time while the condition RequesterName=<NAME>
can be enforced at the permission grant time.
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Figure 3.8: Performance comparison of ESPOON and ESPOONERBAC
Figure 3.8 shows the performance overheads of evaluating ESPOON and
ESPOONERBAC policies. In ESPOON, a requester’s subject is matched with one in the
repository of 500 entries (i.e., 50 subjects each with 10 actions and targets). If there is
any match, requester’s action and target are matched and then condition is evaluated.
In the worst case, in ESPOON, the access request processing can take approximately up
to 500 ms. On the other hand, in ESPOONERBAC , a requester first gets active in a role
provided condition holds. The role activation can take approximately up to 60 ms for a
user that can get active in 5 roles. After the role activation, a requester can be granted
permissions assigned to its role. However, first the active role is searched in the session
and then the permission can be granted if the condition associated with that permission
holds. As we can see in Figure 3.8, grating the permission takes up to 42 ms. The reason
why ESPOONERBAC performance is better than that of ESPOON because (i) all possible
conditions are enforced at the role activation time and (ii) introduction of roles simplified
the roles and permissions management.
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We also consider the effect of role hierarchies on the ESPOONERBAC performance.
In a role hierarchy, we assume that a role can inherit all permissions from its base role.
This simplifies the role management and permission assignment to roles. In our exper-
imentation, we consider 50 roles where each role has 5 permissions. Furthermore, there
is a role hierarchy graph containing 25 roles, which is necessary for finding inheritance
relationship between roles. Figure 3.8 shows a very slight performance gain to evaluate
the access request in case of role hierarchy in ESPOONERBAC . Since the permission can
be associated with base role, we need to traverse in the role hierarchy graph to find base
roles. The performance of traversing in the role hierarchy graph is shown in Figure 3.8.
Finally, the requested permission is granted if associated even with any base roles. The
role hierarchy may improve performance but in the worst case it incurs higher overhead.
However, the performance of ESPOONERBAC with role hierarchy is still better than that
of ESPOON.
3.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the ESPOONERBAC architecture that can enforce
sensitive RBAC policies in an encrypted manner, where users are assigned roles and users
can execute permissions if they are active in a session that manages lists of roles different
users are active in. For structuring sensitive roles within an organisation, ESPOONERBAC
also supports the role hierarchies in RBAC. The RBAC policy is enforced such that
it does not reveal information about roles and permissions managed in the outsourced
environment.
In order to cope with the real-world business requirements, Sandhu et al. [16] propose
an RBAC constraint model that includes both static and dynamic security constraints.
The static security constraints can easily be enforced by existing ESPOONERBAC and
ESPOON architectures. However, the challenging issue is to support dynamic security
constraints in outsourced environments, where the access histories are managed by the
curious Service Provider. In the next chapter, we investigate how to manage the ac-
cess histories in order to enforce dynamic security constraints without leaking private
information to the curious Service Provider.
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E-GRANT: Dynamic Security
Constraints in RBAC⋆
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm offering outsourced services to enterprises for
storing and processing huge amount of data at very competitive costs. For leveraging the
cloud to its fullest potential, organisations require security mechanisms to regulate access
on data, particularly at runtime. One of the strong obstacles in widespread adoption of
the cloud is to preserve confidentiality of the data. In fact, confidentiality of the data
can be guaranteed by employing existing encryption schemes; however, access control
mechanisms might leak information about the data they aim to protect. State of the art
access control mechanisms can statically enforce constraints such as static separation of
duties. The major research challenge is to enforce constraints at runtime, i.e., enforcement
of dynamic security constraints (including Dynamic Separation of Duties and Chinese
Wall) in the cloud. The main challenge lies in the fact that dynamic security constraints
require notion of sessions for managing access histories that might leak information about
the sensitive data if they are available as cleartext in the cloud. In this chapter, we present
E-GRANT: an architecture able to enforce dynamic security constraints without relying
on a trusted infrastructure, which can be deployed as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). In
EnforcinG encRypted dynAmic security constraiNts in The cloud (E-GRANT), sessions’
access histories are encrypted in such a way that enforcement of constraints is still possible.
As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented a prototype and provided a preliminary
performance analysis showing a limited overhead.
⋆The final version of this chapter will appear in [89].
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4.1 Introduction
With its cost-effective model, cloud-based services are very attractive for enterprises and
government sectors. Initially developed as a cheap storage solution (monthly $0.085/GB
and $0.095/GB, as of October 2013, offered by Google [2] and Amazon [3], respectively),
the cloud paradigm today is able to offer affordable software solutions. The term Soft-
ware-as-a-Service (SaaS) is used to indicate software products offered as a service through
the cloud. Several vendors have adopted this model to offer their products at a more
affordable price. Classes of software products available as SaaS range from document
management tools (such as Google Drive [90]) to image processing tools (such as Adobe
Photoshop [91]). Recently, even Business Process Management (BPM) solutions have
become available as SaaS from major players in this field, such SAP with its Business
ByDesign [92]. BPM solutions are at the core of modern organisations to coordinate
the activities within their departments and streamline customers’ requests. As empirical
studies have demonstrated [93], the use of BPM solutions increases the productivity of
the organisation and customer satisfaction.
One of the crucial aspects of BPM systems is the enforcement of access control decisions
for assigning human resources to execute tasks within a business process. If this control
is too restrictive then it could hamper the productivity of the overall business process.
On the other hand, a very lax approach might undermine the confidentiality of sensitive
data (when accessed by unauthorised users), resulting in serious consequences for the
organisation. In a BPM system, the access control mechanism has to take into account
business-related notions such as conflict-of-interests. Typical examples are that of an
employee able to execute two tasks that might lead to fraudulent actions and that of
an employee executing the same task over two different sets of data that could be in
conflict with each other. Over the years, a huge amount of research effort has been put
on this topic. The results have culminated in identifying and enforcing dynamic security
constraints [16, 94–96].
If dynamic security constraints are to be correctly enforced, the system needs to main-
tain history of all actions executed by the entities that it controls, as well as contextual
information of the requester (e.g., time and location). When the system receives a new
request, it checks whether allowing the current request violates any constraints in view of
the earlier actions performed by the same (group of) requesters. State of the art enforce-
ment techniques [80,97–99] rely on a trusted infrastructure, which expects information to
be in cleartext. That is, the history of actions, contextual information, and constraints
are all stored in cleartext to be readily accessible.
With the move towards outsourced solutions, the trust assumptions in the manage-
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ment of the infrastructure do not hold any longer. The cloud providers that have control
over the hardware, where data and security constraints are deployed (and enforced),
could easily have access to them. The data can be protected using encryption techniques;
however, state-of-the-art enforcement techniques [80, 97–99] cannot preserve confiden-
tiality of dynamic security constraints because they expect all information in cleartext
at both deployment and enforcement times. The problem here is that learning about
the security constraints might leak information about the data itself. There are some
cryptographic techniques that can enforce static security constraints in outsourced envi-
ronments [20, 28, 33, 75, 76]. Unfortunately, there is no cryptographic solution that can
enforce dynamic security constraints in the cloud.
4.1.1 Research Contributions
In this chapter, we want to fill this gap and propose an enforcement mechanism for dy-
namic security constraints that can be offered either as a stand-alone SaaS solution or
integrated with other SaaS products that require the enforcement of these constraints.
The main idea is to outsource the enforcement of constraints without revealing sensi-
tive information to the untrusted infrastructure. To the best of our knowledge, we are
first to address the problem of enforcing dynamic security constraints in outsourced envi-
ronments. We named our solution E-GRANT. E-GRANT can enforce constraints while
taking into account contextual information (such as time and location of the user) with-
out revealing any information to cloud providers. In our mechanism, an administrator
can specify constraints with contextual conditions including non-monotonic boolean ex-
pressions and range queries. In E-GRANT, constraints as well as session information are
encrypted. The encryption scheme we use is such that it does not require users to share
any encryption keys. In case a user leaves the organisation, the system is still able to
perform its operations without requiring re-encryption of constraints or access histories
managed by the session. Finally, we have implemented a prototype of E-GRANT and
analysed its performance to quantify the incurred overhead.
4.1.2 Chapter Outline
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related work. Sec-
tion 4.3 provides an overview of the dynamic security constraints supported in E-GRANT.
Section 4.4 describes the E-GRANT architecture. Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 focus on
solution and algorithmic details of the E-GRANT architecture, respectively. In Section
4.7, we provide details about information disclosure in E-GRANT and the type of collu-
sion attack that our solution is subjected to. Section 4.8 describes implementation details
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and analyses the performance overhead of the E-GRANT prototype. Finally, Section 4.9
concludes this chapter.
4.2 Related Work
There is a significant amount of research on enforcing dynamic security constraints in-
cluding Dynamic Separation of Duties (DSoD) [16, 94, 95, 100–102] and Chinese Wall
(CW) [96, 103]. State of the art solutions including RCL 2000 [98], GTRBAC [80],
MFOTL [104] and [97, 99, 105, 106] mainly focus on formally specifying the constraints.
They assume a trusted infrastructure in order to enforce the constraints. There are some
approaches that extend the enforcement mechanisms for taking into account contextual
information such as time and location while making the access decision [78–81]. However,
none of the existing approaches are applicable when the enforcement mechanism is dele-
gated to a third party that is not trusted. These approaches operate on the constraints
that are stored in cleartext. Unfortunately, these constraints may leak information about
the internal policies of an organisation and can result in serious implications if not ade-
quately protected.
There are some approaches for enforcing static security constraints in outsourced en-
vironments [20, 28, 33, 75, 76]. The idea of delegating the access control mechanism to an
outsourced environment has initially been explored by De Capitani di Vimercati et al.
in [20] and extended it in [33]. Their proposed solution is based on the key derivation
method [45], where each user has a key capable of decrypting resources she is authorised
to access. The main drawback of this type of approaches is that they tightly couple se-
curity policies with the enforcement mechanism; therefore, any changes in the security
policies require to generate new keys and to redistribute them to the users.
In [28], we propose ESPOON that aims at providing a clear separation between security
policies and the enforcement mechanism. ESPOON enforces authorisation policies in
outsourced environments. In ESPOON, a data owner may attach an authorisation policy
with her data while storing it on the server running in the outsourced environment. A data
consumer may request for the data and get access if the authorisation policy corresponding
to the requested data is satisfied, where the evaluation is performed also by the server
running in the outsourced environment. ESPOON does not consider concept of roles at
all. In [75, 76], we extend ESPOON for supporting an encrypted version of the RBAC
model and propose ESPOONERBAC . Users can be associated to roles and get access rights
based on the role hierarchies that are managed by the server. In ESPOONERBAC , it is
possible to enforce static security constraints, such as static separation of duties; however,
it is not possible to delegate the enforcement of dynamic security constraints, such as
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History-Based Dynamic Separation of Duties (HBDSoD) and CW. The main issue is
that the proposed architecture in [75,76] lacks to manage encrypted session management,
necessary for enforcing dynamic security constraints in outsourced environments.
The security policy enforcement is mainly based on encrypted matching schemes in
untrusted environments. There are number of schemes that address encrypted matching
in outsourced environments [35, 36, 38, 44, 47, 49]. Song et al. [35] are the first to pro-
pose an encrypted matching scheme, where documents and requests are encrypted using
symmetric keys. The main drawback of this scheme is that it is a single-user scheme.
Multi-user Searchable Symmetric Encryption (MSSE) [38] is the first scheme to support
encrypted matching in multi-user settings. In the MSSE scheme, a data owner controls
the search access by granting and revoking the search privileges to the users within her
group by employing the symmetric encryption. The issue with scheme is that it requires
redistribution of secret to all users once a user is revoked. Boneh et al. [36] are the first
to propose the encrypted matching scheme in the public settings; however, it is not a
multi-user scheme. Shao et al. [44] introduce Proxy Re-Encryption with keyword Search
(PRES) scheme that is a combination of proxy re-encryption and Public-key Encryption
with Keyword Search (PEKS). In PEKS, a delegation key is generated for the target user.
The target user re-encrypts the ciphertext with the delegated key. The re-encryption al-
gorithm outputs another ciphertext corresponding to the public key of the target user.
That is why, this scheme high performance overhead for re-encrypting ciphertext.
There are schemes based on ABE including CP-ABE [47] and KP-ABE [49]. In
CP-ABE, policies are attached with ciphertext; while, in KP-ABE, attributes are at-
tached with ciphertext. The main issue is that both schemes leave policies and attributes
in cleartext, respectively. Unfortunately, policies and attributes in cleartext may reveal
private information about the encrypted data.
4.3 Dynamic Security Constraints in E-GRANT
E-GRANT focuses mainly on enforcing dynamic security constraints. There are two vari-
ants of dynamic security constraints: (i) DSoD [16, 94, 95] and (ii) CW [96]. Both DSoD
and CW can be implemented by maintaining access history for each entity active in the
system [107]. At each new request, the system has to check that none of the defined con-
straints are violated by granting the received request with respect to the earlier actions
performed by the same (group of) requesters. With each variant of constraints, it is pos-
sible to specify contextual conditions i.e., enforcing constraints while taking into account
contextual information, such as time and location of the requester. In the following, first
we briefly explain both variants and then we describe contextual conditions.
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4.3.1 Dynamic Separation of Duties
DSoD constraints [16,94,95] aim at providing multi-user control over the resources when
there is any conflict-of-interest for completing a business process. In the following, we
provide a brief description of each category of DSoD varying from coarse-grained to fine-
grained levels, as discussed in [108].
Simple Dynamic Separation of Duties (SDSoD) In SDSoD, a user may be a mem-
ber of two mutually exclusive roles but must not be active in both roles simultane-
ously.
Object-Based Dynamic Separation of Duties (ObDSoD) In ObDSoD, a user may
be active in mutually exclusive roles simultaneously, but must not act in both roles
upon a single object.
Operational Dynamic Separation of Duties (OpDSoD) In OpDSoD, a user may
be active in mutually exclusive roles simultaneously, but must not get authorised to
execute all actions of a business process.
HBDSoD In HBDSoD, a user may be active in mutually exclusive roles simultaneously,
but the user must not get authorised to execute all actions of a business process
involving the same object. For example, a user active in both clerk and manager
roles can either issue or approve a particular instance of the purchase order. HBDSoD
combines ideas behind ObDSoD and OpDSoD, requiring a detailed access history
on each object. Thus, it is the most fine-grained category of DSoD.
4.3.2 Chinese Wall
A CW constraint [96] prevents users to access an object belonging to a domain which is
in conflict-of-interest with other domain whose object is previously accessed by the same
(group of) users. In other words, a CW constraint aims at providing confidentiality by
preventing illegitimate information flow between domains that are in conflict-of-interest.
For instance, let us consider the consultant organisation that provides services to com-
panies that are in conflict-of-interest, say Google and Microsoft. The CW constraint will
help the consultant organisation to enforce the policy that an employee can work at either
Google or Microsoft but cannot work at both companies.
4.3.3 Contextual Conditions
In E-GRANT, both DSoD and CW constraints can be enforced under a certain context
[28,75,78–81]. The context can be specified as contextual conditions, which are evaluated
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at runtime by collecting contextual information. Usually, contextual information includes,
but not limited to, the requester’s location and the access time. As an example of a
HBDSoD constraint with contextual conditions, we can consider the case where a user
active in two mutually exclusive roles. For instance, two roles clerk and manager cannot
issue and approve the same instance of the purchase order on the same day from the same
sub-office.
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Figure 4.1: The E-GRANT architecture for enforcing dynamic security constraints in outsourced
environments
4.4 The E-GRANT Architecture
The E-GRANT architecture aims at enforcing dynamic security constraints in outsourced
environments in such a way that contents of constraints, contextual conditions, session
information for maintaining access histories and contents of the request are not revealed
to cloud providers because they are encrypted. Therefore, the enforcement mechanism
can be deployed in the cloud without the need of fully trusting administrators of cloud
providers. Our main goal here is to protect the confidentiality of information used by
the enforcement mechanism for taking its access control decisions. The rationale behind
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this is that even if the data is protected (e.g., encrypted) a curious administrator might
learn information about the data by inspecting the constraints and access histories that
are typically deployed in cleartext. Figure 4.1 illustrates the E-GRANT architecture
containing the following entities:
Admin User An Admin User is responsible for deploying, updating and deleting dy-
namic security constraints.
Requester A Requester is a user that can make requests to access resources and execute
actions in the system.
Outsourced Enforcement Module (OEM) It is responsible for storing and enforc-
ing dynamic security constraints. In E-GRANT, the OEM is deployed as SaaS in
the outsourced environment, managed by the cloud provider. We assume that the
cloud provider is honest-but-curious (as assumed in [20, 33]): that is, it allows the
components to follow the protocol for performing requested actions but curious to
deduce information about contents of constraints, access histories and requests.
Trusted Key Management Authority (TKMA) The TKMA is a trusted authority
responsible for generating keys used for protecting data stored on the OEM. For
each user (be it an Admin User or a Requester), the TKMA generates the client key
set and the server key set that are sent to the user and the OEM, respectively. The
OEM stores all server side key sets in the Key Store and is responsible for revoking
users. The TKMA is only the minimal infrastructure that is run within a trusted
environment. However, the TKMA can be kept offline because it generates the key
only once when any user gets registered with the system.
In E-GRANT, an Admin User can deploy new constraints and update (or delete) exist-
ing constraints. For deploying new constraints, an Admin User sends the (i) Constraint to
the OEM as shown in Figure 4.1. The Administration Point is a component of the OEM
that receives (i) and then stores it in the Constraint Repository (ii), which is managed by
the OEM.
A Requester can send a (1) Request to the OEM as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The PEP
of the OEM receives (1) and then identifies whether (1) is a role activation request or an
access request. The PEP forwards the (2) Role Activation/Access Request to the PDP of
the OEM. The PDP is the core component that can grant the request after evaluating the
deployed constraints. For evaluating constraints, the PDP fetches the (3) Constraint from
the Constraint Repository and the (4) Session Information from the Session component
of the OEM. The Session component maintains two repositories including Active Roles
and the Access History. Active Roles is a repository that keeps record of roles that have
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been activated for a Requester while the Access History is a repository that maintains
what information has been accessed by a Requester. The Session Information can include
information about active roles or the access history; thus, it plays a vital role in evaluating
the constraints.
The constraints could be enforced under some contextual conditions. A PDP evaluates
contextual conditions after collecting contextual information, such as time and informa-
tion about the Requester, e.g., her location. The Policy Information Point (PIP) is a
trusted entity that provides (5) Contextual Information to the PDP. The contextual in-
formation must satisfy contextual conditions for the successful enforcement of constraints.
After the evaluation, the PDP sends the (7) Role Activation/Access Response to the
PEP. The response in (7) is either allow or deny depending on the PDP evaluation
as explained in Section 4.5. In case of allow, the PDP updates the session with the role
activation or access information by sending the (6) Session Update message to the Session.
The PDP forwards its decision to the PEP. If the decision is allow, the PEP forwards (7B)
Access Request to the Service Interface. Finally, the PEP may send the (8) Response to
the Requester.
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Figure 4.2: Integration of E-GRANT with other services by (a) directly importing the Service
Interface (b) remotely invoking the Service Interface
The Service Interface is a programmable interface that can be used for integrating
E-GRANT with other services. The Service Interface can be used as an entry point for
forwarding access requests to the PEP for other services. Figure 4.2 shows two possible
configurations. In Figure 4.2(a), the E-GRANT OEM is integrated with an Enterprise
Resource Management (ERM) SaaS. In this scenario, the OEM can be used for receiving
users’ requests, enforcing security constraints and forwarding the granted requests to
the ERM. Another option is shown in Figure 4.2(b), where several BPM SaaS instances
remotely invoke the Service Interface of the OEM for making access control requests. It
should be noted that the mechanisms used by other services to protect their data is out of
the scope of E-GRANT. E-GRANT is solely responsible for the enforcement of encrypted
security constraints. In the following section, we will provide a detailed description on
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how encrypted security constraints are deployed and enforced by the OEM.
4.5 Solution Details of E-GRANT
E-GRANT aims at enforcing dynamic security constraints in outsourced environments.
The main idea behind E-GRANT is to employ the encryption scheme for protecting
constraints and the sessions while delegating the enforcement mechanism to the OEM.
The encryption scheme is based on the proxy re-encryption proposed by Dong et al. [30].
Due to lack of space, we omit details of some operations (including enforcement of SDSoD,
ObDSoD and OpDSoD) and cover the most complex operations offered by E-GRANT
including enforcement of HBDSoD and CW. In the following, we describe how constraints,
as well as requests are represented and then we provide technical details for enforcing
constraints in an encrypted way.
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Figure 4.3: An example of HBDSoD where a Requester’s action can be 1-of-(Issue,Approve)
AND Object-Type is Purchase-Order
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Figure 4.4: An example of CW illustrating two domains that are in conflict-of-interest
4.5.1 Representation of Constraints
For representing both DSoD and CW constraints, we use the tree structure proposed by
Bethencourt et al. in [47], which they used for representing CP-ABE policies. Internal
nodes of the tree represent AND, OR or threshold gates (e.g., 2 out of 3) while leaf
nodes represent values of the condition predicates of a constraint. Figure 4.3 illustrates
an example of the HBDSoD constraint, where a Requester can execute either issue or
80
CHAPTER 4. ENFORCING DYNAMIC SECURITY CONSTRAINTS IN RBAC 81
approve but not both actions on the same instance of the purchase order. Similarly, we
can express the CW constraint. Figure 4.4 illustrates an example of the CW constraint,
where a Requester can work exclusively on instance of either Google’s marketing project
or Microsoft’s marketing project.
4.5.2 Representation of a Request
The access request can be represented as a tuple REQ = 〈R,A,O, I〉, where R is role of
the Requester, A indicates the action to be taken, O and I describe type of the object
being accessed and its instance identifier, respectively. For instance, consider a Requester,
active in a role manager, takes the approve action over the instance of a purchase order.
The object type O may be a fully qualified name that may include the domain hierarchy
an object type may belong to. For example, consider a CW constraint, where a Requester
(employed by a consultant organisation) cannot work on instances belonging to both
Google’s marketing project and Microsoft’s marketing project. Here, the object type O
is Project while the domain hierarchy is: Google/Marketing and Microsoft/Marketing. In
case, if it is the role activation request then a Requester just needs to send her role. Thus,
the access request is more complex than the role activation request; therefore, we will
focus more on the access request in rest of the chapter.
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Figure 4.5: The detailed E-GRANT architecture
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4.5.3 Technical Details of E-GRANT
In this section, we provide technical details of the E-GRANT architecture as illustrated
in Figure 4.5. The detail of the algorithms in Figure 4.5 can be found in Chapter 2 (Sec-
tion 2.5) while the detail of each phase in the enforcement lifecycle of dynamic security
constraints can be found in Section 4.6.
Initialisation: E-GRANT is based on the proxy re-encryption scheme proposed by Dong
et al. [30], where each user (including an Admin User and a Requester) gets a client side
key set from the TKMA while the OEM as a proxy server also receives a server side key
set corresponding to that user. The OEM maintains all these key sets in a Key Store,
which can be accessed by different components of the OEM including the Administration
Point, the PDP and the PEP.
Constraint Deployment: For deploying a constraint, an Admin User performs the
first round of encryption using the client side key set. In this round of encryption, each
leaf node of the constraint tree is encrypted while non-leaf nodes representing AND, OR
or threshold gates are in cleartext. Next, an Admin User sends the user encrypted tree
to the Administration Point of the OEM as shown in Figure 4.5 Step (i). After the first
round of encryption, constraints are protected but they cannot be enforced yet as they
are not in common format. To convert constraints into a common format, the Admin-
istration Point of the OEM performs the second round of encryption using the server
side key set corresponding to the same Admin User who performed the first round of
encryption as shown in Figure 4.5 Step (ii). In fact, the second round of encryption by
the Administration Point serves as a proxy re-encryption. The common format implies
that the constraints get encrypted with the master secret key, which is known neither to
any users nor to the OEM. Like the first round of encryption, each leaf node of the tree
representing the security constraint is re-encrypted. Finally, the re-encrypted constraints
are stored by the Constraint Repository.
If an encrypted request satisfies any encrypted deployed constraint (i.e., Figure 4.5
Step (4)), then the session information is required to be matched against elements of the
constraint (i.e., Figure 4.5 Step (6)). That is, the session information is matched with
those elements of the constraint that are not present in the request. For example, let us
consider the SDSoD constraint, where a user may be a member of two mutually exclusive
roles clerk and manager but must not be active in both roles simultaneously. Let us
assume that the requester’s role is clerk. Since the requester’s role is matched against
the same role in the constraint, the OEM will consult the session to check if the same
user is active in manager’s role. For performing such a check, OEM requires trapdoors of
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the constraint because only trapdoors could be matched with the encrypted information.
That is why, trapdoors are stored along with the encrypted constraint at deployment
time. For calculating these trapdoors, an Admin User performs the first round of trap-
door generation using the client side key set for each leaf node in the request (as shown
in Figure 4.5 Step (i)) while the OEM performs the second round of trapdoor generation
using the server side key set corresponding to that Admin User (as shown in Figure 4.5
Step (ii)). The trapdoor representation does not leak any information.
Making a Request: For making a request, a Requester generates REQ and trans-
forms it into trapdoors using the client side key set for each element in the request. That
is, there is a trapdoor for each element in REQ . Finally, REQ is sent over to the PEP of
the OEM as shown in Figure 4.5 Step (1).
Constraint Evaluation: The deployed constraints are checked when the OEM receives
a request from any Requester. The request is not in the common format yet and requires
another round of the trapdoor generation. In the second round of trapdoor generation,
the PEP generates the server side trapdoors for each element in REQ (i.e., Figure 4.5
Step (2)). After completing the second round of trapdoor generation, the PEP forwards
the request to the PDP. The PDP fetches encrypted constraints from the Constraint
Repository (i.e., Figure 4.5 Step (3)) and matches it against the encrypted request (i.e.,
Figure 4.5 Step (4)). If the constraint is satisfied, then certain elements of the constraint
(i.e., all elements except one that is present in the request) are required to be matched
against the session information.
Contextual Conditions: Optionally, constraints may include contextual conditions (al-
ready discussed in detail in Chapter 2). For the evaluation of contextual conditions, the
PDP might require contextual information, which is fetched from the PIP. The PIP per-
forms the first round of trapdoor generation using the client side key set1. Let us consider
that the required contextual information is current office hour and location of the Re-
quester. We represent each string attribute as a single element. The numerical attributes
are represented as a bag of bits, where each numerical attribute of size s-bit is represented
by s elements (in the worst case). For the simplicity, we assume that there are total 8
office hours (from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM) that can be represented with three bits. For
instance, the first office hour can be represented as: t : ∗ ∗ 0 , t : ∗0∗ and t : 0 ∗ ∗; and
the last (8th) office hour can be represented as: t : ∗ ∗ 1 , t : ∗1∗ and t : 1 ∗ ∗. Similarly,
1The PIP is considered as a user and gets the client side key set in the same way as a normal user (an Admin
User or a Requester) does.
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the location of the Requester can be represented as: location : office. While performing
the first round of trapdoor generation, a trapdoor is generated for each element of con-
textual information. For instance, in the example where contextual information includes
office hours (say the first hour) and location of the Requester (say office), a trapdoor is
generated for each element including t : ∗ ∗ 0 , t : ∗0∗, t : 0 ∗ ∗ and location : office. After
performing the first round of trapdoor generation, the PIP sends contextual information
to the PDP. The PDP performs the second round of trapdoor generation for each element
of contextual information so that a match can be performed.
While performing the encrypted match between the encrypted session information and
the encrypted constraint/request, the OEM does not reveal contents. If contextual in-
formation is required to be matched, it is matched in the same way as other elements of
the constraint/request are matched against the session information. After checking the
session information (i.e., Figure 4.5 Step (6)), if the constraint is not satisfied, the access
is permitted and the role activation (or the access) response is sent from the PDP to the
PEP as allow. Otherwise, the access is denied and the role activation (or the access)
response is sent from the PDP to the PEP as deny.
Updating the Session: If the evaluation is successful, the PDP updates the session
to maintain the access history, as well as active roles. For updating the session, the PDP
requires the request (and contextual information). The Requester may send encrypted
request along with the trapdoors of the request as shown in Figure 4.5 Step (1). Alterna-
tively, the PDP/PEP can collect this information after the PDP evaluation is succeeded.
In both cases, the OEM performs the second round of encryption and finally updates
the Session with the encrypted request as shown in Figure 4.5 Step (7). If the requested
action is the access request, the PEP additionally forwards it to the Service Interface.
Finally, the PEP may send a response to the Requester.
User Revocation: In E-GRANT, users (both Admin Users and Requesters) do not
share any keys and even if a compromised user is removed, there is no need to re-encrypt
deployed constraints or re-distribute keys. For removing a user from the system, the Ad-
ministration Point of the OEM takes the user identifier and then removes the server side
key corresponding to that user from the Key Store.
4.6 Algorithmic Details of E-GRANT
In this section, we identify all phases describing the enforcement lifecycle of dynamic
security constraints in outsourced environments. For each of these phases, we list all of
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its algorithms in detail. In fact, these algorithms constitute the proposed schema that is
based on [30].
4.6.1 The Initialisation Phase
In this phase, the system is initialised by the TKMA. During the system initialisation, the
system level master key and public parameters are generated. This phase consists of only
one algorithm called Init illustrated in Algorithm 2.1. After running this algorithm, the
TKMA publicises the public parameters params = (G, g, q, h, H, f) and keeps securely
the master secret key msk = (x, s).
4.6.2 The Key Generation Phase
During the key generation phase, the keying material is generated for each user including
an Admin User and a Requester by the TKMA. This phase consists of only one algorithm
calledKeyGen and is illustrated in Algorithm 2.2. After running theKeyGen algorithm,
the TKMA generates two key sets: Kui and Ksi corresponding to user i. The TKMA
securely transmits Kui and Ksi to the user i and the OEM, respectively. Each user i
receives the user side key set Kui and stores it securely as it serves as the private key
for her. The Administration Point of the OEM receives the server side key set Ksi
corresponding to user i and inserts it in the Key Store, where the Key Store is updated
as: KS ← KS ∪Ksi. The Key Store of the OEM is initialised as: KS ← Φ.
Algorithm 4.1 ClientGeneratedConstraint
Description: It transforms cleartext constraints into the (encrypted) client generated con-
straints, which are sent to the Administration Point as shown in Figure 4.1 Step (i).
Input: The constraint tree SCT , the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i
and the public parameters params.
Output: The client generated constraint tree SCTCi .
1: SCTCi ← SCT
2: for each leaf-node element e in tree SCTCi do
3: c∗i (e)← call ClientEnc (e, Kui , params)
4: td∗i (e)← call ClientTD (e, Kui , params)
5: ug(e)← (c∗i (e), td
∗
i (e))
6: replace e of SCTCi with ug(e)
7: end for
return SCTCi
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4.6.3 The Constraint Deployment Phase
During this phase, a constraint is deployed by an Admin User. Each constraint is de-
ployed in two phases; therefore, this phase consists of two algorithms: Algorithm 4.1
and Algorithm 4.2 called ClientGeneratedConstraint and ServerGeneratedCon-
straint, respectively. The constraint is first transformed into a tree structure as already
explained in Section 4.5. After performing transformation, each leaf node of this tree
SCT is encrypted (by running ClientEnc described in Chapter 2 as Algorithm 2.3) and
client generated trapdoors (by running ClientTD described in Chapter 2 as Algorithm
2.9) are also calculated using the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i
as shown in Algorithm 4.1, which is run by the Admin User. Finally, the client generated
constraint SCTCi is sent over to the Administration Point of the OEM as illustrated in
Figure 4.1 Step (i).
Algorithm 4.2 ServerGeneratedConstraint
Description: It re-encrypts the client generated constraints into the server generated con-
straints, which are finally deployed by the Administration Point as shown in Figure 4.1
Step (ii).
Input: The client generated constraint tree SCTCi and Admin User i.
Output: The server generated constraint tree SCTS.
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i
2: SCTS ← SCTCi
3: for each leaf-node client generated element ug(e) = (c∗i (e), td
∗
i (e)) in tree SCTS do
4: c(e)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (e), Ksi)
5: td(e)← call ServerTD (td∗i (e), Ksi)
6: sg(e)← (c(e), td(e))
7: replace ug(e) of SCTS with sg(e)
8: end for
return SCTS
The Administration Point of the OEM receives the client encrypted constraint SCTCi
and performs another round of encryption (by running ServerReEnc described in Chap-
ter 2 as Algorithm 2.4) and the trapdoor generation (by running ServerTD described
in Chapter 2 as Algorithm 2.10) using the server side key set Ksi corresponding to Ad-
min User i as shown in Algorithm 4.2. After running Algorithm 4.2, the Administration
Point stores the server generated constraints in the Constraint Repository on the OEM
as illustrated in Figure 4.1 Step (ii).
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Algorithm 4.3 ClientGeneratedRequest
Description: It transforms the cleartext request into the client generated request, which is sent
to the PEP as shown in Figure 4.1 Step (1).
Input: The request REQ containing list of elements, the client side key set Kui corresponding
to Requester i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client generated request REQCi .
1: REQCi ← REQ
2: for each element e in list REQCi do
3: td∗i (e)← call ClientTD (e, Kui , params)
4: c∗i (e)← call ClientEnc (e, Kui , params)
5: req∗i (e)← (td
∗
i (e), c
∗
i (e))
6: replace e of REQCi with req
∗
i (e)
7: end for
return REQCi
4.6.4 The Request Phase
In this phase, Requester i makes a request REQ , which is enciphered using her private
key set Kui. This phase consists of one algorithm called ClientGeneratedRequest
illustrated in Algorithm 4.3 in which each element in REQ (assuming REQ also includes
contextual information) is transformed into a trapdoor (by running ClientTD described
in Chapter 2 as Algorithm 2.9). Furthermore, each element in REQ is encrypted (by
running ClientEnc described in Chapter 2 as Algorithm 2.3) because it is required to be
stored in the session provided it is granted. Finally, the client request REQCi is sent over
to the OEM.
4.6.5 The Constraint Evaluation and Session Update Phase
This is the core phase in which constraints are evaluated and the session is updated
with the information within the request, provided the request is granted. This phase
consists of one algorithm called ConstraintEval-SessionUp illustrated in Algorithm
4.4, which is run by the PEP of the OEM. After receiving the client request REQCi,
the PEP first retrieves the server side key Ksi corresponding to Requester i (Line 1).
The PEP then performs the second round of trapdoor generation (by running ServerTD
described in Chapter 2 as Algorithm 2.10) for each element in REQCi (Line 2-6). After
performing the second round of trapdoor generation, the server generated request REQS
is matched against the deployed constraint SCTS (Line 7-12), where it is mainly checked
if the encrypted tree EncryptedTree of the deployed constraint SCTS is satisfied by the
encrypted request REQS (Line 12). The detail how EncryptedTree is matched against
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Algorithm 4.4 ConstraintEval-SessionUp
Description: It fetches the encrypted constraints (see Figure 4.1 Step (3)), transforms the
client request into the server generated request, then matches constraints with the request.
Input: The server generated constraint tree SCTS, the list of client generated trapdoor REQCi ,
Requester i and session S.
Output: true or false .
1: Ksi ← KS[i] ⊲ retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester i
2: REQS ← REQCi
3: for each client generated request element req∗i (e).td
∗
i (e) in list REQS do
4: td(e)← call ServerTD (td∗i (e), Ksi)
5: replace req∗i (e).td
∗
i (e) of REQS with td(e)
6: end for
7: EncryptedTree← SCTS
8: Add field decision to each node of EncryptedTree
9: for each node n in tree EncryptedTree do
10: n.decision← null ⊲ initialise decision field with null
11: end for
12: call CheckTreeSatisfiability (EncryptedTree.root, EncryptedTree , REQS)
13: if EncryptedTree.root.decision
?
= true then
14: TrapdoorList ← extract trapdoors from EncryptedTree that needs to be searched in
session s
15: record-found← false
16: for each record r in session S do
17: for each server encrypted element c(e) in r to be matched with td(e) in TrapdoorList
do
18: match← call Match (child.c(e), REQS .td(e))
19: if match
?
= false then
20: break;
21: end if
22: end for
23: if match
?
= true then
24: record-found← true
25: break;
26: end if
27: end for
28: if record-found
?
= true then return false
29: end if
30: end if
⊲ steps for updating session
31: r← φ
32: for each client encrypted request element req∗i (e).c
∗
i (e) in list REQS do
33: c(e)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (e), Ksi)
34: r ← r ∪ c(e)
35: end for
36: S ← S ∪ r ⊲ session updation
return true
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Algorithm 4.5 CheckTreeSatisfiability
Description: It checks whether the encrypted constraint satisfies the encrypted request.
Input: The root node n of encrypted constraint tree EncryptedTree and the list of server gen-
erated trapdoors of request REQS .
Output: true or false .
1: if n
?
= null then
return true ⊲ if null constraint then it trivially satisfies the request
2: end if
3: if n.decision 6= null then
return n.decision ⊲ if decision is already made then return it
4: end if
5: if isLeaf(n)
?
= true then
6: n.decision← call Match (n.c(e), REQS .td(e))
return n.decision ⊲ if it is leaf node then perform matching and return its decision
7: end if
8: k′ ← 0
9: for each child of n in EncryptedTree do ⊲ if it is non-leaf node then call this function
recursively for each of its child
10: if call CheckTreeSatisfiability (child, EncryptedTree , REQS)
?
= true then
11: k′ ← k′ + 1
12: end if
13: end for
14: if (n.gate
?
= OR and k′ ≥ 1) or n.k
?
= k′ then
15: n.decision← true ⊲ set decision as true if (a) node’s gate is OR and one of its child
is satisfied or (b) the number of children n has is equal to number of satisfied elements, i.e.,
the case of both AND and threshold gates
16: else
17: n.decision← false
18: end if
return n.decision
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REQS is provided in Algorithm 4.5.
If SCTS is matched against REQS (Line 13), then the certain trapdoors of the deployed
constraint are extracted (Line 14) and then matched against records in the Active Roles
repository (in case of role activation request) or the Access History repository (in case
of access request) of the session (Line 15-27). If the match (in Line 28) is successful
(assuming the constraint with 1-out-of-n condition for roles or actions), no action is taken
and false is returned (Line 28), indicating that the session is not updated; otherwise, each
element of REQS is re-encrypted (by running ServerReEnc described in Chapter 2 as
Algorithm 2.4) and then the session is updated with the encrypted information of active
roles or the access history (Line 31-36) and true is returned (Line 36), indicating that the
session is updated by running Algorithm 4.4.
4.7 Discussion
This section provides the discussion about security aspects of E-GRANT including infor-
mation disclosure and the collusion attack.
4.7.1 Information Disclosure
In E-GRANT, a curious OEM may deduce the structure of security constraints. That is, a
curious OEM may learn what gates (AND, OR and k-of-n) are used in security constraints.
However, the most important information is actually contents of security constraints that
are not revealed to the OEM. To partially resolve the problem of revealing structure,
we may include some dummy elements in the constraint. Furthermore, a curious OEM
may also deduce how many elements are present (but does not learn about contents of
elements) in the request or contextual information; once again, the Requester or the PIP
can include some dummy elements in order to obfuscate the number of elements present
in the request or contextual information, respectively.
4.7.2 Collusion Attack
In E-GRANT, a single compromised user (either an Admin User or a Requester) may
recover the master secret key by colluding with the OEM. One way to withstand the
collusion attack is to split the client side key set into two parts; where, one part is given
to the user while the other part is managed by the organisation gateway to access the
OEM. In this case, the organisation gateway is assumed trusted. The other way to
withstand the collusion attack is to consider the trusted hardware for storing the client
side key set.
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4.8 Performance Analysis of E-GRANT
In this section, we show the effectiveness of E-GRANT for enforcing dynamic security con-
straints by quantifying the performance overhead incurred by the cryptographic operations
performed at both the client and the server sides. During this performance evaluation, we
are not taking into account the latency introduced by the network. In the following, we
first describe implementation details of the prototype we have developed. Next, we show
the performance evaluation of: (i) deploying dynamic security constraints, (ii) making
a request, (iii) evaluating dynamic security constraints and (iv) finally updating session
with the information within the request.
4.8.1 Implementation Details of E-GRANT
We have developed a prototype of E-GRANT for enforcing dynamic security constraints.
The prototype is implemented in Java 1.6. For this prototype, we have designed all
the components of the architecture required for deploying and evaluating constraints. In
short, we have implemented all algorithms presented in Section 4.6.
We have tested our E-GRANT prototype on a single node based on an Intel Core2
Duo 2.2 GHz processor with 2 GB of RAM, running Microsoft Windows XP Professional
version 2002 Service Pack 3. The values of the execution time shown in the following
graphs are averaged over 1000 iterations.
4.8.2 Performance Analysis of Deploying Dynamic Security Constraints
In this section, we analyse the performance of deploying dynamic security constraints. In
order to deploy a constraint, an Admin User performs on the client side the first round of
encryption and the trapdoor generation for each element in the constraint as explained in
Section 4.5 (see Algorithm 4.1) and sends the client generated constraint to the OEM. The
Administration Point of the OEM receives the client generated constraint and performs
the second round of encryption and the trapdoor generation for each element in the client
generated constraint (see Algorithm 4.2). Finally, the server generated constraint is sent
to the Constraint Repository of the OEM.
We measure the performance of deploying both types of security constraints includ-
ing HBDSoD and CW. The simplest HBDSoD constraint is defined with two actions
at least, meaning a user cannot execute both actions. For increasing complexity of the
HBDSoD constraint, we can consider more than two actions using the following notation:
HBDSoD(Y a), where Y (≥ 2) denotes the number of actions in the constraint. Similarly,
the simplest CW constraint is defined at the object level, meaning a user cannot access an
instance of an object whose instance has already been accessed. In order to increase the
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complexity of the CW constraint, we can include the domain hierarchy. Generally, the
CW constraint can be represented as: CW (Zd/o), where Z (≥ 0) denotes the number of
domains that may be present in the domain hierarchy. If the constraint is at the object
level, the value of Z will be 0 and constraint would become CW(o). However, if the
constraint includes any domains, then the value of Z will be more than 0. For instance,
if there is one domain then the constraint would be represented as CW(d/o). Similarly, if
there are two domains (i.e., one domain and one subdomain) in the domain hierarchy of
an object then the constraint would be represented as CW(2d/o) and so on. Asymptot-
ically, the complexities of deploying HBDSoD and CW constraints are Θ(Y ) and Θ(Z),
respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Performance overhead of deploying dynamic security constraints
Figure 4.6 indicates the performance overhead incurred by deploying constraints on
both the client and the server sides. During the performance evaluation, we consider both
HBDSoD and CW constraints, each with varying level of complexity, where number of
actions in the HBDSoD constraint are varied from 2 to 5 (with step size 1) and number
of domains in the CW constraint are varied from 0 to 3 (with step size 1), respectively.
As we can expect, the performance overhead of each type of constraint grows linearly if
we gradually increase its complexity. Furthermore, we can observe that algorithms on
the client side take more time as compared to that of the server side for deploying any
type of constraints. This is mainly due to the fact the client side performs more complex
cryptographic operations such as random number generations and hash calculations (as
shown in Algorithm 2.3 and Algorithm 2.9 in Chapter 2) than the respective algorithms
on the server side (as shown in Algorithm 2.4 and Algorithm 2.10 in Chapter 2). However,
these operations are executed only when the Admin User has to deploy a new constraint
or update existing ones. On the other hand, constraints are evaluated every time a request
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is made. Thus, the performance of generating requests and evaluating constraints, which
are measured in the following sections, is of great importance, considering the fact that
it will impact the latency for providing access to the data.
4.8.3 Performance Analysis of Generating Requests
In this section, we analyse the performance of generating access requests on the Re-
quester’s client side. To make the access request, a Requester has to generate the
REQ = 〈R,A,O, I〉 tuple representing that role R is requesting to perform action A
on instance I of object type O. Each element of REQ is transformed into trapdoors, nec-
essary for performing the match against encrypted HBDSoD or CW constraints deployed
on the OEM. The trapdoor representation does not leak information on elements of REQ .
Furthermore, each element of REQ is also encrypted, necessary for storing the REQ tuple
as encrypted in the session after REQ is granted. The time required to generate such a
tuple (by running Algorithm 4.3) is around 120 ms as shown in the graph of Figure 4.7.
The PDP might need contextual information to make the decision whether the re-
quested action is permitted based on deployed constraints. One way to provide such
information is to send the required contextual information together with the REQ tuple.
In this case, the client side of the Requester takes the responsibility to generate the trap-
doors of contextual information. The other option is to let the PDP requests contextual
information to the PIP (running in the trusted environment) when such information is
needed. The former option requires fewer interactions because the PDP has already all
required information. However, this comes at the price for the Requester’s client side
of generating extra encrypted data (the trapdoor representation for contextual informa-
tion). The latter option requires more interaction since the PDP has to contact the PIP.
However, this happens only if contextual information is really required by the PDP.
In our experiments, we considered case in which the contextual information is included
with every REQ tuple. We selected two types of contextual information: the time and
the location of the Requester. As we explained in Section 4.5, the time t is represented
as three elements indicating the office hour while the location l is represented as a single
string element.
The graph in Figure 4.7 shows the performance overhead incurred at the Requester’s
client when the REQ tuple contains the value of time t (REQ(t) in the graph) and location
l (REQ(l) in the graph). As can be seen in the graph, when the value of time is added to
the REQ tuple, there is more performance overhead to be incurred as compared to that of
the location because the time value t is represented as three elements, requiring generation
of three trapdoors. On the other hand, the value l of the location is represented by just
a single element, requiring generation of only a single trapdoor. We also measured the
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Figure 4.7: Performance overhead of generating access requests on the Requester’s client side
case in which both time and location trapdoors are generated with the REQ tuple and
the overhead is combination of two previous cases (REQ(t, l) in the graph).
When CW constraints are enforced, it might be needed to include additional infor-
mation about the target resource within the REQ tuple. This additional information
is the domain hierarchy an object type may belong to. In the domain hierarchy, there
may be multiple levels of domains. The trapdoors representing this information need also
to be generated by the Requester’s client. We performed experiments where together
with the time and location, also domain information have been added to the REQ tu-
ple. Moreover, we also varied the depth of the domain hierarchy from one domain level
(represented as REQ(t, l, d)) to three levels (represented as REQ(t, l, 3d)). The last three
values in Figure 4.7 provide the measurements for these cases. As it is quite obvious, the
performance overhead of generating these requests increases linearly with the increase in
domains levels. However, it should be noticed that even in the worst case (where time,
location and three domain levels are inserted in the REQ tuple), the average time for
generating a request is still below 325 ms. In the worst case, the request generation phase
takes Θ(Z).
4.8.4 Performance Analysis of Evaluating Dynamic Security Constraints
In this section, we analyse performance of evaluating security constraints on the OEM.
For evaluating constraints, the request coming from the Requester is first transformed
into the common format by performing the second round of trapdoor generation (see
Algorithm 4.4). During the trapdoor generation, each client generated trapdoor is trans-
formed into the server generated trapdoor as illustrated in Algorithm 2.10 of Chapter
2. This second round of encryption is necessary to perform the matching between the
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trapdoors of the request and the encrypted constraints. In the following, we analyse the
performance overheads of evaluating both HBDSoD and CW constraints.
Evaluating HBDSoD Constraints: First of all, let us make a concrete example of
the enforcement of HBDSoD constraints to understand what operations are executed at
the OEM. Let us assume a Requester makes a request REQ for executing the action
approve on the object type purchase order. As an example of a HBDSoD constraint, let
us consider one that limits a Requester to execute only one action out of the two actions
issue and approve that can be executed on a particular instance of a purchase order.
First, the PDP matches the object type in REQ with the object type of the deployed
constraints in the Constraint Repository. If the match is successful, the PDP will match
the action in REQ with one of the action specified in the HBDSoD constraint. On the
second successful match, the PDP has to check that the Requester has not executed the
issue action on this specific instance of purchase order in the past. To perform this check,
the PDP searches in the Access History to find all records where the object type and
instance match with that of REQ tuple. If such a record is found then the PDP checks
if the action value in the records matches the k-out-of-n condition of the HBDSoD con-
straint. In particular, in our example it means the PDP searches in the Access History to
find any records containing action approve. If this is the case, the constraint is violated
and the PDP will not grant the action. Otherwise, the Requester can issue the purchase
order.
From the above example, it is clear that the performance of enforcing a constraint
depends on three main factors. The first factor is the number of constraints deployed in
the Constraint Repository. When a request arrives, the PDP has to find in the repository
a matching constraint. Finding a matching constraint clearly depends on the number of
constraints in the repository. The second factor is the number of elements specified in
the constraint. These elements can include two or more actions that could be executed
only once by a Requester on a given instance of an object. Moreover, also contextual
information can be taken into account. Finally, the other major factor is the number
of records in the Access History that the PDP has to search to check whether a given
constraint is violated or not. Asymptotically, the enforcement of HBDSoD constraints
takes O(Y · c · r), where C is the number of constraints deployed in the repository and r
is the number of records in the Access History.
To measure the performance overhead, we performed the following experiments. We
deployed 100 different HBDSoD constraints in the repository such that the one that
matches the incoming request is the last one. This, of course, represents the worst case
scenario. We also believe that 100 different constraints is way beyond the typical needs
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Figure 4.8: Performance overhead of evaluating dynamic security constraints (a) HBDSoD and
(b) CW on the OEM
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of an enterprise. To study how the complexity of the constraint specification and number
of records in the Access History affect the performance of the constraint evaluation, we
execute several runs of our experiments varying the constraint complexity and number
of records. Figure 4.8(a) shows the evaluation time in seconds in different settings. As
we can observe in Figure 4.8(a), the evaluation time increases with the increase in the
number of actions in the constraint (from 2 actions up to 5) and when contextual informa-
tion such as time t and/or location l of the Requester are also considered. Similarly, the
evaluation time increases with the increase in the number of records in the Access History.
Evaluating CW Constraints: A CW constraint enforces that a Requester cannot
gain access to two mutually exclusive objects. When a request REQ tuple is received,
the PDP has to search the CW constraints relevant to the object type specified in the
request tuple. Basically, the object type in the request tuple has to match one of the
object types specified in a CW constraint. If a match is found, the PDP has to search
in the Access History for a record containing the object type specified in the constraint
that is not matched with that of the REQ tuple (and that is relevant to the Requester).
If such a record is found, it means the constraint is violated; that is, the Requester has
accessed in the past a object type that is in conflict with the one specified in the current
request. In this case, the action in the request will not be permitted. The CW constraints
can be specified at the level of object types. However, a fine-grained specification may
be achieved if the domain hierarchy, objects may belong to, is also taken into account.
In this case, we assume that REQ and records in the Access History repository have the
domain information at the same level (where level indicates number of domains) as is
present in the constraint, where each element of the domain information in REQ will be
matched with the corresponding element in the constraint.
As for the HBDSoD constraints, the time for evaluating the CW constraints depends
on the number of deployed constraints in the repository, the complexity of the constraint
specification and the number of records in the Access History. Thus, the asymptotic
complexity can be calculated as O(Z ·c·r). To measure the actual overhead, we performed
a similar set of experiments as conducted for HBDSoD constraints. We deployed 100
different CW constraints and considered the worst case scenario. We then changed the
number of elements in the constraint and the number of records in the Access History.
The results are shown in Figure 4.8(b).
The above results clearly show that there is a penalty to be paid for the enforcement of
encrypted constraints in outsourced environments. The execution time varies from 100 ms
to 2.5 seconds as number of records in the Access History increase from 100 to 500. To be
fair, our experiments have been executed with very basic hardware. We expect that our
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Table 4.1: Summary of time complexity of each phase in the lifecycle of E-GRANT
Phase Name Complexity in the Worst Case
Deployment of HBDSoD constraints Θ(Y )
Deployment of CW constraints Θ(Z)
Generation of requests Θ(Z)
Evaluation of HBDSoD constraints O(Y · c · r)
Evaluation of CW constraints O(Z · c · r)
solution would be able to perform better with more dedicated resources, such as servers
deployed in a cloud infrastructure. Moreover, all the executions have been performed as
a centralised solution. Clearly, having in these settings a single PEP and a single PDP
to process all the incoming requests represent a bottleneck. To solve this problem, we
are planning to develop a distributed version of our proposed architecture that can be
deployed on multiple nodes and adapted to the actual request demand.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of time complexities of different phases in the lifecycle
of E-GRANT.
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Figure 4.9: Performance overhead of updating the Session with the request data
4.8.5 Performance Analysis of Session Update
After the PDP checks that the current request is not violating any deployed constraints
and the request is granted, the Access History in the Session needs to be updated with
the information in the executed request. The session update is managed by the PEP that
executes the second round of encryption before storing the encrypted data in the Session
(see Algorithm 4.4). Figure 4.9 shows the performance overhead of encrypting the request
for storing it in the Session. The graph shows the execution time of different formats of
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the REQ tuple: that is, from the basic format containing only subject, action and target
information to more complex ones having time, location and a domain hierarchy of objects
up to three levels.
4.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed E-GRANT, an architecture for enforcing dynamic
security constraints as an outsourced service running in the cloud. The main contribution
of E-GRANT is that it supports the enforcement of encrypted security constraints while
maintaining the encrypted session in the cloud. In this way, cloud providers learn neither
about the information stored by the session nor about the content of security constraints
being enforced. The proposed approach provides a scalable key management, where users
do not share any encryption keys. If users leave the organisation or keys get compromised,
they can be revoked without requiring re-distribution of keys and re-encryption of deployed
constraints.
The combination of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 offers the full-fledged RBAC
model that can support role hierarchies and the constraint model. This full-fledged RBAC
model can be outsourced such that the Service Provider cannot learn private information
about sensitive policies being enforced. The data (or policy) outsourcing follows the
traditional client-server model, where there are two main roles, a client and a server.
Our proposed solutions assume that both client and server roles run in different spaces.
The issue of enforcement of sensitive policies becomes quite challenging if we consider a
distributed model, where each peer can play multiple roles simultaneously. Unfortunately,
our existing proposals do not work because the underlying assumption becomes invalid,
i.e., both a client and a server run in the same space in distributed settings. In the next
chapter, we investigate privacy and security issues in enforcing sensitive security policies
in distributed environments.
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Chapter 5
PIDGIN: Enforcing Security Policies
in Distributed Environments⋆
Opportunistic networks have recently received considerable attention from both industry
and researchers. These networks can be used for many applications without the need for a
dedicated IT infrastructure. In the context of opportunistic networks, the application to
content sharing in particular has attracted specific attention. To support content sharing,
opportunistic networks may implement a publish-subscribe system in which users may
publish their own content and indicate interest in others’ content through subscription.
Using a smartphone, any user can act as a broker by opportunistically forwarding both
published content and interest within the network. Unfortunately, despite their provision
of this great flexibility, opportunistic networks raise serious privacy and security issues.
Untrusted brokers can not only compromise the privacy of subscribers by learning their
interest but also can gain unauthorised access to the disseminated content.
There are solutions that can regulate access to content by specifying access policies.
However, access policies may reveal information about content they aim to protect. This
chapter addresses the research challenges inherent to the exchange of content and interest
without: (i) revealing content and its associated policies to unauthorised brokers and (ii)
compromising the privacy of subscribers. Specifically, this chapter presents an interest
and content sharing solution that addresses these security challenges and preserves privacy
in opportunistic networks. We demonstrated the feasibility and efficiency of this solution
by implementing a prototype and analysing its performance on real smart phones.
⋆The final version of this chapter will appear in [89].
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5.1 Introduction
In the last few years, the usage of smartphones has grown dramatically and is predicted
to increase even more in coming years [109]. Considering the pervasive nature of smart-
phones, mobile opportunistic networks could be leveraged to share information. Several
of the concepts behind opportunistic networks originate from Delay Tolerant Networks
(DTNs) that offer flexible content sharing without requiring a dedicated IT infrastruc-
ture [21]. Haggle [110], an example of such a network architecture, allows smartphones to
opportunistically share content via short-range communication [111]. To share content,
opportunistic networks such as Haggle implement a publish-subscribe system in which
nodes can publish their own content and subscribe to others’ content by indicating their
interest. Any node can also act as a broker (also called a relay) that opportunistically
receives content and interest, matches them, and possibly delivers that content to other
nodes.
The opportunistic networks could be applied to the exchange of information in a wide
range of domains from social media to military applications. However, such networks also
present serious privacy and security issues, particularly the need for an approach to the
exchange of content and interest that neither (i) reveals content and its associated policies
to unauthorised brokers nor (ii) compromises the privacy of subscribers.
For the regulation of access to content, cryptographic approaches such as ABE which
include CP-ABE [47] and KP-ABE [49] offer fine-grained control over content but leak
information about the policies and attributes that protect that content, respectively. To
protect these policies, state-of-the-art solutions exist to enforce sensitive policies in out-
sourced environments [28, 75, 112]. However, such solutions assume that the outsourced
server does not collude with any client. Thus, these solutions cannot be applied in op-
portunistic network settings in which nodes communicate in a peer-to-peer fashion, i.e.,
serving as both a client and a server.
5.1.1 Research Contributions
This chapter presents Privacy preserving Interest anD content sharinG in oppor-
tunIstic Networks (PIDGIN), an interest and content sharing scheme that preserves
privacy. In PIDGIN,
• brokers match subscriber’s interest against policies associated with content without
compromising the subscriber’s privacy (say, by learning attributes or interest).
• an unauthorised broker neither gains access to content nor learns access policies,
and authorised nodes gain access only if they satisfy fine-grained policies specified
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by the publishers.
• the system provides scalable key management in which loosely-coupled publishers
and subscribers communicate with each other without any prior contact.
As a proof-of-concept, we have developed and analysed the performance of a prototype
running on real smartphones in order to show the feasibility of our approach.
5.1.2 Chapter Outline
The rest of this chapter is organised into the following sections. Section 5.2 provides a
brief overview of opportunistic networks, describes the motivating scenario, and lists some
of the major research challenges for interest and content sharing in opportunistic networks
with guaranteed preservation of privacy. In Section 5.3, we draw the system model. Next,
we describe the proposed scheme in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 elaborates PIDGIN’s details.
In Section 5.6, we provide the concrete construction. Section 5.7 analyses PIDGIN from a
security perspective. In Section 5.8, we report the outcomes of the performance analysis.
Section 5.9 is dedicated for discussion. Section 5.10 reviews the related work. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5.11.
5.2 Opportunistic Networks and Research Challenges
In this section, we provide a brief overview of opportunistic networks, a motivating sce-
nario, and the major research challenges in opportunistic networks that we address.
5.2.1 Overview of Opportunistic Networks
Conceptually, opportunistic networks originate from DTNs that enable content exchange
between nodes in a publish-subscribe fashion, generally via short-range communication.
In a typical opportunistic network, such as Haggle, a subscriber node subscribes interest
while a publisher node publishes content to its neighbouring nodes [111]. These neigh-
bouring nodes are intermediate nodes, known as brokers, that epidemically disseminate
interest and content within the network. A resolution takes place when a broker node
finds a match between the interest of a subscriber and the tags associated with published
content. As a result of resolution, a broker forwards content to the subscriber. In the
following section, we consider a motivating scenario that can further help to understand
opportunistic networks and research challenges concerning privacy and confidentiality.
Curiosity - A Military Mission: Let us consider a battlefield scenario for a mission
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called Curiosity in which soldiers are equipped with smartphones. During the mission, a
scout collects some sensitive information about the enemy (for instance, an image of the
enemy’s position) using her smartphone camera. After acquiring this sensitive informa-
tion, a scout desires to share it with other soldiers. For this reason, she may tag the image
with the mission name, i.e., Curiosity. Unfortunately, there is no Internet connectivity
on the battlefield and the only way to share is to use the short-range communication
offered by smartphones. Therefore, the scout would like to share the image with other
soldiers using their smartphones. We assume that the soldiers are interested in getting
information about the mission and subscribe using their smartphones.

	
	


 
	

Figure 5.1: An example of content sharing in an opportunistic network
5.2.2 Motivating Scenario
Haggle: A Possible Solution: To exchange information in such scenarios, we can
leverage opportunistic networks, such as Haggle. Using Haggle, the scout publishes the
image with Curiosity as a tag. Any solider can show interest in Curiosity by subscribing,
as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Here, we assume that someone as a broker receives both in-
terest and image along with the tag. Whenever that happens, the broker checks whether
the interest of a subscriber matches any tag associated with the image. If so, the broker
forwards the image to the subscriber(s).
Privacy and Confidentiality Issues: First of all, to preserve confidentiality, the infor-
mation about the Curiosity mission should be shared only within a particular group of
soldiers. Each content item is associated with an access policy that indicates who should
have access to it. For example, information about the Curiosity mission might have a
policy (P) that content is shared with either a Major or a Soldier from the Infantry
unit. Even if the content (i.e., image) is encrypted, the policy itself could reveal sensitive
information. That is, an enemy may infer useful information from the fact that some
contents are sent to a Major or a Soldier from the Infantry unit. Outsiders (i.e., enemies)
and insiders (i.e., soldiers) serving as brokers may gain unauthorised access to contents.
Furthermore, the interest of subscribers and the tags associated with content may also
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reveal sensitive information. Therefore, in addition to the content itself, its associated
tags, policies, and subscription information (i.e., interests) should also be protected.
This scenario motivates the need to tackle the security and privacy issues that we
generally face in opportunistic networks. In the following section, we list some major
research challenges inherent to these issues that we address in this chapter.
5.2.3 Research Challenges
To guarantee the preservation of privacy for interest and content sharing in opportunistic
networks, the following major research challenges related to both (i) privacy and confi-
dentiality (i.e., C1-C3 ) and (ii) functionality (i.e., C4-C5 ) need to be addressed:
C1 In the presence of unauthorised brokers, how do we regulate access to disseminated
content and preserve confidentiality of content and associated policies?
C2 In the presence of curious brokers, how does the network exchange content without
compromising the privacy of its subscribers?
C3 How can a subscriber subscribe to content without exposing her interest to untrusted
brokers?
C4 In order to minimise the flood of unnecessary traffic on the communication network,
how do we ensure that a subscriber receives content if and only if authorised to
decrypt?
C5 Assuming the loosely-coupled nature of the publish-subscribe model, how do we ad-
dress the challenges above (i.e., C1-C4 ) without sharing any keys between publishers
and subscribers?
5.3 The System Model
Before presenting our threat model and assumptions, we identify the entities involved in
the system:
A Publisher is a node that can publish the content.
A Subscriber is a node that can subscribe interest.
A Broker is a node that may receive and disseminate both content and interest. It
evaluates whether any content matches known interest. On successful evaluation, it
forwards content to the subscribers.
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Trusted Key Management Authority (TKMA) is an offline trusted entity that dis-
tributes keying material (including private keys and/or public parameters) to all
nodes out of the band (usually once in the lifetime of a node, typically when the
node is initialised).
The Threat Model. We assume that brokers are honest-but-curious, i.e., they honestly
follow the protocol, but remain curious to learn about content and interest. Also, we
assume that brokers may collude. Furthermore, we consider that the TKMA is fully
trusted and plays a role at the time of system initialisation. Last but not least, we assume
only passive adversaries and do not consider active adversaries that can manipulate the
exchanged information.
5.4 The Proposed Idea
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme for preserving privacy during interest
and content sharing in opportunistic networks. As a starting point, we consider some
basic schemes that partially address research challenges listed in Section 5.2.3. Next, we
gradually address all research challenges and finally describe the proposed scheme.
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Figure 5.2: Regulating access to content using CP-ABE policies
5.4.1 Scheme I: Regulate Access on Content
To preserve the confidentiality of content, a publisher might specify who can gain access.
A possible approach for the publisher could be to regulate access on content by employing
ABE, such as CP-ABE [47] or KP-ABE [49]. ABE offers fine-grained policies for content
access. In this scheme, we consider CP-ABE because it enables a publisher to exert control
over access to content, as described in the use case scenario. In contrast, in KP-ABE, a
key generation authority exerts control over who can access content. Figure 5.2 illustrates
this scheme in which the image is encrypted according to the policy: either a Major or a
Solider from the Infantry unit can get access. The policy is expressed as a tree whose leaf
nodes represent the attributes; non-leaf nodes denote the AND, OR and threshold gates.
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In this scheme, a broker forwards content to the subscribers if a subscriber’s interest
matches with any tag associated with the content.
This approach preserves the confidentiality of disseminated contents without providing
access to unauthorised brokers. This scheme, however, has a drawback. A broker might
send content to subscribers who might not be able to decrypt it. In fact, a broker’s
role is merely to match the interest of subscribers against tags associated with content
without checking whether a subscriber has access authorisation. For instance, consider a
subscriber who is a soldier but neither a Major nor a member of the Infantry unit.
In summary, this scheme resolves the access control problem (C1) while raising the
problem of a communication network flooded with unnecessary traffic (C4).
5.4.2 Scheme II: Perform an Authorisation Check
This scheme extends Scheme I and resolves the flooding problem C4. In this scheme, a
subscriber may send attributes and interest to brokers so that a broker can perform an
authorisation check prior to forwarding the contents. To perform the authorisation check,
a broker matches leaf nodes in the policy tree with the subscriber’s attributes. If there
is a match, a leaf node will be marked as satisfied. After evaluating leaf nodes, a broker
evaluates intermediate nodes (including AND, OR and threshold) in the policy. A broker
will forward encrypted content to subscriber if and only if (i) the root node of the policy
is marked as satisfied and (ii) the interest matches to the tags.
This scheme targets both the access control problem (C1) and the flooding problem
(C4). However, it still raises some privacy issues. First, both the cleartext attributes of
subscribers and the cleartext CP-ABE policies can compromise the privacy of subscribers,
i.e., C2. For example, the enemy may learn from policies that there is some information
intended for a Major. Second, the cleartext interest of a subscriber may also leak infor-
mation, i.e., C3. For instance, the enemy may learn that this content or interest concerns
the Curiosity mission.
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Figure 5.3: Private information is hidden through replacement of leaf nodes in the CP-ABE
policy, tags, attributes and interest items with their corresponding hashes
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5.4.3 Scheme III: Hide Private Information Using a Hash
In order to partially overcome the issue of subscriber privacy (C2), a subscriber and a
publisher may hash both attributes and leaf nodes in the policy tree, respectively. Simi-
larly, a subscriber’s interest could be protected by calculating the hash values of interest
items and tags associated with contents. In this scheme, a broker forwards encrypted
content to subscribers if and only if (i) the hash value of the interest matches the hash
value of the tag (i.e., h(‘Curiosity’)) and (ii) hash values of attributes (i.e., {h(‘Soldier’),
h(‘Infantry’)}) satisfy the policy P ′ whose leaf nodes are also hashed, as shown in Figure
5.3.
Unfortunately, this scheme is vulnerable to a pre-computed dictionary attack. That is,
the enemy may pre-calculate a list of hashes for possible attributes (and leaf nodes in the
policy tree) and a list of hashes for potential interest items (and tags). The pre-calculated
list of hashes may easily reveal the original attributes (and leaf nodes in the policy tree)
and interest (and tags).
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Figure 5.4: Hardening against a pre-computed dictionary attack through concatenation a pair
of (i) a leaf node in the CP-ABE policy and a tag (ii) an attribute and an interest item, then
calculation of the hash on the final string
5.4.4 Scheme IV: Hardening Against a Pre-Computed Dictionary Attack
To harden against the pre-computed dictionary attack, a publisher may replace each
leaf node in the policy with a hash of a concatenated pair of a tag and an attribute.
Similarly, a subscriber may subscribe using the hash of a concatenated pair of an interest
item and an attribute (i.e., {H(‘Curiosity’ || ‘Soldier’), H(‘Curiosity’ || ‘Infantry’)}) as
illustrated in Figure 5.4. In this scheme, a broker just needs to check whether the items
in a subscription satisfy the hashed policy P ′. Upon successful evaluation, the broker
will forward the content to subscribers. The advantage of this scheme is that it not
only hardens against pre-computed dictionary attacks but also decreases the number of
comparisons performed at the broker’s end as compared to Scheme III. This is because
a broker performs integrated checks that cover both authorisation and interest matching
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simultaneously in contrast to Scheme III in which a broker performs two different checks:
one to check the authorisation and one to match the interest. Though it enlarges the
key space (which could be computationally extensive), this scheme is still vulnerable to a
pre-computed dictionary attack.
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Figure 5.5: The PIDGIN scheme protecting the content, the policy, the tags associated with
content, and the subscriber’s interest and attributes
5.4.5 PIDGIN: The Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme, PIDGIN, aims at addressing all research challenges (i.e., C1-C5 )
listed in Section 5.2.3. The main idea behind PIDGIN is regulation of access to content
using CP-ABE and extension of cleartext CP-ABE policies with the PEKS scheme [36]
to protect attributes, interest, tags and leaf nodes in the policy tree. The PEKS scheme
consists of four basic functions including Keygen, Etag1, Trapdoor and Test. For
each attribute, we run Keygen to calculate a key pair consisting of both public (i.e.,
hSoldier) and private (i.e., xSoldier) keys corresponding to a given attribute (i.e., Soldier).
To protect policies and tags, a publisher can replace each leaf node in the policy tree with
the Etag function of the PEKS scheme, which takes as input a tag (i.e., Curiosity) and
the public key of the attribute as shown in Figure 5.5. A subscriber protects attributes
and interest by replacing each interest item in the subscription list with a Trapdoor
function which takes as input an interest item (i.e., Curiosity) and the private key (i.e.,
generated by the PEKS scheme) corresponding to the attribute.
A broker performs encrypted matching between encrypted policies and encrypted sub-
scriptions. It runs the Test function, a building block that matches a trapdoor to an
encrypted tag. If an encrypted tag in the policy tree P ′ matches with any encrypted trap-
door in the subscription list, the tree node is marked as satisfied. The broker evaluates
all nodes in the policy tree starting from leaf nodes to root. If the root is satisfied, the
broker will forward content along with the encrypted policy to the subscribers.
1The Etag function is called PEKS in [36].
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5.5 Technical Details of PIDGIN
5.5.1 Initialisation and Key Generation Phases
During the initialisation phase, the system is set up to initialise both CP-ABE and PEKS
schemes. In PIDGIN, the TKMA generates and distributes keys during the key generation
phase. The TKMA generates a private set of attributes (i.e., CP-ABE private key) and
sends it securely to the subscriber out of the band. The TKMA publishes the public
part of attributes (i.e., CP-ABE public key) to all publishers. Since the attributes are
protected using the PEKS scheme, the TKMA also generates a pair of keys corresponding
to each attribute. Similar to the CP-ABE key distribution, the TKMA sends the private
and public parts of the PEKS key pair to the subscriber and publishers, respectively. The
major difference between the CP-ABE private key set and the PEKS private key set is
that the former is unique for each user, while the latter is not.
5.5.2 The Publisher’s Encryption Phase
To protect the content and preserve the privacy of subscribers, a publisher encrypts
content with CP-ABE policies and protects those policies as well. The contents could be
encrypted with a symmetric key, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which is
further encrypted with the CP-ABE policy. Since the CP-ABE policy may compromise the
privacy of subscribers, the CP-ABE policies are encrypted using PEKS. While encrypting
CP-ABE policies using PEKS, PIDGIN also incorporates tags that are associated with
content.
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Figure 5.6: The extended CP-ABE policy with two tags, i.e., ‘Curiosity’ and ‘Urgent’.
To extend CP-ABE policies for PEKS, a publisher considers each leaf node in the
policy tree as well as number of tags that are associated with contents. If there is only
a single tag then a publisher replaces the leaf node with the Etag function as already
illustrated in Figure 5.5. The Etag function takes a tag keyword to be encrypted and the
110
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public key corresponding to the leaf node under consideration. After running the Etag
function, a publisher gets an encrypted tag. The Etag function does not leak information
about the tags or leaf nodes in the policy tree. In the case that there is more than one tag
then a publisher runs the Etag function for each tag item and encrypts it with the public
key corresponding to the leaf node under consideration. Finally, the leaf node attribute
is replaced with the subtree where all newly generated Etags corresponding to tags are
disjuncted using OR. Figure 5.6 illustrates an example of the policy involving two tags,
i.e., ‘Curiosity’ and ‘Urgent’.
5.5.3 The Subscriber’s Encryption Phase
In order to protect the interest of a subscriber and its attributes, a subscriber encrypts
each interest item using the private key (i.e., generated by the PEKS scheme) correspond-
ing to the attribute. PIDGIN considers that a subscriber might have multiple attributes
and interest items. Generally, each interest item is encrypted with each private key (i.e.,
generated by the PEKS scheme) that corresponds to the attribute. Figure 5.5 describes
the case in which a subscriber holds two attributes and subscribes with a single interest
item. Let us assume that a subscriber has two interest items, say ‘Curiosity’ and ‘Urgent’,
while holding attributes Solider and Infantry. The subscription list would contain four
items including Trapdoor(‘Curiosity’, xSoldier), Trapdoor(‘Curiosity’, xInfantry), Trap-
door(‘Urgent’, xSoldier) and Trapdoor(‘Urgent’, xInfantry). The trapdoor representation
does not leak information about the interest item and the attribute.
5.5.4 The Broker’s Matching Phase
A broker opportunistically exchanges both content and subscriptions. Once a broker
receives both the encrypted subscription and the encrypted content along with the en-
crypted policies, it evaluates whether the encrypted subscription satisfies the encrypted
policy. For this evaluation, the broker runs a matching function that recursively evaluates
the encrypted policy tree. The Test function matches each encrypted leaf node in the
policy against the encrypted interest item in the subscription.
The Test function returns either TRUE or FALSE, indicating whether the encrypted
tag is matched with the trapdoor or not, respectively. By running the Test function,
a broker does not learn about the tag or the interest item because both are encrypted
and they are matched in an encrypted manner. If an encrypted tag in the policy tree
matches with any trapdoor in the subscription list, that node is marked as satisfied. After
evaluating leaf nodes, a broker can evaluate intermediate AND, OR and threshold nodes
in the policy tree to finally identify whether the root node of the policy tree is satisfied or
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not. If the root node is satisfied, the broker will forward content along with the encrypted
policy to the subscriber.
5.5.5 The Subscriber’s Decryption Phase
Once a subscriber receives the encrypted content along with the encrypted policy, it first
recovers the original CP-ABE policy. For this recovery, either leaf node (if a single tag,
see Figure 5.2) or a subtree of tags (if more than one tag, see Figure 5.6) is replaced with
their corresponding attribute. Before sharing the encrypted interest, a subscriber builds
the subscription history as a lookup table containing an attribute and its corresponding
trapdoor. If the trapdoor is matched with any encrypted tag in the leaf node of the
policy, the subscription history will be looked up to find the attribute corresponding to
the matched trapdoor. Next, a leaf node (if a single tag) or a subtree of tags (if more
than one tag) will be replaced with the found attribute. If no match is found, then a
dummy attribute will be placed. This recovers the original CP-ABE policy (i.e., one
shown in Figure 5.2) that can finally be used by the CP-ABE decryption function to get
the symmetric key that is required for decryption of the contents.
5.6 Concrete Constructions of PIDGIN
In this section, we provide some definitions and details of core functions used in different
phases of the PIDGIN lifecycle.
5.6.1 Definitions
The Policy Structure. We assume a policy tree P that represents an access structure.
Each non-leaf node represents an AND, an OR or a threshold gate. Let us consider that
numx denotes number of children of a node x and kx represents the threshold value. For
OR and AND gates, kx is 1 and numx, respectively. For the threshold gate, the value of
kx is: 0 < kx ≤ numx. Let us consider that parent(x) represents the parent of a node
x, att(x) denotes the attributes associated with leaf node x, and index(x) returns the
number associated with a node x, with nodes numbered from 1 to num.
Bilinear Maps. Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order
p. Let g be a generator of G1 and e : G1×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. The bilinear map
e satisfies the following properties:
• Computability: given g, h ∈ G1, there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute
e(g, h) ∈ G2.
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• Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(u
a, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: if g is a generator of G1 then e(g, g) is a generator of G2, where
e(g, g) 6= 1.
Notice that the bilinear map e is symmetric since e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga).
Hash Functions. We consider the hash functions:
H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}
log p
Lagrange Coefficient. We define the Lagrange coefficient ∆i,A for i ∈ Zp and a set A
of elements in Zp:
∆i,A(x) =
∏
j∈A,j 6=i
x− j
i− j
5.6.2 Construction Details of PIDGIN
Init(1K). The init algorithm takes as input the security parameter k that determines
the size of p. It randomly picks two exponents α, β ∈ Zp and outputs the public key
PK = (G1, g, h = g
β, e(g, g)α) and the master key MK = (β, gα). The public key PK is
published while the master key MK is kept securely by the TKMA. Moreover, two stores,
the Search Key Secret Store (SKSS) and the Search Key Public Store (SKPS), which
are managed by the TKMA, are initialised as:
SKSS ← φ
SKPS ← φ
KeyGen(MK,A). The key generation algorithm is run by the TKMA. It takes as input
a list of attributes A and outputs a CP-ABE decryption key and a set of search key pairs.
To generate the decryption key, it first chooses a random r ∈ Zp and then a random
rj ∈ Zp for each attribute j ∈ A. Next, it computes the decryption key as:
DK = (D = g(α+r)/β,
∀ ∈ A : Dj = g
r ·H1(j)
rj , D′j = g
rj)
Before the generation of a search key pair for an attribute j ∈ A, a search key store
(either SKSS or SKPS) can be looked up. If the search key pair already exists, then the
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public and private keys will be collected from SKPS or SKSS, respectively. Otherwise,
the algorithm chooses a random xj ∈ Z
∗
p, calculates hj = g
xj , and updates both private
and public key stores as:
SKSS ← SKSS ∪ (j, xj)
SKPS ← SKPS ∪ (j, hj)
Next, it computes the search key secret as: SKS = (∀ ∈ A : xj). Finally, the SKPS
is publicised while the decryption key DK and the search key secret SKS are securely
transmitted to the subscriber.
Etag(PK, hi, t). The Etag algorithm encrypts a given tag t with hi. It chooses a
random r ∈ Z∗p and computes z = e(H1(t), h
r). Next, it computes A = gr and B = H2(z)
and outputs the encrypted tag as: ET = (A,B).
Pub-Enc(PK, SKPS,C, P, T ). The publisher encryption algorithm encrypts content
C under the access policy P with a list of tags T . It also encrypts P . In reality, it ran-
domly generates a symmetric key K and encrypts C as {C}K and then encrypts K under
P . To encrypt K under P , it chooses a polynomial qx for each node x in a top-down
manner, starting from the root R, such that it sets degree dx one less than the threshold
value kx, i.e., dx = kx − 1. Starting from the root R, it chooses a random s ∈ Zp, sets
qR(0) = s and chooses other dR points randomly. For any other non-root node x, it sets
qR(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and chooses other dx points randomly. Let Y be the set of
leaf nodes in P . The ciphertext is computed as:
CT = (E˜ = Ke(g, g)αs, E = hs,
∀y ∈ Y : Ey = g
qy(0), E ′y = H1(att(y))
qy(0))
Next, the policy P is encrypted as follows. For each leaf node i, it looks up the correspond-
ing private secret key hi from the SKPS. Then, it runs Etag(hi, t) for each tag t ∈ T
and combines all encrypted tags corresponding to an attribute to form an OR subtree.
The original leaf node attribute is replaced with this OR subtree. If only one tag exists in
T , the original attribute is replaced with the output of the Etag function. This basically
generates the encrypted policy P ′. Finally, this algorithm returns PE = (P ′, CT, {C}K).
Trapdoor(xi, t). The Trapdoor algorithm encrypts interest item t using xi. It re-
turns the encrypted interest item TD = H1(t)
xi.
Sub-Enc(I, SKS). The subscriber encryption algorithm encrypts interest I using the
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attributes SKS. For each interest item t ∈ I, it runs Trapdoor(xi, t) using search key
secret xi corresponding to each attribute i ∈ SKS. A subscriber also maintains a history
of subscription HS to keep track of all trapdoors belonging to a subscription. HS is
initialised as HS ← φ and updated as:
∀i ∈ SKS : HS ← HS ∪ (i, TDi)
HS maintains each trapdoor with its corresponding attribute. Finally, this algorithm
publicises SE = (TD1, TD2, . . . , TD|I|.|SKS|) and keeps HS securely.
Test(ET, TD). The Test algorithm takes the encrypted tag and trapdoor and returns
TRUE if H2(e(TD,A)
?
= B is TRUE and FALSE otherwise.
Bro-Match(P ′, SE). This algorithm takes the publisher encrypted policy P ′ and the
subscriber encrypted interest SE and returns TRUE if they match and FALSE other-
wise. To perform the match, a broker runs Test(ETi, TDj) for each leaf node i in P
′
and trapdoor TDj ∈ SE. If an encrypted leaf node matches with any trapdoor, it is
marked as satisfied (i.e., TRUE ). After evaluating leaf nodes, the algorithm evaluates
intermediate nodes (AND, OR and threshold). After this evaluation, if the root node of
the encrypted policy P ′ is satisfied, that is, TRUE, then this algorithm returns TRUE
and FALSE otherwise.
Sub-Dec(PE,HS,DK) This algorithm decrypts the policy P ′ and then decrypts the
encrypted contents PE. First, it matches encrypted leaf nodes with a trapdoor in HS
by running Test. If a match is found, the corresponding attribute is selected from HS.
The leaf node (if a single tag) or a subtree of encrypted tags conjuncted with OR (if
more tags) will be replaced with the selected attribute. If no match is found, then a
dummy attribute will be placed. This recovers the original policy, which will be used to
decrypt the symmetric key: if node x is a leaf node then we assume i = att(x) and run
the following function if i ∈ A:
DecryptNode(CT,DK, x) =
e(Di, Ex)
e(D′i, E
′
x)
=
e(gr.H(i)ri, gqx(0))
e(gri, H(i)qx(0))
= e(g, g)rqx(0)
If i 6∈ A then DecryptNode(CT,DK, x) = ⊥. For a non-leaf node x, the algorithm runs
DecryptNode(CT,DK, z) for each child z of x and stores output as Fz. Let Ax be an
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arbitrary kx-sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6= ⊥. If no such set exists then the
node was not satisfied and the function returns ⊥. Otherwise, it computes:
Fx =
∏
z∈Ax
F
∆i,A′x(0)
z
(where i = index(z) and A′x = index(z) : z ∈ Ax)
=
∏
z∈Ax
(e(g, g)r.qz(0))∆i,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Ax
(e(g, g)r.qparent(z)(index(z)))∆i,A′x (0)
(by construction)
=
∏
z∈Ax
(e(g, g)r.qx(0))∆i,A′x (0)
= (e(g, g)r.qx(0)
(using polynomial interpolation)
If the tree is satisfied by A, we set
G = DecryptNode(CT,DK,R)
= e(g, g)rqR(0)
= e(g, g)rs
The symmetric key is decrypted by computing:
E˜/(e(E,D)/G) = E˜/(e(hs, g(α+r)/β)/e(g, g)rs) = K.
Finally, K is used to decrypt {C}K in order to access contents C.
5.7 Security Analysis of PIDGIN
In PIDGIN, the contents are encrypted using a symmetric key, which is encrypted with
the CP-ABE policy. The leaf nodes in the policy tree are further encrypted using Etag as
proposed in PEKS by Boneh et al. [36]. The PEKS is semantically secure against a chosen
keyword attack in the random oracle model, assuming that the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
116
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(BDH) problem is hard (for proof, see Theorem 3.1 in [36]). However, the CP-ABE policy
structure is not protected and leaks information about number of attributes or tags used.
This leak could partially be tackled by inclusion of some dummy attributes at the cost
of an increase in complexity. In PIDGIN, brokers may collude but they cannot gain
access to contents, policies or subscriptions. If a broker colludes with a subscriber, they
together learn no more information than is already available to the subscriber alone. In
the case that two subscribers collude to receive content that each of them alone cannot get
otherwise, our scheme prevents such collusion attacks because each subscriber’s (CP-ABE)
decryption key includes a randomness value that will prevent access to the content.
5.8 Performance Analysis of PIDGIN
As a proof-of-concept, we have developed a prototype of PIDGIN. The prototype is based
on an extension of the open source libfenc library [113] written in the C language, a library
of functional encryption that includes CP-ABE. Since we proposed to extend CP-ABE
with PEKS, we have implemented PEKS in C using the Pairing-Based Cryptography
(PBC) library [114], which is an underlying library also required by the libfenc library.
PBC is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The curve we use in our experimen-
tation is of type A. After extending the CP-ABE with PEKS (on the x86 architecture),
we cross-compiled it for the ARM architecture to test our prototype on a Samsung Galaxy
SIII smartphone (Android version 4.1.2, kernel version 3.0.31, 1 GB RAM, and 1.4 GHz
processor). For the deployment of this prototype, we cross-compiled both GMP [115]
(the GNU Multiple Precision arithmetic library required by PBC) and PBC libraries for
the ARM architecture and installed both on the smartphone. The presented results are
averaged over 20 runs.
In our analysis, we have not considered battery consumption because the prototype
of PIDGIN we have developed so far requires some optimisations that we have suggested
in Section 5.9. However, our future plan is to analyse battery consumption after imple-
menting possible optimisations.
5.8.1 Initialisation and Key Generation Phases
During the initialisation phase, the system-level keying material is generated. During the
key generation phase, both search and decryption keys are generated for a given set of
attributes. Both phases could be run on a PC because keys are distributed out of the
band. However, we consider running both phases on a smartphone (with specifications
already described above). The initialisation phase takes 108.5 ms. The generation time
of search keys grows linearly with increase in number of attributes as illustrated in Figure
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Figure 5.7: Effect of attributes on the key generation time
5.7, where 30 search keys take 300 ms (i.e., an average of 10 ms per attribute). Similarly,
the key generation time of decryption keys also grows linearly with increase in number of
attributes, where 30 decryption keys take approximately 877 ms (i.e., an average of 29.25
ms per attribute). Asymptotically, the complexity of the key generation is Θ(|A|), where
|A| indicates number of attributes in list A.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of content size on the AES encryption/decryption time
5.8.2 The Publisher’s Encryption Phase
In this phase, a publisher encrypts content with a randomly generated symmetric key.
In our prototype we use AES keys. The symmetric key is encrypted with the CP-ABE
policy. The CP-ABE policy is extended with tags that are also encrypted. Figure 5.8
shows the symmetric encryption time, which grows linearly with the increase in size of
content (C). Encryption of a piece of content of size 40 Kilo Byte (KB) takes 0.105 ms (i.e.,
an average of 0.026 ms per KB). To measure the performance overhead for the encryption
118
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Figure 5.9: Effect of (a) tags, (b) attributes and (c) both tags and attributes on publisher’s
encryption time
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time, we varied the numbers of tags and/or attributes (A∗P ), as shown in Figure 5.9. In
Figure 5.9(a) and Figure 5.9(b), we observe the effect of tags and attributes on publisher’s
encryption time, respectively. In Figure 5.9(a), we observe effect of tags (ranging from 2
to 10) while keeping the number of attributes constant (i.e., 2 attributes - the minimum
attributes required to make AND/OR policy). As we can expect, the time to extend
a policy with tags grows linearly with increase in number of tags. In Figure 5.9(b), we
observe the effect of attributes (ranging from 2 to 10) in a policy while considering a single
tag. The time for encryption of the symmetric key with the policy grows linearly with
increase in number of attributes. Since the number of attributes increases, it also linearly
increases the time to extend the policy with tags. In Figure 5.9(c), we show the most
complex case in which we increase both attributes and tags simultaneously. The growth
of the time needed to extend a policy with tags is quadratic, depending on the number
of attributes and the number of tags. In our experimentation, we considered the number
of tags as equal to the number of attributes. In a policy with 2 attributes each with 2
tags, it takes approximately 120 ms to extend the policy tags, while in a policy with 10
attributes with 10 tags each, it takes approximately 1632 ms. Generally, the asymptotic
complexity of publisher’s encryption is Θ(|A∗P | · |T |+ |C|).
5.8.3 The Subscriber’s Encryption Phase
Figure 5.10 shows the performance overhead incurred during the encryption (see Figure
5.10(a)) and decryption phases (see Figure 5.10(b) and Figure 5.10(c)). In the subscriber’s
encryption phase, a subscriber encrypts the subscription, which is based on the number
of interest items (I) and attributes (A∗S). In our experimentations, we observed the
effect of how different values for the number of attributes and interest separately and
together affect the subscription’s encryption time. To observe the effect of the number of
attributes, we increased the attributes from 2 to 10 while keeping interest items constant
(i.e., 1 interest item). Generation of trapdoors for 10 attributes with a single interest item
each took approximately 106 ms. Second, we observed the effect of number of interest
items on the subscription’s time by increasing interest items from 2 to 10 while keeping
attributes constant (i.e., 2 attributes conjuncted with either AND or OR). The subscriber
took approximately 284 ms to encrypt an interest containing 10 items. As illustrated
in Figure 5.10(a), attributes alone or interest items alone linearly affect the subscriber’s
encryption time. However, we also consider the case when we see effects of both attributes
and interest items together. For this purpose, we assumed that number of attributes is
equal to that of interest items; that is, if there are two attributes, it means there are two
interest items per attribute. Similarly, we assumed 10 attributes with 10 interest items
each, which took 1063 ms. The combined effect of attributes and interest items indicates
120
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Figure 5.10: Effect of (a) attributes/interest items on the subscriber’s encryption time and effect
of (b) attributes and (c) tags on the subscriber’s decryption time
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Figure 5.11: Effect of (a) tags, (b) interest items and (c) both tags and interest items on the
broker’s encrypted matching time
that its growth has quadratic effect on the subscriber’s encryption time as shown in Figure
5.10(a). The asymptotic complexity of the subscriber’s encryption is: Θ(|A∗S| · |I|).
5.8.4 The Broker’s Matching Phase
This is the key phase in the lifecycle of PIDGIN. During this phase, a broker matches
the encrypted subscription against the encrypted policy associated with the encrypted
content. In our analysis, we observe the effect of the numbers of tags and interest items
separately and together while keeping the number of attributes constant (i.e., 2 attributes,
necessary to have OR or AND policy). Furthermore, we consider the matching case with
both OR and AND policies, as well as a zero match case which is the worst case situation.
Figure 5.11 shows the performance analysis of this phase. In Figure 5.11(a), we observe
the effect of number of tags on the matching time while keeping the number of interest
items as constant, i.e., 1. As the graph shows, the matching time increases linearly with
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the increase in number of tags. Similarly, we measure the effect of the number of interest
items on the matching time while keeping the number of tags constant, i.e., 1. As Figure
5.11(b) indicates, the matching time grows linearly with the increase in the number of
interest items. In both Figure 5.11(a) and Figure 5.11(b), the OR policy takes less time
as compared to that of the AND policy when we consider the matching case because we
use a short circuit evaluation (explained in Section 5.9.2) to evaluate both OR and AND
gates. Finally, we consider the most complex case in which we increase the number of tags
and the number of interest items together (equally) with 2 attributes. Similar to Figure
5.11(a) and Figure 5.11(b), it takes less time to evaluate the OR policy as compared
to that of the AND policy. Next, we consider the worst case in which there are 5 tags
and 5 interest items with a 2-attribute policy conjuncted using OR. Since there are 2
attributes in the policy tree with 5 tags each, there will be 10 leaf nodes in the encrypted
policy. Furthermore, 2 attributes with 5 interest items each will make 10 trapdoors in
the subscription list. The broker checks whether any encrypted leaf node in the policy
matches with any trapdoor in the subscription list. In this worst case, the broker runs
the Test function 100 times, thus taking approximately 1324 ms. In addition to this
experiment, we measured the overhead for running the Test function and discovered that
it takes 13.28 ms. This implies that the real overhead comes from the Test function, that
is, in fact, a bilinear pairing operation. Hence, the matching operation is dependent on
how efficient the bilinear pairing is. The best and worst case complexities of this phase
are Ω(1) and O(|A∗P | · |T | · |A
∗
S| · |I|), respectively.
5.8.5 The Subscriber’s Decryption Phase
A subscriber receives the encrypted content (along with the encrypted policy) from the
broker if the encrypted interest satisfies the encrypted policy associated with the encrypted
content. During the decryption phase, first a subscriber strips off the tags from the policy
and then performs decryption with the policy to recover the symmetric key, which is
finally used to decrypt the contents. Figure 5.10(b) and Figure 5.10(c) show the effect of
the number of attributes and interest items, respectively, on the subscriber’s decryption
time. In Figure 5.10(b), where we increase attributes from 2 to 10 while keeping the
number of interest items constant i.e., 1, we consider both OR and AND policies to
see the effect of attributes on the stripping of tags from the policy. Also, we show the
performance overhead for the decryption that recovers the symmetric key. In Figure
5.10(c), we describe the case in which the number of interest items are increased from
2 to 10 (but attributes are kept constant i.e., 2), assuming the matching case, i.e., both
the publisher and the subscriber are using the same tags and interest items, respectively.
Here, the overhead does not increase with the increase in the number of interest items
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because we have implemented the short circuit evaluation to evaluate AND, OR and
threshold gates. In fact, the trapdoor in the subscription matches interest items against
tags in the policy, thus making policy evaluation successful without requiring further
matches. Finally, the encrypted contents are decrypted using the symmetric key, which is
recovered after we perform the CP-ABE decryption. Figure 5.8 shows the time required
for decryption of the content using the AES key. Decryption of a piece of content of size
40 KB takes 0.87 ms (i.e., an average of 0.22 ms per KB). Overall, the complexity of
subscriber’s decryption is: O(|A∗P | · |T | · |A
∗
S| · |I| + |C|) in the worst case and Ω(|C|) in
the best case.
Table 5.1: Summary of time complexity of each phase in the lifecycle of PIDGIN
Phase Name Best Case Worst Case
Key generation Θ(|A|)
Publisher encryption Θ(|A∗P | · |T |+ |C|)
Subscriber encryption Θ(|A∗S | · |I|)
Broker matching Ω(1) O(|A∗P | · |T | · |A
∗
S | · |I|)
Subscriber decryption Ω(|C|) O(|A∗P | · |T | · |A
∗
S | · |I|+ |C|)
Table 5.1 summarises time complexity of each phase in the lifecycle of PIDGIN.
Table 5.2: Space overhead of generating encrypted tags and trapdoors
Function Size (in Bytes)
Encrypted Tag (by a publisher) 256
Trapdoor (by a subscriber) 128
5.9 Discussion
5.9.1 Storage Analysis of PIDGIN
As we explained in Section 5.8, the curve we use in our experimentation is of type A.
Using this curve, the space complexity of an encrypted tag a trapdoor are 256 and 128
Bytes, respectively. Table 5.2 shows space overhead of generating encrypted tags and
trapdoors.
5.9.2 Optimisation and Scalability
Optimisation using Short Circuit Evaluation. The real bottleneck is matching
at brokers a set of encrypted policies against encrypted subscriptions. The large scale
124
CHAPTER 5. ENFORCING POLICIES IN DISTRIBUTED ENVIRONMENTS 125
matching requires efficiency and some optimisations. One of the optimisations at brokers
is implementation of short circuit evaluation for evaluating internal (i.e., non-leaf) nodes
of the encrypted policy tree including OR and AND gates. That is, if the node is an OR
gate then a broker can stop its evaluation and mark it satisfied once a single child node is
satisfied, without performing further matches. Similarly, a broker can mark an AND gate
unsatisfied when a single child node is marked unsatisfied. The short circuit evaluation
can significantly reduce number of encrypted matches at brokers. This might be useful for
the large policies involving a number of children in the policy tree. However, this might
not speed up the performance when the set of policies or the number of subscriptions is
very large.
Scalability. For matching a large set of encrypted policies against a large number of
encrypted subscriptions, PIDGIN can take into account additional information that can
drastically improve the overall performance. That is, a publisher can specify the content
creation date while a broker can log time when the content was received. A subscriber
can take advantage of this extra information by expressing additional constraints in sub-
scription. For instance, a subscriber can express her subscription as: all pieces of content
matching with my interest, where the content is created or received in last two hours. The
content creation date and the content received time may help brokers to check whether
subscriptions satisfy the published contents, without requiring encrypted matching. Fur-
thermore, a publisher can publish content with Time To Live (TTL), meaning brokers
should remove that particular piece of content after expiration of TTL. Similarly, sub-
scribers also can include TTL with subscriptions to indicate that brokers can remove
subscriptions from the network after expiration of TTL. The inclusion of TTL, in both
the content and the subscription, will reduce both computation and storage needs.
5.9.3 Key Management
Deployment in Practical Scenarios. There are various options to setup the TKMA,
an offline trusted entity that distributes keying material. It mainly depends on the sce-
nario for which PIDGIN is deployed. For instance, for the military scenarios, it can be
administrated by a military headquarter; similarly, in organisations, the admin depart-
ment can manage it. However, it is challenging to setup the TKMA for various civilian
applications. For those kinds of applications, the town or city administration could be
one option. For emerging scenarios, such as social events, the organising authorities (such
as event organisers) might own the TKMA.
Distributed TKMA. Without loss of generality, we can make the TKMA distributed.
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126 5.10. RELATED WORK
There are two main types of keys that are generated by the TKMA, the CP-ABE and the
search keys. There are alraedy solutions for setting up multi-authority ABE [116, 117],
where the CP-ABE key authorities can be distributed. Whereas, the key authority for
generating the search keys is inherently distributed.
5.10 Related Work
The problem of encrypted matching in opportunistic networks is an instance of the wider
problem of a search over encrypted data. Song et al. [35] propose a search scheme over
encrypted data based on symmetric keys. The symmetric nature of the scheme rules
out its applicability where mobile nodes communicate with each other without any prior
contacts. The PEKS scheme [36] supports a search on encrypted data in the public key
setting. In PIDGIN, we use the PEKS scheme as a building block; moreover, its usage
in isolation does not solve privacy and confidentiality issues in opportunistic networks
because it lacks the ability to regulate access on content while providing collusion-resistant
decryption keys.
The ABE schemes can regulate access to content while guaranteeing collusion resis-
tance. However, both variants of ABE including CP-ABE [47] and KP-ABE [49] do not
protect the policies and attributes associated with content, respectively. In PIDGIN,
we use CP-ABE [47] as a building block but only after we protect the policies because
the original CP-ABE scheme does not specifically protect them. The complimentary
KP-ABE [49] scheme does not protect attributes. While, Goyal et al. leave the problem
of encrypted attributes as open [49], we address this challenging issue in this chapter.
ESPOON [28] can protect security policies in outsourced environments. In [75],
we propose ESPOONERBAC that extends ESPOON with Encrypted Role-Based Access
Control (ERBAC) that is deployable in outsourced environments. However, these solu-
tions [28, 75, 112] assume no collusion between a user and a server. Thus, none of these
solutions [28, 75, 112] are applicable to opportunistic networks in which each node can
serve as all three roles including publisher, broker and subscriber.
There are schemes that protect policies [22, 23, 118, 119] and assume that the policy
is evaluated at the receiver’s end. Furthermore, schemes offering hidden credentials [51]
and hidden policies [120] assume direct interaction between the sender and the receiving
parties. Unfortunately, all such schemes cannot work in opportunistic networks where
policy enforcement is delegated to untrusted brokers.
Shikfa et al. [24] propose a method that provides privacy and confidentiality in context-
based forwarding. However, their method is a different dimension of work than ours. In
fact, their proposed scheme disseminates information in one direction, i.e., from publishers,
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without taking into account whether a subscriber is interested or not. In other words,
it does not provide opportunity for a subscriber to subscribe. Moreover, our proposed
scheme regulates access to content while offering more expressive and fine-grained policies
as compared to the one proposed in [24].
Nabeel et al. [121] provide a solution for preserving privacy in content based publish-
subscribe systems. In their approach, brokers in outsourced environments make routing
decisions without knowing the content. However, they assume that subscribers get reg-
istered with publishers prior to any communication and publishers share the symmetric
key with subscribers. This solution cannot work in opportunistic network settings where
loosely-coupled publishers and subscribers do not require any registration or key sharing
with each other.
In the context of publish-subscribe systems, there are many solutions that address
privacy and security issues [25–27]. However, state-of-the-art techniques are mainly based
on centralised solutions that cannot be applied to opportunistic networks, where each node
may serve as a publisher, a broker and a subscriber.
5.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented PIDGIN, a privacy preserving interest and content sharing scheme
for opportunistic networks. In PIDGIN, access policies are enforced by brokers such that
they neither learn content and associated policies nor compromise privacy of subscribers.
To show the feasibility of our approach, we implemented PIDGIN and evaluated its per-
formance by measuring the overhead incurred by cryptographic operations when run on
a smartphone.
In Chapter 2-4, we have investigated how to enforce sensitive security policies in out-
sourced environments while this chapter has addressed how sensitive policies can be en-
forced in distributed environments. Hence, we covered enforcement of sensitive security
policies in both outsourced and distributed environments. In the next chapter, we sum-
marise our contributions and highlight some directions for future work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we have addressed a fundamental issue of establishing trust in un-
trusted environments by protecting access policies and data. In particular, we have investi-
gated how to enforce sensitive policies in outsourced and distributed environments. In our
approach, the data is encrypted under expressive access control policies that are attached
with the encrypted data. Our proposed mechanisms enforce those policies such that pri-
vate information is not revealed during the policy deployment and evaluation phases.
Furthermore, we offer the full-fledged RBAC mechanism (including role hierarchies and
dynamic security constraints) for large enterprises with complex user management.
In our work, we have presented some motivational scenarios. Besides what we have
considered, there could be other application scenarios as well. For data outsourcing, we
can imagine investigation and security agencies that might require data protection, as well
as secure enforcement of sensitive policies. Similarly, we can apply our policy enforcement
mechanism in opportunistic networks to report and control crimes in developing countries,
where the Internet connectivity is poor or unaffordable. In developed countries, we can
think of more sophisticated use cases, such as partially offloading the central Content
Delivery Network (CDN) by employing our proposed mechanism so that subscribers can
download content from neighbourhood, thus reducing the burden on the centralised server.
In this chapter, we briefly summarise the research contributions of the dissertation
and outline some future directions emerging from this work.
6.1 Summary of the Contributions
The core contributions of this dissertation are stated as follows:
ESPOON: Enforcement of Sensitive Policies in Outsourced Environments. In
Chapter 2, we have addressed the challenging issue of enforcing sensitive policies in out-
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sourced environments while protecting confidentiality of access policies. Our proposed
solution, ESPOON, provides a clear separation between security policies and the enforce-
ment mechanism. ESPOON does not reveal private information about access policies
or the access request. In fact, we implement ESPOON as an outsourced service with-
out compromising the confidentiality of policies under the assumption that the service
provider is honest-but-curious. Furthermore, ESPOON supports contextual conditions
and incorporates contextual information during the policy evaluation phase. Contextual
conditions are expressive because they include non-monotonic boolean expressions and
range queries. The system entities do not share any keys; therefore, if a user is deleted
or revoked, the system is still able to perform its operations without requiring any re-
encryption of policies. Last but not least, we have implemented a prototype of ESPOON
to measure overheads incurred by cryptographic operations during the policy deployment
and evaluation phases.
ESPOONERBAC : Supporting RBAC Policies and Role Hierarchies. In Chap-
ter 3, we have extended ESPOON with RBAC policies and proposed ESPOONERBAC .
In ESPOONERBAC , users are assigned roles and permissions are assigned to roles. A
user can execute the permission if she is active in a role managed by the session main-
tained in outsourced environments. Besides the basic RBAC policies, ESPOONERBAC
incorporates roles hierarchies, where roles can be inherited. For developing prototype of
ESPOONERBAC , we have extended prototype of ESPOON. Finally, we have measured the
computational overheads incurred by ESPOONERBAC operations.
E-GRANT: Facilitating RBAC with Dynamic Constraints. In Chapter 4, we
have focused on the enforcement of dynamic security constraints without revealing sensi-
tive information to the untrusted infrastructure. The dynamic constraints include DSoD
and CW. For enforcement of dynamic constraints, we have developed E-GRANT. E–
GRANT can seamlessly be integrated with ESPOONERBAC . Finally, we have developed
the prototype and reported performance overhead of E-GRANT.
We would like to mention that ESPOON, ESPOONERBAC and E-GRANT can be de-
ployed as SaaS.
PIDGIN: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in Opportunistic Networks.
In Chapter 5, we have investigated how to exchange content and interest without (i)
providing any access to unauthorised brokers and compromising privacy of subscribers.
The solution we propose is PIDGIN that aims at regulating access by encrypting content
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using CP-ABE policies. The CP-ABE policies are very expressive and specify who can
gain access to content. In PIDGIN, CP-ABE policies and tag associated with content are
further encrypted using the PEKS scheme. Therefore, brokers match subscriber’s inter-
est against content polices without compromising privacy of subscribers. Furthermore,
unauthorised brokers do not gain access to content and nodes gain access to content if
they satisfy fine-grained policies specified by the publishers. Moreover, the system pro-
vides a scalable key management, where loosely-coupled publishers and subscribers do
not share any keys. Finally, we have developed a prototype of PIDGIN and analysed the
performance of involved cryptographic algorithms by running PIDGIN on smartphones.
6.2 Future Directions
The research work described in this dissertation can be extended along several directions.
Accountable Access Control Mechanisms. In this dissertation, we have proposed
how sensitive policies can be enforced. One possible direction of future research is to
explore ways of making the enforcement architecture accountable in untrusted environ-
ments, thus preventing service providers (or brokers) to repudiate the operations that have
been performed. The mechanism should allow service providers to generate genuine audit
logs without revealing private information about both data and access policies. However,
an auditing authority must be able to retrieve information about who accessed the data
and what policy was enforced against any access request.
Negative Authorisation Policies and Conflict Resolution. In our proposed so-
lutions, we have considered positive authorisation policies in untrusted environments. It
would be interesting to investigate how to support negative authorisation policies. Since
negative and positive authorisation policies might raise conflicts, conflict resolution of
policies in untrusted environments might be another interesting topic of research.
Making Policy Outsourcing Distributed. Another substantial part of our future
research aims at re-engineering the architecture in a distributed manner in order to run
several instances of the proposed system on multiple nodes of the service provider. One
of the key aspects here is to adapt the number of instances to the actual request load
for offering a reasonable Quality of Service (QoS) without over-provisioning the resources.
Scalable and Collusion-Resistant Access Control Models. Generally, access con-
trol models in the literature are only either scalable or collusion-resistant. In our view,
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proposing a scalable and collusion-resistant access model for outsourced environments is
still an open challenge. Besides that, developing an efficient cryptographic construction
and implementing it efficiently are also among open research challenges.
Protection of Policy Structure. In our proposed mechanisms, we express an access
control policy as a tree, where leaf nodes of the tree are encrypted while internal nodes
(including AND, OR and threshold gates) are in cleartext. Protection of this policy
structure is also an open challenge. More specifically, it is a challenging issue to support
expressive access control policies such that service providers do not learn any information
about structure of policies being enforced.
Key Revocation in Distributed Settings. In distributed settings (including op-
portunistic networks), revoking a key is quite problematic. The issue is that one cannot
inform all nodes about keys that have been revoked because there is no centralised au-
thority for management of key revocation. That is, the key revocation information could
epidemically be disseminated only through nodes, say from a group of nodes to other
nodes in the network. We believe that investigating an approach to efficiently address the
key revocation problem would make distributed networks more practical.
Efficient Pairing Implementation. As evident from the performance evaluation, the
real bottleneck is the overhead incurred by pairing operations at brokers in opportunistic
networks. Basically, an efficient pairing implementation would drastically improve the
performance of the system. As future work, we would investigate possible optimisations
and the use of an efficient pairing implementation, such as the one proposed in [122].
Alternatively, we can consider implementation of cryptographic constructs at processor
level, i.e., support of pairing operations in a cryptographic processor.
6.3 Closing Remarks
This work has appeared in international journals, conferences and workshops (See Ap-
pendix A). In particular, the basic architecture for enforcing sensitive security policies
in outsourced environments has been presented in [28]. The proposed architecture has
been extended to support RBAC style of access policies in outsourced environments and
is described in [75, 76]. The work on enforcing RBAC in outsourced environments has
further been extended by incorporating security constraints in RBAC, which is presented
in [89]. The data protection issues have been tackled in [73, 123]. The scenario based se-
curity and privacy issues have been listed in [124]. For brevity reasons, we have included
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only the research work that fall within the core topic of this dissertation and excluded
some published work [73, 123, 124]. Finally, the issue of policies and data protection in
distributed environments has been analysed and addressed in [125].
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ESPOONERBAC : Enforcing Security Policies in Outsourced Environ-
ments, Elsevier Computers & Security (COSE), volume 35, pages 2-24, 2013. One
of three papers from ARES 2011 invited to this journal.
Abstract: Data outsourcing is a growing business model offering services to indi-
viduals and enterprises for processing and storing a huge amount of data. It is not
only economical but also promises higher availability, scalability, and more effective
quality of service than in-house solutions. Despite all its benefits, data outsourc-
ing raises serious security concerns for preserving data confidentiality. There are
solutions for preserving confidentiality of data while supporting search on the data
stored in outsourced environments. However, such solutions do not support access
policies to regulate access to a particular subset of the stored data.
For complex user management, large enterprises employ Role-Based Access Con-
trol (RBAC) models for making access decisions based on the role in which a
user is active in. However, RBAC models cannot be deployed in outsourced en-
vironments as they rely on trusted infrastructure in order to regulate access to
the data. The deployment of RBAC models may reveal private information about
sensitive data they aim to protect. In this chapter, we aim at filling this gap by
proposing ESPOONERBAC for enforcing RBAC policies in outsourced environ-
ments. ESPOONERBAC enforces RBAC policies in an encrypted manner where a
curious service provider may learn a very limited information about RBAC poli-
cies. We have implemented ESPOONERBAC and provided its performance evalua-
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tion showing a limited overhead, thus confirming viability of our approach.
Keywords: Encrypted RBAC, Policy Protection, Sensitive Policy Evaluation, Se-
cure Cloud Storage, Confidentiality
2. Muhammad Rizwan Asghar, Mihaela Ion, Giovanni Russello, Bruno Crispo,
E-GRANT: Enforcing Encrypted Dynamic Security Constraints in the
Cloud, 2013. (In submission).
Abstract: Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm offering outsourced services
to enterprises for storing and processing huge amount of data at very competitive
costs. For leveraging the cloud to its fullest potential, organisations require security
mechanisms to regulate access on data, particularly at runtime. One of the strong
obstacles in widespread adoption of the cloud is to preserve confidentiality of the
data. In fact, confidentiality of the data can be guaranteed by employing exist-
ing encryption schemes; however, access control mechanisms might leak information
about the data they aim to protect. State of the art access control mechanisms can
statically enforce constraints such as static separation of duties. The major research
challenge is to enforce constraints at runtime, i.e., enforcement of dynamic security
constraint (including Dynamic Separation of Duties and Chinese Wall) in the cloud.
The main challenge lies in the fact that dynamic security constraints require notion
of sessions for managing access histories that might leak information about the sen-
sitive data if they are available as cleartext in the cloud. In this chapter, we present
E-GRANT: an architecture able to enforce dynamic security constraints without
relying on a trusted infrastructure, which can be deployed as SaaS. In E-GRANT,
sessions’ access histories are encrypted in such a way that enforcement of constraints
is still possible. As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented a prototype and provide
a preliminary performance analysis showing a limited overhead, thus confirming the
feasibility of our approach.
Keywords: Secure Cloud Services, Sensitive Dynamic Constraints, Encrypted DSoD,
Encrypted Chinese Wall, SaaS Enforcement Mechanism
In International Conferences and Workshops
3. Muhammad Rizwan Asghar, Ashish Gehani, Giovanni Russello, Bruno Crispo,
PIDGIN: Privacy-preserving Interest and Content Sharing in Oppor-
tunistic Networks, 2013. (In submission).
Abstract: Opportunistic networks have recently received considerable attention
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from both industry and researchers. These networks can be used for many appli-
cations without the need for a dedicated IT infrastructure. In the context of op-
portunistic networks, the application to content sharing in particular has attracted
specific attention. To support content sharing, opportunistic networks may imple-
ment a publish-subscribe system in which users may publish their own content and
indicate interest in other content through subscription. Using a smartphone, any
user can act as a broker by opportunistically forwarding both published content and
interest within the network. Unfortunately, despite their provision of this great flex-
ibility, opportunistic networks raise serious privacy and security issues. Untrusted
brokers can not only compromise the privacy of subscribers by learning their inter-
est but also can gain unauthorised access to the disseminated content. This chapter
addresses the research challenges inherent to the exchange of content and interest
without: (i) compromising the privacy of subscribers and (ii) providing unauthorised
access to untrusted brokers. Specifically, this chapter presents an interest and con-
tent sharing solution that addresses these security challenges and preserves privacy
in opportunistic networks. We demonstrated the feasibility and efficiency of this
solution by implementing a prototype and analysing its performance on real smart
phones.
Keywords: Secure Opportunistic Networks, Privacy-preserving Content Sharing,
Sensitive Policy Enforcement, Encrypted CP-ABE Policies, Secure Haggle
4. Muhammad Rizwan Asghar, Giovanni Russello, Bruno Crispo, Mihaela Ion,
Supporting Complex Queries and Access Policies for Multi-user En-
crypted Databases, In Proceedings of The 5th ACM Workshop on Cloud Comput-
ing Security Workshop (CCSW) in conjunction with the 20th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Berlin, Germany, November 2013.
Abstract: Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm offering companies (virtually)
unlimited data storage and computation at attractive costs. It is a cost-effective
model because it does not require deployment and maintenance of any dedicated
IT infrastructure. Despite its benefits, it introduces new challenges for protecting
the confidentiality of the data. Sensitive data like medical records, business or gov-
ernmental data cannot be stored unencrypted on the cloud. Companies need new
mechanisms to control access to the outsourced data and allow users to query the
encrypted data without revealing sensitive information to the cloud provider. State-
of-the-art schemes do not allow complex encrypted queries over encrypted data in
a multi-user setting. Instead, those are limited to keyword searches or conjunctions
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piece of data has been produced. It is vital for a post-incident investigation, widely
used in healthcare, scientific collaboration, forensic analysis and legal proceedings.
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